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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of Decision: 4th January, 2022

+ **W.P.(C) 6999/2015**

SCHOOL OF OPEN LEARNING Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mohinder J.S.Rupal, Advocate
versus

AJAY SHANKAR SAXENA Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajrishi, Advocate

CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)

1. This hearing has been done through video conferencing.
2. The present petition challenges the impugned award dated 7th April, 2015 by which the Labour Court has awarded compensation to the Respondent-Workman (*hereinafter* “*Workman*”), in **ID No.461/04 (Old LID No. 84/87)** in *Ajay Shankar v. School of Correspondence Courses and Continuing Education (Presently known as School of Open Learning, University of Delhi)*, in the following terms:

“In my considered opinion, in the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, grant of lump sum compensation equivalent to 50% of full back wages/full salary of workman in the scale for the post workman was holding as on 15.09.1982 (the last date on which workman was on sanctioned leave without pay) alongwith annual/other increments in salary as per University Non-teaching Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1971 sine 05.01.1983 (on which date workman had reported for duty but was not allowed to join the duties) till the date of his retirement as per University Non-Teaching Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service)



Rules, 1971 to the workman for illegal/unjustified termination of his services by the management and for consequences thereof would meet the ends of justice. If this lumpsum compensation is not paid to workman within one month of award coming into force management shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum on this amount from the date of the award till its payment. A sum of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) is also awarded to workman as costs of litigation payable by the management.”

3. The Workman had joined the Petitioner-Management (*hereinafter* “*Management*”) as a clerk-cum-typist on 1st June, 1966. He was thereafter appointed as an Assistant in 1971 against a temporary leave vacancy. The Management had then extended the Workman’s probationary period and a decision was taken on 20th March, 1975 to not confirm the Workman as Assistant and he was reverted to the original post of clerk-cum-typist w.e.f. 21st March, 1975. This was challenged by way of a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, bearing ***Civil Writ Petition No. 1348/1976***, which was dismissed and the services of the Workman were then placed on a temporary basis between October, 1977 and July, 1978 and against the substantive post of Assistant w.e.f. 1st August, 1978, on purely temporary and humanitarian grounds. Between 1980 to 1982 the case of the Management is that the Workman was irregular and his attendance was erratic and he also evaded the receipt of letters sent by the Management. For the period between 16th September, 1982 and 1st January, 1983, it is alleged that there was absence from duty for a period of 108 days. Relying upon Rule 49(v) of the University Non-Teaching Employees (Terms & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1971 (*hereinafter* “*University Employees Rules*”) the Management treated the Workman as absconding from duties and deemed the services of



the Workman as terminated on 1st January 1983, however, w.e.f. 16th September, 1982, i.e., the date from when he remained absent.

4. The Workman filed a claim before the Ministry of Labour, GNCTD seeking reference for adjudication by the Labour Court. The same was initially dismissed on 21st April, 1993, when the Labour Court passed a 'No Dispute Award'. However, an application for setting aside the award was filed by the Workman. Again, due to non-prosecution, a 'No Dispute Award' was passed on 1st February, 2000. Finally, another application was moved by the Workman seeking setting aside of the said award which was set aside on 8th March, 2001. Thereafter, the Labour Court proceeded with the matter. Parties filed their respective documents and led evidence. At one stage in the proceedings, the Management was also proceeded *ex parte*, vide order dated 22nd February, 2007. However, finally by the impugned award, the Workman was held to have been terminated illegally. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the primary ground on which the termination has been held to be illegal is because of the fact that no domestic inquiry was conducted and no-show cause notice was issued.

5. Mr. Rupal, Id. counsel appearing for the Management, relies upon Rule 49 (v) of the University Employees Rules, to argue that as per the said Rule, there is a deemed termination whenever non-teaching staff absent themselves without prior permission. He submits that in the cross-examination, the Workman had clearly admitted that he had absented himself without any sanction. He relies upon the fact that detailed evidence was led before the Labour Court. Therefore, he submits that even if the domestic inquiry was not held due to the operation of the said Rule, since the Management had led detailed evidence, filed various documents and the



witnesses as well as the Workman's admission, had also established the unauthorised absence of the Workman, the Labour Court could not have held the termination to be invalid merely on the ground that domestic inquiry was not held. He relies upon the following judgments in order to submit that even when domestic inquiry is not held, if the parties led evidence, the Labour Court ought to consider the same:

- (i) ***Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, 1972 1 SCC 595;***
- (ii) ***State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati 2021 (3) SCC 108*** at paragraph 14; and
- (iii) ***NDMC v. Hari Ram Tiwari, 2020 (4) LLJ 459 (Delhi).***

6. On the other hand, Mr. Rajrishi, Id. counsel appearing for the Workman, submits that the termination was completely violative of the principles of natural justice. No show cause notice was also issued. He relies upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court dealing with this very rule in ***University of Delhi v. Suresh Chand, 138 (2007) DLT 459***, to argue that the principles of natural justice are in-built in this particular rule. He submits that since notice was also not issued by the Management, the Labour Court was justified in holding that the termination as illegal. In addition, the submission of Mr. Rajrishi is that the Management in its written statement did not take a stand that it wishes to justify the Workman's termination by leading evidence before the Labour Court and therefore cannot now claim that the evidence should have been considered by the Labour Court.

7. This Court has heard the counsels for the parties and has perused the judgments on record. The position that is admitted on record is that the Workman was unauthorisedly absent. The said admission is set out in the



impugned award, as extracted from the cross-examination of the Workman, which is set out below:

“In the course of arguments ld. counsel for management referred upon to following depositions made by workman in his cross-examination:-

“....It is correct that my services were terminated by the Managing Committee. Vol the letter of termination was signed by the Chairman. It is correct that I took 108 days leaves from 16.09.1982 to 05.01.1983. It is correct that the managing committee did not sanction 108 days leaves which I took from 16.9.1982 to 05.01.1983....”

Above depositions of workman do not help the management in any manner inasmuch as management terminated the services of workman without complying with the principles of natural justice.”

8. From the above extract, it is clear that the Management had not sanctioned the leave which was taken by the Workman and he was absent for 108 days from 16th September, 1982 to 5th (sic 1st) January, 1983.

9. A perusal of the impugned award also shows that detailed evidence was led both by the Workman as also the Management in order to justify their respective stands. On the one hand, the stand of the Workman was that there were various medical grounds which justified his absence. On the other hand, the Management's evidence was to the effect that various letters were sought to be served upon the Workman which were not accepted by him and no reply was received. The exhibits of the Workman ranged from WW1/1 till WW1/31. On the other hand, Management filed MW1/1 till MW1/60. Respective witnesses had also appeared and they were cross-examined before the Labour Court. However, while recording all the factual background and the procedural background of the proceedings, the Labour



Court in its findings has merely relied upon the fact that no notice was issued and no domestic inquiry was held, to hold that the termination was illegal. The Labour Court did not go into the question as to whether the Workman was able to make out any case for justifying the absence and neither was the Management's stand in respect of the Workman evading service of various letters prior to his termination, etc., considered by the Labour Court. The relevant extract from the impugned award reads as under:

"In the totality of facts and circumstances of this case much importance need not be attached as to whether workman moved any leave applications such as EX.WW1/8 or Ex.WW1/9 inasmuch as admittedly managing committee did not sanction 108 days leaves which workman took from 16.09.1982 to 05.01.1893. The question which requires determination, as already noted, is whether action of management in terminating the services of workman on account of workman remaining absent without prior permission during the period from 16.09.1982 till 01.01.1983 is legal/justified or not. When admittedly there is no prior permission, as required, effect/consequences is same in both the situations (i.e. whether workman moved the application or not).

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Memorandum Ex.MW1/53 dated 01.01.1983 vide which services of workman were terminated w.e.f. 16.09.1982 also suggest that workman was not allowed/sanctioned extra-ordinary leave from 16.09.1982 to 31.12.1982.

Objection taken by workman to the exhibition of Ex.MW1/52 is without any substance inasmuch as workman is also relying upon same document which has been exhibited by workman as Ex.WW1/13. Also it is noted that original signed



copy of document exhibited as Ex.MW1/52 is also available on judicial file and the same is mark as Mark 'AB' for identification purposes. The case laws reported as Mahesh Chand Vs. DTC (supra.) and DTC Vs. Sardar Singh (supra.) relied upon by Id. counsel for management have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case inasmuch as in this case no domestic enquiry was conducted by management. Management even did not serve any show cause notice to the workman for his absence during the period from 16.09.1982 till 01.01.1983 on account of which services of workman were terminated. Ld. counsel for management had submitted that even if management did not conduct the domestic enquiry or issue show cause notice, now this court can determine the validity of act of management in terminating the services of workman by itself (i.e. this Labour Court) placing in the same position as that of disciplinary authority / managing committee. In this regard Id. counsel for management relied upon case law reported as The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Its workmen (supra.).

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The case law The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Its workmen (supra.) relied upon by Id. counsel for management has no application in the totality of facts and circumstances of this case. Management admittedly acted in violation of principles of natural justice. Here it is not the case that management acted without proper enquiry or permission during the pendency of dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Also, it deserves to be noted that this Court has already observed that depositions made by workman in his evidence affidavit Ex.WW1/A paras. 4 to 6 have gone totally



unrebutted / unchallenged. Thus, version of workman that workman was under treatment and circumstances were beyond his control cannot be discarded altogether.

In view of above detailed discussion, it is observed that management terminated the services of workman illegally / unjustifiably.”

10. From the above discussion, it is clear that the primary ground for the Labour Court holding that the termination is illegal, was that there was violation of principles of natural justice as no domestic enquiry was conducted. The Labour Court, thus observed in passing, that the Workman's stand that he was undergoing treatment cannot be disregarded altogether. Thus, it held that the termination was illegal and unjustified. There is, however, no discussion in respect of the detailed evidence of the Management or the Workman.

11. Such an approach of not considering evidence in absence of a domestic enquiry is clearly contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court as held in ***Sureshwati (supra)***, which is set out below.

“14. This Court has in a catena of decisions held that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissal or discharge of a workman, it is open for him to justify the action before the Labour Court by leading evidence before it. The entire matter would be open before the tribunal, which would have the jurisdiction to satisfy itself on the evidence adduced by the parties whether the dismissal or discharge was justified. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Workmen of the Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory MANU/SC/0238/1965 : AIR 1965 SC 1803 held that:

11. It is now well settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before



the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic enquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open before the tribunal which will have jurisdiction not only to go into the limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic enquiry has been properly held (see Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Workmen MANU/SC/0084/1957 : AIR 1958 SC 130) but also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was justified.....

Subsequently in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh MANU/SC/0423/1972 : (1972) 1 SCC 595 this Court held that:

(1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the management, or if the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled to straightway adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. The Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and give a decision thereon. In such a case, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as the employer himself does not rely on it.

.....

Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. The Management of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. and Ors. MANU/SC/0305/1973 : (1973) 1 SCC 813 wherein the broad principle regarding holding of the enquiry were spelt out as:

32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge:



(1) *The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified.*

(2) *Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality.*

(3) *When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide.*

(4) *Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra.*

(5) *The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions*



does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry.

(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective.

(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective.

(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct.

.....

40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction Under Section 11-A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.



.....To come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to re-appraise the evidence for itself.....”

12. Therefore, it is clear that the Labour Court erred in not considering the evidence placed before it by both parties and holding the termination as illegal primarily due to the absence of a domestic enquiry.

13. Now the question that arises is, whether this Court ought to remand back the matter to the Labour Court or consider the matter on merits. In order to decide this question, this Court takes note of the following relevant factors:

- (i) The first and the most important fact being that the Workman would have superannuated as of 2008. He is 72-73 years old and is a senior citizen.
- (ii) The admitted position of unauthorized absence is clearly there on record.
- (iii) The Workman was obviously conscious of Rule 49(v) of the University Employees Rules which provided that unauthorized absence would not be permissible and there would be ‘*deemed termination*’.
- (iv) However, the Management also ought to have issued a notice in the present case before terminating the Workman in terms of the judgment in ***Suresh Chand (supra)***. The relevant extract of this decision is as below:

“9. The respondent was governed by rules of services. Rule 49(2)(v) of the Service Rules reads as under: Except for valid reasons and/or unforeseen contingencies, no employees shall be absent from duty without prior permission. Where an employee absents



himself from duty without prior permission for a continuous period of 90 dates, he shall be treated as absconding from duty and his service be deemed as 'terminated'.

10. In terms of this Rule, the respondent's Explanation only could be considered in respect of the unforeseen contingencies. Where the respondent did not reply to the notices and did not report before the CMO despite directions by the University, the only inference which could be drawn by the University was that there was no unforeseen contingency for the absence of the respondent and the respondent was unauthorizedly absent. There is another important factor. The respondent was entitled to medical facilities provided by the University. He, for his illness, did not go to panel doctor or to the doctors of the Delhi University. He obtained medical certificate from a private doctor where the illness recorded is anxiety and depression. I consider that there are very few persons today in Delhi or in India who are not suffering from one or the other anxiety or depression. If such medical certificates are acknowledged as valid medical certificates for long unauthorized absence, I consider no work can be done in any of the Government Departments. In fact, the over protectionism, which is being provided to the Government employees and other employees, has resulted into total fall in the efficiency and work culture in the Government offices. The appointment to the government services is being considered by the employees as a license to thwart the work culture and discipline of the organization. Thus the University was bound to reject such Explanation and medical certificate given by the respondent.

11. The plea of the respondent that he suffered an injury while going back from the University on 1.12.2000 is of no avail because the period of absence which has been considered by the University is from 10.4.1995 to 30th November, 1995 for which there was no Explanation



given by the respondent. Rule 49(2)(v) has not been held to be an invalid rule. The principles of natural justice are inbuilt in this rule as the University is bound to issue notice and consider the Explanation given by the employee for his absence due to unforeseen contingencies or valid reasons. The University can only give a show cause notice to the employee. The University cannot force an employee to reply to show cause notices. If no reply is given to the show cause notice, the responsibility of the University to comply with the principles of natural justices is over. If the University has acted in accordance with service rules, no fault can be found with the University. In D.K. Yadav's case 1993 3 SC 259, the Supreme Court held that Certified Standing Orders constitute statutory terms and conditions of the services and the employee is bound to such terms and conditions.

Although this statement of law was doubted in Rajasthan SRTC v. V Kumar MANU/SC/0786/1995 : (1995) IILL J728SC , but it was not deviated from. It was, however, made clear that the Certified Standing Orders do not stand as statutory conditions in the sense that dismissal or removal of an employee in contravention of Certified Standing Orders would be a contravention of statutory provisions enabling the workman to file writ petition for their enforcement. However, the respondent was bound by the rules of the University and the University has acted accordingly.”

The judgement of **Sureshchand** (*supra*) deals with the very rule relied upon by Mr. Rupal and holds that the principles of natural justice have to be read into the rule. Thus notice ought to have been issued to the workman before terminating him. No contrary opinion has been brought to the notice of the Court by Id. Counsel for the Management.

- (v) In this light, it is noted that there were various communications which were issued by the Management to the Workman, concerning his



absence, as is clear from the various exhibits which are on record. It is also candidly admitted by Id. Counsel for Management that no specific notice was issued prior to termination as the Management relied upon the Rule which provided for 'deemed termination' due to unauthorized absence. The other communications repeatedly calling upon the Workman to join back are not considered by the Labour Court.

- (vi) During the proceedings in the present writ petition, at one stage, the Court had also recorded on 14th January, 2020 that the Management was willing to offer a lumpsum compensation of Rs.5 lakhs, which was not accepted by the Workman as he demanded Rs. 6 lakhs instead.

14. In addition to these facts, this Court also takes note of the settled legal position where the Supreme Court has emphasized that in these kinds of disputes, where the termination is challenged, the Court ought to take a pragmatic view and it is not necessary that in every case reinstatement or complete back wages with perks and continuity of service ought to be granted. In various recent judgments in **Allahabad Bank & Ors. v. Krishan Pal Singh (SLP(C) No. 19648/2019, decided on 20th September 2021)** and in **Ranbir Singh v. Executive Eng. P.W.D. (Civil Appeal No. 4483/2010, decided on September 2, 2021)**, this position has been reiterated. For instance, the Court in **Allahabad Bank (supra)** held as under:

“8. The directions issued by the High Court of Allahabad for reinstatement were stayed by this Court on 23.08.2019. During the pendency of these proceedings, the respondent - workman had attained age of superannuation. Though, there was strong suspicion, there was no acceptable



evidence on record for dismissal of the workman. However, as the workman has worked only for a period of about six years and he has already attained the age of superannuation, it is a fit case for modification of the relief granted by the High Court. The reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic in every case, where termination / dismissal is found to be not in accordance with procedure prescribed under law. Considering that the respondent was in effective service of the Bank only for about six years and he is out of service since 1991, and in the meantime, respondent had attained age of superannuation, we deem it appropriate that ends of justice would be met by awarding lump sum monetary compensation. We accordingly direct payment of lump sum compensation of Rs.15 lakhs to the respondent, within a period of eight weeks from today. Failing to pay the same within the aforesaid period, the respondent is entitled for interest @ 6% per annum, till payment.”

15. Therefore, in the present case, in view of the facts recorded above, especially in view of the fact that no notice was issued prior to termination of services of the Workman by the Management and no useful purpose would be served in remanding the matter back to the Labour Court, this Court is of the opinion that lumpsum compensation deserves to be awarded to the Workman, as proposed by the Management, recorded in orders dated 25th September, 2019, 7th January, 2020, and 14th January 2020. The order dated 25th September, 2019, whereby the Management had initially offered such amount, reads as under:

“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is willing to pay an amount of Rs.5 lakhs as lump sum compensation to the respondent which is not acceptable to the respondent. In these circumstances, the writ petition has to be heard on merits.



Learned counsel for the respondent prays for an adjournment.”

16. Subsequently, on 7th January 2020, the Court recorded as under:

“1. On the last date, learned counsel for the parties had submitted that an amicable settlement between the parties may not be possible but today, they jointly submit that they are still willing to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Learned counsel for the respondent, on instructions, from the respondent, who is present in Court submits that the respondent is willing to accept a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- as lump sum compensation along with his provident fund dues, as may be lying deposited in the relevant provident fund account maintained by the petitioner.

2. In the light of the aforesaid offer made by the respondent, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for and is granted one weeks' time to get necessary instructions.”

17. On 14th January, 2020, the Management sought further time to seek instructions as below:

“1. On 07.01.2020 when the matter was taken up for consideration, learned counsel for the petitioner had assured the Court that, since the petitioner had already offered to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the respondent/workmen, which offer was not acceptable to the respondent who had instead demanded a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- as lump sum compensation to amicably resolve the matter, he would make an endeavour to amicably resolve the matter by accepting the respondent's offer. The matter was, therefore, adjourned to enable him to get instructions.

2. Today, Mr. Rupal, prays for further time and even though, there is no justification for granting any further opportunity to the petitioner, at request, list on 27.01.2020.”



18. However, vide order dated 12th April 2021, the counsels had agreed for the petition to be listed for hearing and amicable resolution was not pursued.

19. Under these circumstances, the following directions are issued:

- (i) The termination of the Workman is held to be contrary to the principles of natural justice as per the decision in **Suresh Chand (supra)** and even as per the Supreme Court in **D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) IILLJ 696 SC**, where the Court held that principles of natural justice are to be read into standing orders which govern terms of service of employees.
- (ii) The approach of the Labour Court of not considering any evidence concerning the validity of the termination, in absence of a domestic enquiry, is also contrary to the settled legal position in **Sureshwati (supra)**. However, no useful purpose would be served in remanding the matter at this belated stage.
- (iii) In the overall facts and circumstances, as previously proposed by the Management, since the Workman would have been superannuated around 2008, lumpsum compensation of Rs.5 lakhs is awarded to the Workman, as he was not given any notice prior to his termination.
- (iv) In addition, Rs.50,000/- is awarded to the Workman as litigation costs.
- (v) The amount which is lying deposited with the Registry of this Court shall be released to the Workman within four weeks, after deducting the TDS on the interest component. Since the maturity amount of the FDR is Rs.1,95,378/-, the said amount shall be deducted from Rs.5,50,000/-. The remaining amount of Rs.3,54,622/- shall now be



paid to the Workman within eight weeks. The amount shall be remitted directly to the Workman's bank account, details of which shall be furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the Workman to the Registry and to the Id. Counsel for the Management, within one week.

20. The petition along with all applications is disposed of in the above terms.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE

JANUARY 4, 2022
mw/MS

