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CrI.O.P.No.292 of 2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

RESERVED ON : 17.08.2023

PRONOUNCED ON: 25.09.2023

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.SIVAGNANAM

CrI.O.P.No.292 of 2019

and

CrI.M.P.Nos.142, 12084 & 12087 of 2019

1. K. Thiruththaninathan

2. Karthikeyan

3. Mallika Kaarthikeyan

...

Petitioners

/vs/

Malliga Murugaraj

...

Respondent

Prayer : Criminal Original Petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to call for the records in C.C.No.8886 of 2018 on the file of the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai and quash the same.



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For Petitioner ... Mr. C. Munusamy
for Mr.R.Arun Dattan

For Respondent ... Mr. M.Suresh Viswanath

ORDER

Challenging the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.8886 of 2018 on the file of the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai the present criminal original petition has been filed.

2. The case of the respondent/complainant is as follows:-

The first petitioner/first accused is the husband of the complainant/wife. Both of them loved each other and got married on 15.03.2007, which was registered under the Hindu Marriage Act before the Registrar office, Chennai Central, in serial No.141 of 2007 and M.C.No.720 of 2007. After marriage, the complaint/2nd respondent and the petitioner/accused were working in a private concerned in Chennai. Subsequently, went to Singapore, where both of them were employed at Rotary Engineering Private Limited. After 3 years of marriage, the first



petitioner/husband forced the complainant to resign her job and assured that he would also resign his job and would make arrangements for daily employment for both of them in some other Company in Singapore. But, the first petitioner/husband continued his employment. The complainant/wife after resigning her job, returned to India. After returning to India, the complainant/wife did not get any support from the accused to meet her basic needs and found more defect to get a new employment. Thereafter, she visited Singapore on a tourist visa on 14.01.2016. But the first petitioner/husband never allowed her in their residence at Singapore. Therefore, she stayed in her friend's house. Then return back to India. Meanwhile the first petitioner/husband initiated divorce proceedings in case no. FC/D 395 of 2016 before the Family Justice Courts of the Republic, Singapore to declare their marriage as null and void and since she had not defended the case proceedings, it was decreed exparte on 23.06.2016. The first peitioner by furnishing false facts obtained exparte degree of divorce. The petitioners cheated the complainant / wife and her valuables are with the petitioners and they had taken away of her valuables, jewells, certificates and documents. They left her in a helpless



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condition. Therefore, the petitioners committed the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 r/w. 34 of IPC.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after marriage, both of them got employment in a private engineering company and settled their matrimonial home at_Aminjikarai, Chennai. Thereafter, the first petitioner/husband got a job at Singapore in the month of September, 2012 and the respondent/complainant also followed him in the month of October 2012 and they they were living at Singapore. During the year 2014, the respondent/complainant tendered her resignation and wanted to go back to India as she did not want to live with the first petitioner. The first petitioner has filed the petition for divorce before the Family Court at Singapore on 25.01.2016 since the marriage has broken down irretrievably and after filing counter by the respondent/complainant, divorce has been granted on 23.06.2016 by the Singapore Court . After filing counter statement before the Singapore Court, the respondent came to India and filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights before the I Additional Family Court at Chennai in FCOP No.794 of 2016 amongst



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other relief on 17.02.2016 and the same is dismissed on 14.09.2018.

Furthermore, the respondent/complainant had filed the case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act on 29.02.2016 before the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Chennai a DVC No.2 of 2016 for the same reliefs sought for in the Family Court at Chennai except the relief of restitution of conjugal rights as against her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. The petitioners have filed Crl.O.P.No.26537 of 2016 before this Court to quash the proceedings in DVC and the same has been quashed by this Court. While being so, the respondent has again filed the present complaint CC No.8886 of 2018 under Section 200 Cr.P.C for alleged offences under Sections 420, 406 r/w.section 34 of IPC.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the first petitioner is living in Singapore from the year 2012. The first petitioner/husband and the respondent/wife are living separately for a long period. The petitioners 2 and 3 are father and mother of the first petitioner/husband. The allegation in the complaints are false one. The petitioner raised the same allegations second time in this private complaint.




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The earlier complaint in DV case No.2 of 2016 was quashed by this court.

Therefore, the criminal proceedings as against the petitioners are not maintainable and liable to be quashed.

5. To support his argument, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **2010(7) SCC 667 (Preeti Gupta and another /vs/ State of Jharkhand and another) , 2022 (7) SCC 124 (Vijay Kumar Ghai and others /vs/ State of West Bengal and others).**

6. The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant submitted that this criminal original petition is not maintainable . The petitioners committed the offences punishable under Section 420, 406 r/w. 34 of IPC. The first petitioner/husband obtained an exparte degree by alleging false facts before the Singapore Court. Quashing of DVC case in DVC No.2 of 2016 is not a bar to file a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C for the alleged offences under Sections 420, 406 r/w. 34 of IPC and thus pleaded to dismiss the criminal original petition.



8. On perusal of the complaint and material papers, the fact reveals that the first petitioner is the husband of the complainant, 2nd and 3rd petitioners are father and mother of the first petitioner. The first petitioner and the complainant's marriage was a love marriage and their marriage held on 15.03.2007, which was registered under the Hindu Marriage Act before the Registrar of Marriage at the Joint Sub-Registrar Office, Chennai Central under Registration office serial no.1441 of 2007 and M.C.No.788 of 2007. Further the fact reveals that after marriage, both of them went to Singapore and were employed at Rotary Engineering Private Limited. Thereafter, the complainant returned to India from Singapore on 28.11.2014. Again, she visited Singapore on tourist visa on 14.01.2016 Further the fact reveals that the first petitioner filed a divorce petition before the Singapore Court in case No.FC/D 395/2016 and an exparte decree was passed on 23.06.2016 and these facts are not in dispute. Thereafter, the



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complainant filed a petition for restitution of conjugal right before the I Additional Family Court, Chennai in FCOP No.794 of 2016 besides sought other reliefs on 17.02.2016 and the same was dismissed on 14.09.2018. Further, the fact reveals that the complainant had also filed a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act on 29.02.2016 before the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai in DVC No.2 of 2006 for the same relief sought for in the Family Court, which was questioned in Crl.O.P.No.26537 of 2016 and the same was quashed. Thereafter, this private complaint has been filed in CC No.8886 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 420, 406 r/w.34 IPC.

9. Multiple complaints given for the same charge against the same accused in respect of the same incident is impermissible. Further, on perusal of the records, it reveals that the complainant suppressed the material facts with regard to the earlier DV Act case in DVC No.2 of 2016 against the petitioners and remained silent with regard to dismissal of her petition before the Family Court for conjugal rights. When the complainant have to disclose the details of the legal proceedings and litigations within the knowledge, but, in this case the complainant failed.



10. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed in detail about the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C in the following cases:

- (i) ***R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab*** reported in ***AIR 1960 SC 866***
- (ii) ***State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors.*** reported in ***AIR 1992 SC 604***
- (iii) ***M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.*** reported in ***2021 SCC Online SC 315***

10.1. In the case of ***R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab*** reported in ***AIR 1960 SC 866***, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

“6. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the



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Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.”



10.2. Further, in the case of ***State of Haryana & Ors. Vs.***

Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in ***AIR 1992 SC 604***, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued seven guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in the exercise of its inherent power vested by Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR/complaint, which are as follows:

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.



(7) *Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.*”

10.3. Similarly, in the case of ***M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315***, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:

“80., our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the [Constitution of India](#) and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the [Constitution of India](#), our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the [Code of Criminal Procedure](#) contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).



v) *While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;*

vi) *Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;*

vii) *Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;*

viii) *Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;*

ix) *The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;*

x) *Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;*

xi) *Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;*

xii) *The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;*

xiii) *The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;*



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xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to



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hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

11. On perusal of the impugned complaint, it seems that the criminal proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreck vengeance on the accused persons due to the private and personal grudge. Therefore, it meet the parameter laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court . Hence, continuing the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.8886 of 2008 on the file of the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai is unfair and it is appropriate to quash the complaint against the petitioners and the same is liable to be dismissed.

12. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed and the criminal proceeding against the petitioners in C.C.No.8886 of 2018 on the



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file of the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai is quashed

Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

Index : Yes/No

Internet : Yes/No

mrp

25.09.2023

To
The Metropolitan Magistrate,
XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet,
Chennai.



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V.SIVAGNANAM ,J.

mrp

Pre-delivery order made in
CrI.O.P.No.292 of 2019

25.09.2023