

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

Sr. No.119

CRM-49754-2022 in/and

CRM-M-50115 of 2022

Date of Decision: December 23, 2022

Sukhvir Singh and others

...Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMAN CHAUDHARY

Present:- Mr. Paras Sharma, Advocate
for the applicant-petitioners.

Mr. Manipal Singh Atwal, DAG, Punjab.

Mr. Vishal Deep Goyal, Advocate
for respondents No.2 to 4.

AMAN CHAUDHARY, J.
CRM-49754-2022

This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is for preponing the date of hearing of main case, which is already fixed for 06.02.2023.

Notice of the application.

Learned State counsel as well as learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 to 4 have no objection if application is allowed.

In view of the grounds mentioned in the application and no objection by learned State counsel as well as respondent No.2 to 4, hearing of the main case is preponed and main case is taken on Board today itself.

CRM-M-50115 of 2022

The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 58, dated 06.10.2016 registered under Sections 323, 324, 427, 506, 148 and 149 IPC (lateron Section 307 IPC was added) at Police Station City Ahmedgarh, District Sangrur and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, in view of the

compromise deed dated 09.08.2018, Annexure P-4 reached between the parties.

Heard.

In **B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675**, the Hon'ble The Supreme Court of India observed that even though the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hon'ble The Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing.

In the case of “**Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another**”, **2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 543**, Hon'ble The Supreme Court of India had also observed that in order to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court, inherent power can be used by this Court to quash criminal proceedings in which a compromise has been effected. The relevant portion of paras read thus:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.

Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. XXX---XXX”

61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would

tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.”

Hon'ble The Supreme Court of India in the case of **Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand**, (2014) 9 SCC 653, held that “now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely

personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.”

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners and complainant are co-villagers. The dispute between one Himat Singh and Bhagwan Singh (since deceased) was with regard to truck union. He submits that as per the Medical Board of the doctors, the injury No.1 on the person of Major Singh was declared simple, injury No.2 was declared grievous, injury No.3 was declared simple there were two injuries simple in nature on the person of Sukhvir Singh (petitioner No.1) on the forearm and one injury is on the person of Manjit Singh (respondent No.4), which was also simple in nature. Therefore, offence under Section 307 was not made out. Three out of the 19 are respondent Nos.2 to 4 in this case, who have filed for quashing petition bearing CRM-M-8907-2020 on the basis of compromise dated 09.08.2018, Annexure P-4.

Adverting to the facts, parties in this case were directed to appear before the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate for recording their statements in the context of genuineness of the compromise.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, report dated 02.12.2022 of Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur has been received, which is taken on

record. Learned Sessions Judge has reported that the compromise effected between the parties is voluntary, without any pressure or inducement, accused- petitioners have never been declared as proclaimed offender and they are not involved in any other case. The complainant has no objection in case the FIR in question is quashed qua the petitioner(s).

In view of the judgments referred to above, perusing the report of the trial Court regarding amicable settlement between the petitioner(s) and the complainant(s), this Court finds that compounding the offences will accord a quietus to all disputes between the parties and it is in the interest of both sides to bury the hatchet and lead a peaceful life. Thus, no useful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings and in order to secure the ends of justice, the criminal proceedings in the present case deserve to be quashed.

Resultantly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 58, dated 06.10.2016 registered under Sections 323, 324, 427, 506, 148 and 149 IPC (lateron Section 307 IPC was added) at Police Station City Ahmedgarh, District Sangrur and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, in view of the compromise deed dated 09.08.2018, Annexure P-4 and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioners.

December 23, 2022
rimpal

(AMAN CHAUDHARY)
JUDGE

Whether reasoned/speaking: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No