

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

Civil Writ Petition No. 8624 of 2015 (O&M)

Date of Decision: 03.02.2022

Rajinder Singh and others

.... Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana and others

... Respondents

**CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI SHANKER JHA, CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN PALLI, JUDGE.**

Present:- Mr. Rakesh Nehra, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Pankaj Kaushik, Advocate, for the petitioners.

Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, Assistant Advocate General Haryana,
with Ms. Kushaldeep K. Manchanda, Advocate,
for the respondents.

(The aforesaid presence is being recorded through video conferencing since the proceedings are being conducted in virtual Court).

RAVI SHANKER JHA, CHIEF JUSTICE

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 held the field in the country for over a century until it was repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013; came into effect w.e.f. 01.01.2014. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 was an exception to the general repealing of the Act of 1894 as it primarily related to the acquisition proceedings initiated as well as culminated under 1894 Act only. Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013 deals with those cases wherein acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Act of 1894 but before the announcement of the award under Section 11 of 1894 Act, the Act of 2013 came into effect. Section 24 (1) (b) deals with those cases wherein the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 stood culminated

prior to coming into effect of the Act of 2013 which specifically provides that in all such cases, the proceedings will continue under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed. Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 infact is in the form of an exception to all such cases wherein the award was announced prior to coming into effect of the Act of 2013 as it applies to those cases wherein the award under Section 11 of 1894 Act was announced five years or more prior to coming into effect of the Act of 2013 and further postulates two conditions in a way that if either of the condition is fulfilled, the acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have lapsed. In the instant case, the award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 was announced on 04.03.1985 and the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 was sought to be invoked by the petitioners on the ground that they are still in physical possession of land in question and the compensation has not been paid to them and thus by claiming that both the contingencies as provided under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are fulfilled, prayer has been made seeking lapsing of the acquisition proceedings qua the land in question. The reliance in this regard has been placed on to various judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India including ***Pune Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Harak Chand Misri Mal Solanki and others*** cited as ***2014(3) SCC 183***.

2. Before entering into the respective pleadings by the parties, it needs necessary mention that owing to the pendency of interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the petition including the present one wherein the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was sought to be invoked, were kept pending; awaiting the outcome of the issue at hand by the Supreme Court of India. After seeing various interpretations,

the controversy erupted was finally set at rest by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in case *Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal*, AIR 2020 SC 1496. The penultimate para of the judgment is reproduced here in below:-

‘....1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.

2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.

3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

4. The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.

5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who

had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).

7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition'.

3. That the sum and substance of the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 by the Supreme Court is that the first and foremost condition to seek lapsing is that both the contingencies provided i.e. about the physical possession and the payment of compensation are to be fulfilled, meaning thereby, if either of the conditions is not satisfied, there would no lapsing. As far as the obligation to make the payment in lieu of the land acquired is concerned, it has been clarified that such obligation to pay is complete by tendering the compensation which would mean that the compensation amount was made available to the land owner and if he has not accepted the same, it will not be available for the land owner to claim

that the compensation has not been paid. Similarly, word “deposit” has been interpreted to mean depositing with the LAC or the treasury or the reference court. Drawing of panchnama has been considered to be a valid proof of taking physical possession and once the land stands vested in the State, there is no divesting provided under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has further clarified that the period for which any interim order was in operation, will be excluded while computing the gap period of five years. Similarly, it has been clarified that Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition as it applies to only those cases wherein the proceedings were pending on the date of enforcement of Act of 2013.

4. Having perused the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) and the principles laid down, now we proceed to test the factual matrix of the case in hand pleaded before us on to the afore reproduced laid down principles by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

5. The case set up by the petitioners in the instant petition is that they are owners in possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 3699/2885 measuring 1 bigha 15 biswas situated in revenue estate of Village Asodha Todran, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar (Haryana). Their land alongwith the land of other land owners was acquired vide the notification issued under Section 4 & 6 of the 1894 Act dated 20.06.1983 and 13.02.1984 respectively; followed by the award dated 04.03.1985, thereby acquiring land for the allotment of free residential plots to landless/homeless Harijans, members of backward classes, and economically weaker persons in Village Asodha Todran, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar now Rohtak.

The procedural irregularities in undertaking the issuance of notifications as well as the award have been alleged. It has been claimed that they are still in possession of the land in question and no compensation has been paid to them. On coming to know about the enactment the Act of 2013, they approached this court by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 16217 of 2014 while placing reliance on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 14.08.2014 with the directions to the authorities to decide their claim which was decided by speaking order dated 26.09.2014 and their claim was rejected. The instant petition has been filed laying challenge to the speaking order dated 26.09.2014 and also claiming the lapsing of the acquisition proceedings on the dual ground of being in physical possession of the land in question and the compensation having not been paid to them.

6. The notice of motion in the case in hand was issued on 10th September, 2015, however, subsequently; the petition was adjourned sine die to await the decision of the issue as regards interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 pending in the Supreme Court of India. The parties were directed to maintain the status quo regarding possession. The issue as regards the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 06.03.2020 in the case titled Indore Development Authority (supra) and that is how the writ petition has been taken up for hearing. The perusal of the record reveals that pursuant to issue of notice of motion, two separate written statements were filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 & 2 and 3 & 4 respectively.

7. While opening his arguments, Mr. Ankur Mittal, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana had vehemently argued that the filing of the petition by the petitioners is a gross misuse of process of law.

So much so that the stand of being in physical possession was taken even though post the completion of acquisition proceedings and the land acquired having been vested in the State, the allotments had already been made in favour of the persons belonging to weaker section of the society for the residential accommodation, possession had also been delivered after registration of certificate of allotment which was even followed by entering the mutation in the name of allottees. Not only this, the name of the allottees had already been incorporated in the jamabandi for the year 2006-2007. Before making reference to the facts pleaded in the written statement he has taken us to the speaking order dated 26.09.2014 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Bahadurgarh in compliance of the order dated 14.08.2014 passed by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 16217 of 2014 whereby the claim of the petitioners for lapsing of acquisition proceedings under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 was rejected. While rejecting the claim, specific references have been given to the allotments having been made after the acquisition of land and to the revenue entries made in favour of the allottees way back in the year 2006-2007. The reference has also been made to the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat Village Asodha Todran Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar (Haryana) dated 26.09.2014 to the effect that the plots have already been allotted to the beneficiaries, the registry stands executed and the mutation has also been sanctioned in favour of the allottees. Despite this categorical stand in the speaking order, the petitioners claimed before this Hon'ble Court that they are in actual physical possession of the land. While referring to the written statement filed by the respondent nos. 1 & 2, it has been argued that the acquisition proceedings in the case in hand have attained finality. The petitioners challenged the allotment of land to the beneficiaries before the Assistant Collector Ist

Grade, Bahadurgarh which was dismissed vide order dated 13.09.2005. Appeal and revision filed against the said order were dismissed vide order dated 30.01.2007 and 24.12.2014 by the Collector and Commissioner, Rohtak respectively. So far as the alleged procedural irregularities stated by the petitioners, it has been duly replied to by giving details of the entire procedure adopted till passing of the award.

8. He has further submitted that from the date of passing of the award on 04.03.1985 till coming into effect the Act of 2013 on 01.01.2014 i.e. for 29 years the petitioners did not lay challenge to the acquisition proceedings, however, taking advantage of the enactment of the Act of 2013 and by falsely pleading that they are in physical possession of the land in question and compensation has not been paid to them, they approached this court seeking lapsing by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 16217 of 2014 which was disposed of vide order dated 14.08.2014 with the directions to decide their claim. It was accordingly rejected by passing the detailed speaking order. Apart from the factum of taking physical possession and its utilization, he has submitted that the amount of compensation was deposited in the treasury after the announcement of the award. He has also referred that after taking the possession even the mutation was also sanctioned in favour of Government of Haryana bearing no. 3773 dated 23.09.1986. After allotments were made in favour of the beneficiaries from the weaker section of the society, the mutation stood sanctioned in their favour as well. By pleading so, he has argued that none of the contingencies is available to the petitioners to contend the lapsing of acquisition proceedings qua the land in question under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. He has further argued that even though the prayer no. 2 in the petition is seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings but in essence, the entire matter pertains to the claim

of lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 as otherwise also, the challenge to the acquisition proceedings on merits in the year 2015 as regards the award having been passed in the year 1985 will clearly be not maintainable being hit with delay and laches. Thus, he has prayed for dismissal of the petition and the vacation of the status quo order. At the end he has argued that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose which stood already allotted to the weaker section of the society, in whose favour the registration had already been done and even the mutation stood sanctioned long back in the year 2006-2007 and, therefore, the writ petition be dismissed so that the poor persons who are awaiting for the real fruit of the allotment having been made to them, could actually enjoy its fruits, for which they have been deprived of by the petitioners due to their vested interest.

9. Having heard the respective arguments, going through the respective pleadings and above all the exposition of Indore Development Authority (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the instant petition is liable to be dismissed for more than one reason:-

I. Physical possession of the land in question stands taken

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) has clearly observed that for deemed lapsing of acquisition proceedings under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, both the conditions i.e. payment of compensation and taking of possession must not be fulfilled i.e. if either of the condition is fulfilled, the lapsing cannot happen. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed that word "or" occurring in Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 must be read as "and/nor". Relevant paras from the judgment are reproduced here in

‘...99. In this Court’s considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be read as “nor” or “and”.

xxxx

xxxx

xxxx

xxxx

101. In *M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors.*⁷⁷, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there are two negative conditions, the expression “or” has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed:

“(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a case, “or” really means “either” “or.” In the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* one of the meanings of the word “or” is given as “A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative.” It is also there stated, “The alternative expressed by “or” is emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv. *EITHER*.” So, even without “either,” “or” alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be imposed.

(14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the position becomes different. The word “or” between the two clauses would then spread the negative influence over the clause following it. This rule of grammar is not in dispute. In such a case the conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled and the result would be that the penalty that can be imposed can never exceed Rs. 1,000.’

(15) The question then really comes to this: Is the sentence before us a negative or an affirmative one? It seems to us that the sentence is an affirmative sentence. The substance of the sentence is that a certain person shall be liable to a penalty. That is a positive concept. The sentence is therefore not negative in its import.” (emphasis supplied)

Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse...

In the case in hand as reflected from the speaking order as well as from the written statement filed, it is evident that after the award was announced on 04.03.1985, the physical possession was taken where after the mutation was sanctioned in favour of the Government of Haryana and the land in question was allotted to the weaker sections of the society for their residential accommodation. The possession of their respective plots was given after registration of certificate of allotment in their favour which was followed by the mutation entry in their favour in the jamabandi for the year 2005-2006. This fact stands duly substantiated from the challenge made by the petitioners to the allotment of land to the beneficiary before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Bahadurgarh wherein they lost till the Court of Commissioner, Rohtak. As far as the compensation part is concerned, it stands duly stated in the reply that the amount was duly deposited before the treasury which is a sufficient compliance of the obligation to make the payment by the State. In view thereof, both the contingencies as provided in Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are not fulfilled.

II. Physical possession of the land in question stands taken

The petitioners in the instant petition have claimed to be in the physical possession of the land in question. Positive case set up by the petitioners is that even though the award was passed on 04.03.1985 and they did not make challenge to the acquisition proceedings but yet the physical possession has not been taken from them. In this regard, the respondents have filed the written statement submitting therein that after the announcement of the award possession was duly taken and the mutation no. 3773 dated 23.09.1986 was duly sanctioned in favour of State of Haryana.

After taking the possession, the land acquired was duly utilized as the

allotments were made to the weaker section of the society for their residential accommodation. The possession of their plots have also been given after registration of certificate of allotment in favour of the allottees which were followed by entering the mutation in favour of the allottee in the jamabandi for the year 2006-2007. In the reply filed, it has been categorically pleaded that the petitioners are not entitled to lay challenge to the acquisition after its possession has been taken by the State. The respondents have further contended that earlier a civil suit was filed seeking declaration with relief of permanent injunction in respect of allotment having been made to the persons from weaker section of society which was also dismissed by the Civil Court, Bahadurgarh vide judgment and order dated 25.01.2013 and even the appeal against the same was dismissed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Jhajjar vide judgment and order dated 23.07.2014. The utilization of land acquired is the best piece of evidence to construe that physical possession has been taken which stands supplemented with the fact that the mutation entry stand sanctioned in favour of Government of Haryana bearing No. 3773 dated 23.09.1986. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provides that after taking the possession of the land, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the physical possession of the land in question stands duly taken which has not only been vested in the State but stands utilized for the public purpose, for which it was acquired. Thus, the plea being raised by the petitioners of being in physical possession of the land in question is wholly mis-conceived and is liable to be rejected.

III. Whether the compensation amount for the land in question was tendered or not.

The respondents have categorically pleaded in the written statement that the amount of compensation for the entire awarded land was made available to all the landowners, however, who so ever did not accept the same, and the amount was deposited in the treasury. In this regard, Mr. Mittal has asserted that in view of the exposition in Indore Development Authority (supra) the obligation of the State to pay the compensation is discharged if the amount of compensation is tendered which has been interpreted to mean that the amount was made available to the land owners as observed in Para 203 which is reproduced here in below:-

*‘...203. The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court. Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented from payment. **However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment.** In default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Sections 32 and 33 (which had been relied upon by the landowners’ counsel to say that valuable rights inhere, in the event of deposit with court, thus making deposit under Section 31 mandatory) provide for investing amounts in the Government securities, or seeking alternative lands, in lieu of compensation, etc. Such deposits, cannot fetch higher interest than the 15 per cent contemplated under Section 34, which is pari materia to Section 80 of Act of 2013. Section 34 is pari materia to section 80 of Act of 2013 in which also the similar rate of interest has been specified. Even if the amount is not deposited in Reference Court nor with the treasury as against the name of the person interested who is entitled to receive it, if Collector has been prevented to make the payment due to exigencies provided in Section 31(2), interest to be paid. **However, in case the deposit is made without tendering it to the person interested, the liability to pay the interest under section 34, shall continue.** Even assuming deposit in the Reference Court is taken to be mandatory, in that case too*

interest has to follow as specified in section 34. However, acquisition proceeding cannot lapse due to non-deposit....'

The aforestated facts clearly reveal that the observations made here in above did not leave any scope for doubt that the State has discharged its obligation towards making the compensation for the land acquired and thus the plea being raised by the petitioners that they have not been paid the compensation amount is rejected.

IV. Reliance placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case *Pune Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Harak Chand Misri Mal Solanki and others cited as 2014 (3) SCC 18:-*

In this regard, it is required to be noticed that the aforesaid judgment was over-ruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) in Para No. 362 which is extracted here in below:-

'...362. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (supra) is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors., (supra), the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether 'or' has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and' was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment...

As far as the reliance being placed on the other judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India are concerned, we have gone through those judgments as well. Since all the judgments being relied have been passed prior to the exposition in Indore Development

Authority (supra), same are of no help to the petitioners as their case is squarely covered by Indore Development Authority (supra) against them...”

V. **Essentiality of the land in question**

Mr. Ankur Mittal on the strength of the facts recorded in the speaking order dated 26.09.2014 as well as the written statements filed has contended that the land in question was acquired for the allotment of free residential plots of landless/homeless Haryana, members of backward classes and economically weaker persons in Village Ashodha Todran, Tehsil Bahadurgarh. After passing of the award dated 04.03.1985, the physical possession was taken and the mutation no. 3773 dated 23.09.1986 was sanctioned in favour of the Government of Haryana. Consequently, the land in question was allotted to the weaker section of society for their residential accommodation and possession of their plots were also given after registration of certificate of allotment in their favour which was followed by entering of mutation in favour of the allottees as per jamabandi for the year 2006-2007. Thus, the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose for which the land was acquired. We have considered this part of arguments raised by the respondents and are in complete agreement with the same as it is an essential factor to be kept in mind while dealing with the case arisen out of the acquisition of the land.

VI **Speaking order dated 26.09.2014 passed in compliance of the order dated 14.08.2014 of this Court in CWP No. 16217 of 2014.**

As a conspectus of what all has been discussed here in above especially the fact that after the announcement of the award, mutation was sanctioned in favour of the State Government whereafter the allotments had been made in favour of the persons from the weaker section of the society, the mutation stood sanctioned in favour of the allottees way back in the year 2006-2007 which itself proves that physical possession of the land had actually been taken, the compensation amount having been duly tendered and is lying deposited in the treasury and also that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose, for which it is acquired.

We are of the considered opinion that no ground is made out in the petition to interfere in the acquisition proceedings much less holding that the acquisition proceedings are deem to have elapsed and thus the claim made by the petitioners is rejected and the petition filed is hereby dismissed. Since the main petition has been dismissed, all the pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Status quo order passed vide order dated 20th January, 2016 is hereby vacated.

(RAVI SHANKER JHA)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(ARUN PALLI)
JUDGE

03.02.2022
ravinder

Whetherspeaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whetherreportable	Yes/No