

**250 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M-40117-2020

Date of Decision: 19.7.2022

Gursimrat Singh and others

..... Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ

Present: Mr. Arjun Veer Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioners.

Mr. Rakeshinder Singh Sidhu, AAG, Punjab.

Mr. Deepak K. Bhartia, Advocate, for respondent No.2.

Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (ORAL)

Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR No.61 dated 11.6.2014, registered under Sections 406, 498-A, 120-B IPC, at Police Station Women Cell, District Ludhiana and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise dated 22.11.2018 (Annexure P-2).

FIR in question was got registered by complainant-respondent No.2 and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their inter se dispute, which is apparent from Compromise Deed, annexed as Annexure P-2. On the basis of the compromise, the petitioners are praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of the Court and thus, the FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

This Court vide order dated 10.6.2022 directed the parties to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the Illaqa Magistrate/Duty

Magistrate was also directed to send its report.

In pursuance to the same, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana has sent its report dated 14.6.2022 to this Court. With the report, he has also annexed original statement of complainant-respondent No.2-Beant Kaur and joint statements of the petitioners, namely, Gursimrat Singh, Harbans Singh and Kuldeep Kaur and statement of SI Sukhwinder Singh recorded on 14.6.2022. On the basis of the statements, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana has concluded in its report that compromise is genuine and the same has been entered into voluntarily and without any pressure and the compromise is not a result of any fraud or misrepresentation and is the result of free will of the parties. It is further mentioned in the report that except the present petitioners there is no other accused in this case. It is mentioned in the report that the accused Harbans Singh and Kuldeep Kaur were not declared proclaimed offender, whereas, accused Gursimrat Singh was declared proclaimed offender vide order dated 4.8.2015. It is further mentioned that there is no other case pending against the petitioners.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that earlier petitioner No.1 Gursimrat Singh approached this Court impugning the order dated 4.8.2015, whereby he was declared proclaimed offender. This Court disposed of the same vide order dated 31.5.2022 and granted protection of 7 days to petitioner No.1 Gursimrat Singh that in case petitioner No.1 arrives in India on 2.6.2022. He has placed on record the copy of the order dated 31.5.2022. He further submits that in pursuance to the same, petitioner No.1 has arrived in India and filed application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. granting pre-arrest bail. In view of the same, learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Ludhiana, vide its order dated 6.6.2022, directed petitioner No.1 to surrender before the trial Court within 7 days and in the event of doing so, he was directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.1 lac with one surety in the like amount. He submits that petitioner No.1 has duly complied the order and appeared before the Court. He further submits that petitioner No.1 is no more proclaimed offender. He further submits that the marriage in question has also been dissolved by decree of divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana.

A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including **Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675** followed by this Court in Full Bench case of **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052** have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Gian Singh vs State of**

Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303 further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in **State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal**, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like

transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

Applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments and this High Court it is apparent that when the parties have entered into a compromise, in the nature of cases as prescribed then continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

In the facts and circumstances, this Court finds that the case in hand squarely falls within the ambit and parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, FIR No.61 dated 11.6.2014, registered under Sections 406, 498-A, 120-B IPC, at Police Station Women Cell, District Ludhiana

and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioners, on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-2).

Needless to say that the parties shall remain bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise and their statements recorded before the Court below.

Petition stands allowed.

19.7.2022
sharmila

(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE

Whether Speaking/Reasoned	:	Yes/No
Whether Reportable	:	Yes/No