

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

Civil Writ Petition No. 2660 of 2016 (O&M)

Date of Decision: 03.02.2022

Sunil Kumar and others ...Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana and others ...Respondents

CORAM: **HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI SHANKER JHA, CHIEF JUSTICE**
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN PALLI, JUDGE.

Present:- Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioners.

Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, Assistant Advocate General Haryana,
with Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate, for the respondents.

(The aforesaid presence is being recorded through video conferencing since the proceedings are being conducted in virtual Court).

RAVI SHANKER JHA, CHIEF JUSTICE

After having chosen not to assail the process of acquisition though completed way back vide the award announced under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 dated 16.03.1993, the petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court; after coming into effect of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 (hereinafter referred as 2013 Act) w.e.f. 01.01.2014, by filing the present petition in the year 2016; thereby claiming that the acquisition of land qua their share falling in Khasra no. 572/1 (0B-6B-0B) situated at Village Islampur, District Gurgaon has lapsed in view of section 24(2) of 2013 Act: by positively contending that he has built a house

acquired land was neither paid nor deposited in the Reference Court and as such, both the contingencies provided under Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 are satisfied.

Pleadings made in the present petition

2. The perusal of the pleadings reveal that the aforementioned land was acquired vide notifications issued under section 4 and 6 of 1894 Act dated 22.03.1990 and 19.03.1991 respectively; followed by the award under section 11 of 1894 Act dated 16.03.1993, for the public purpose namely for development and utilization of land for residential, commercial, institutional and maintenance of open space in Gurgaon as per the plan prepared under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977. It has been contended that over the land in question, a house was built which is still in their possession. It has further been contended that inspite of the fact that the acquisition proceedings were completed way back in the year 1993 but neither the possession of the land over which the house has also been constructed, is taken nor is the compensation paid to him. An attempt has also been made to project the case of discrimination by contending that their surrounding land has already been released from acquisition, whereas in his case it has neither been released nor he has been compensated for the land as well as the structure. Invoking the provisions of section 24(2) of 2013 Act, it has been contended that the legislature has enacted the said provisions by providing deeming fiction which provides for deemed lapsing, in case, either of the contingency as provided under section 24(2) of 2013 Act is satisfied whereas in his case both the contingencies are fulfilled and satisfied and thus, a case is made out for issuance of declaration that the acquisition for his land stands lapsed. Besides raising the plea of lapsing of acquisition

proceedings, the contentions have also been made as regards release of land of other landowners and even of granting licenses which allegedly makes out a case of discrimination.

3. To support their claim, the reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court of India in case '***Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki and others, 2014(3) SCC 183***, to contend that in the similar situation and while holding that the payment made in treasury cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to landowners/ persons interested, the Hon'ble Court directed the acquisition proceedings to have lapsed. Besides, the reliance has been placed onto various judicial pronouncements which came to be passed in an era prior to coming into effect of Act of 2013.

Law laid down by the Hon'ble Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority

4. The writ petition came up for hearing before this Court on 10.02.2016 whereby the notice of motion was issued. During the pendency of the petition after finding that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is seized of the controversy erupted as regards the interpretation of section 24(2) of 2013 Act, the hearing in the present matter was deferred to await the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which came to be decided in ***Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and others, AIR 2020 SC 1496***. The penultimate paragraph from the constitution bench judgment laying down the guiding principles is reproduced herein below:-

'...1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.

2. *In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.*

3. *The word 'or' used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and'. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.*

4. *The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.*

5. *In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.*

6. *The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).*

7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition'

5. In essence, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has cleared the clouds of doubt qua the words "paid" in section 24(2), "deposited" occurring in the proviso to section 24(2) and read the word "or" used in between the both the contingencies of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as "nor" or as "and". Similarly, the expression "physical possession" occurring in the main section has also been clarified to mean "drawing of panchnama"/ "Rapat Roznamcha". It has been crystallized that for seeking lapsing, both the contingencies will have to be satisfied. Broad principles as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court are crystallized as under:-

- (a) In all those cases wherein the acquisition process had been initiated but the award has not been announced under section 11 of the Act of 1894, on the date of commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e. 01.01.2014, there is no lapse of proceedings and the

same will continue, however, with the rider that the compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. All those cases wherein the award under section 11 of the Act of 1894 has been announced prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, the provisions of the Act of 2013 would have no bearing or application and the proceedings will continue in respect of those cases, as if, the Act of 1894 has not been repealed.

- (b) The word 'or' used in between the both the contingencies of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be read as '***nor***' or as '***and***' which means that to seek lapsing of the acquisition proceedings both the contingencies must be fulfilled. Meaning thereby, that if the possession had been taken but the compensation was not received, there would be no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been accepted but the possession has not been taken, there would be no lapsing. ***(reference to para 99 and 363(2) of the judgment)***
- (c) As far as the aspect of compensation for the land acquired is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has categorically observed that the expression paid in the main part of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. What is required to be proved is that the compensation amount was tendered which has been explained in ***para 203*** that the tendering of the amount would mean that the amount is made available to the landowner and that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person cannot be penalized for the default in making the

payment. While referring to section 31(1), 31(2), 34 of the Act of 1894 and comparing them with the para materia provisions i.e. section 71 and 80 of the Act of 2013, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified that the only consequence of non-payment of compensation is to make the payment of interest as per section 34 of the Act of 1894. Even the Hon'ble SC has further clarified that once the payment of compensation has been offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the amount has remain unpaid due to refusal to accept by the landowner. To clarify it further, the Supreme Court has further observed that if a landowner has filed the reference for higher compensation he cannot claim that he was not paid the amount.

- (d) While reading the proviso to section 24 to be part of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the Supreme Court has clarified that in case, the offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the landowners as on the date of notification for land acquisition under section 4 of the Act of 1894. Regarding the deposit, it has been clarified in ***para 242*** of the judgment that for the higher compensation to follow, the money should not have been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in the Court with respect to majority of land holdings, meaning thereby if it was deposited in any of the three modes with respect to majority of holdings, the higher compensation

will not follow, but interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894 would be the consequence.

- (e) As regards the mode of taking possession, the Supreme Court had clarified that drawing of inquest report/ memorandum would mean that physical possession has been taken. The law with regard to vesting of land has once again be reiterated to hold that once the possession has been taken under section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vest in the State and there cannot be any divesting or lapsing.
- (f) While computing the gap period of five years between the date of award and commencement of the Act of 2013, any interim order subsisting is to be excluded which means that after excluding the interim order, the pre-requisite gap period of 5 years is not there, the provisions of section 24(2) cannot be invoked.
- (g) The Hon'ble Court has further clarified that if the acquisition of land had earlier been challenged and the acquisition was upheld, which means the proceeding stood concluded, the umbrella protection of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be invoke as it does not revive stale and time barred claims.
- (h) In para 337, the Hon'ble Court has made it clear that the provision of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is meant to be invoked by the beneficiaries i.e. landowners who were recorded so at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894. Any subsequent purchaser, POA holder or otherwise, cannot invoke the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

6. After having gone into the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Constitution Bench, for whose decision, hearing in the present case was kept pending, we proceed to test the factual matrix of the instant case onto the afore stated principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Before we do so, it require necessary mention that in the case at hand, the short reply was filed on behalf of all the respondents on 24.03.2021 thereby refuting all the claims put forth by the petitioners and in turn, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition by specifically contending that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose for which it was acquired so much so, it affects the site of 10 plots of 6 marla, 2 nos roads of 10 mtr wide, as per the sanctioned layout plan. The record reveals that inspite of having received the reply, the petitioners have chosen not to file any replication and thus the facts stated in the written statement have gone un-rebutted.

Written statement filed and arguments by the respondents:-

7. Mr. Ankur Mittal, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents opened his arguments by contended that the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands so much so they are guilty of concealment of factum of their constructed portion measuring 0B-1B-0B falling in Khasra no. 572/1 stands already released from the acquisition and it is the vacant piece of land which was acquired. He further argued that the said concealment on the part of the petitioners make their mala fide intent crystal clear. He has further argued that even though the petition has been filed seeking lapsing of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of Act of 2013 but yet an attempt has been made to set up the plea of discrimination as well in an absolutely vague manner. The law in this regard is well settled that the plea of parity/ discrimination cannot be raised

required to be only similarly placed but identically placed. Since the petitioners did not give any description of the land and the land owner and also the date when the said release was made, such vague plea is not even worth entertaining by this court.

8. While referring to the reply, it has been argued that the possession of the land in question was taken vide rapat-rozنامcha No. 323 dated 16.03.1993. The total award money for the entire land acquired vide the award in question was Rs 34,45,22,645.75/- and out of it, an amount of Rs. 31,92,15,995.40/- stands disbursed. Rest of the amount was also duly tendered but the same was not accepted by the landowners including the petitioners. While referring to the fact pleaded in the reply, it has been argued that in the petition, the petitioners have set up a case of them having a house over the land acquired wherein they are residing but the said house has not been released from the acquisition whereas fact of the matter is that out of the land in question, the constructed area measuring 0B-1B-0B was released and it is only the vacant land, which has been acquired, on which account itself the petition is required to be dismissed with exemplary cost for having approached this court based upon misstatement and misrepresentation. With regard to the fact that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose for which it was acquired, it has been stated that as per the planning made, it affects site of 10 plots of 6 marla, 2 nos roads of 10 mtr wide.

9. By placing reliance on the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court of India, Mr. Mittal has argued that the petitioners having pleaded wrong facts on affidavit has made an attempt to mislead this court so as to take undue advantage of the deeming fiction provided under section

24(2) of 2013 Act. The petitioners have deliberately made a wrong statement that on the land acquired, they have a house which has not been released, whereas the constructed area measuring 0B-1B-0B in existence at the time of initiation of the acquisition proceedings had been released. Be that as it may, the possession of the land in question has already been taken by drawing Rapat Roznamcha No. 323 dated 16.03.1993 for the land in question acquired excluding the constructed portion of 0B-1B-0B which in terms of Indore development Authority (supra) is sufficient to construe that the physical possession of the land in question have been taken. So far as the question of compensation for the land in question to be paid to the landowner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that expression paid in the main part of section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act will be deemed to be satisfied if the compensation amount was tendered which has been explained to mean that the amount is made available to the landowner and that would be discharge of the obligation to make the payment. At the end, he argued that the reliance placed by the petitioners on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is also of no help to the petitioners as the said judgment has been expressly overruled the same in Para 362 of Indore Development Authority (Supra).

10. Taking it further, Mr. Mittal has argued that since the word “or” occurring in both the contingencies mentioned in the main section of 24 (2) of 2013 Act has been read as “nor/and”, both the contingencies occurring will have to be mandatorily fulfilled and that too with the prerequisite gap period of 5 years or more between the date of award and coming into effect of 2013 Act which means that if the state/authority is required to demonstrate that any time prior of gap period of 5 years, the possession has been taken by drawing the panchnama or even the compensation is tendered, it will negate the claim of the landowner of lapsing u/s 24 (2) of 2013 Act.

He further argued that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose so much so even the road is also affected and any release/declaration of lapsing will adversely affect the planning in terms of lay out plan.

Discussion

11. After having bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the rival claims put forth by the competing parties, having gone through the respective pleadings and the judgment passed by the Hon'ble constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, we are of the considered opinion that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed for more than one reason. In the instant case, it is the categoric pleaded stand of the state that the possession of the land in question has already been taken way back in the year 1993 i.e. by Rapat Roznamcha No. 323 dated 16.03.1993 and thus, the land in question stands vested in the State for all intent and purposes. While interpreting the word "physical possession", the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the recording of panchnama is valid mode of taking possession and explained that once the possession of land is taken, the land vest in the State and if thereafter the possession is retained by the erstwhile landowner or any other person, it will be only be in the capacity of trespasser and it will not be available for the landowner to claim that the possession hasn't been taken from him and that he is still owner in possession. In the instance case, though concealed by the petitioners but as stated by the respondents, excluding the constructed portion of 0B-1B-0B land, the possession of the rest/remaining land was taken by Rapat Roznamcha, therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the physical possession of the land in question stands taken and thus, it is not available to the petitioners to

contend that he is still in possession of the land in question and accordingly, one of the contingency occurring in section 24(2) of 2013 Act goes.

12. Though in terms of the principle laid down in Indore Development Authority (Supra), after having been recorded that possession of the land in question has been taken, this is the end of the road for the petitioners so far his claim of lapsing being sought u/s 24 (2) but still since, the petitioners have specifically taken the plea that the compensation for the land in question has neither been paid nor deposited before the Reference Court, we would like to test this contention of the petitioners in the light of the principles laid down in Indore Development Authority (Supra). It is important to highlight here that the Hon'ble Apex court while interpreting the word 'paid' occurring in Sec-24(2) and the word 'deposited' used in proviso to Sec 24 (2) of 2013 Act has very categorically observed the meaning and effect of both by holding that the word 'paid' does not include deposit and in case, the amount has been tendered, the obligation to pay is fulfilled. What would construe to mean "tender of the amount" has been explained in Para 203 to mean that the amount is/was made available to the landowner and that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment. In view of the above, we have no hesitation to hold that in the case in hand, the compensation was duly tendered but the petitioners chose to not to accept the same and thus, the state has clearly discharged its obligation to make the payment and thus, the second contingency appearing in section 24 (2) of 2013 Act also goes so far as the instance case is concerned.

13. As regards the plea of release of land in favour of other land owners is concerned, we noticed that the said plea has been raised in an absolutely vague manner wherein no particulars what so ever has been given. The law in this regard is well settled that firstly if the plea of

discrimination/parity is to be raised, it is required to be raised within the close proximity of the event taken place, based upon which the discrimination/parity is being sought to be alleged. Moreover, after passing of the judgment in Indore Development Authority (supra) especially holding that the physical possession of the land in question will be construed to be taken from the date of drawing the panchnama/rapat-rojnamcha dis-entitles the State to exercise the power enshrined under Section 48 of the 1894 Act. The law is also well settled that the land in question vests in the State after taking its possession and the same cannot be divested. Safest conclusion in this regard comes is that after taking possession of the land acquired, the State cannot release the land from acquisition and thus any plea being raised to release the land from acquisition by referring to an event taken place prior to coming into effect of the new act and especially the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority of India (supra) will be clearly misplaced and cannot be entertained.

14. Further it is well settled that the burden to prove the plea of discrimination is on the petitioners and they have to produce concrete evidence before the Court to show that their case is identical to other persons whose land had been released from the acquisition proceedings. Merely by stating that there is discrimination without refereeing as to with whom the petitioners have been discriminated and are similarly situated to those land owners, whose land has been released. The finding of discrimination cannot be recorded merely on the basis of vague and bold assertions as has been made by the petitioners in the instant writ petition. The reference in this regard, can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ***Shanti Sports Club Vs. Union of India 2009 (15) SCC 705***

wherein the Apex Court held as under:-

“...The plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution put forward by the appellants is totally devoid of substance because they did not produce any evidence before the High Court and none has been produced before this Court to show that their land is identically placed qua the lands on which Hamdard Public School, St. Xavier School, Scindia Potteries, etc. exist. In the representations made to different functionaries of the Government and DDA, the appellants did claim that other parcels of the land have been de-notified and before the High Court a copy of notification dated 6.9.1996 issued under Section 48(1) was produced, but the said assertion and notification were not sufficient for recording a finding that their case is identical to those whose land had been denotified. The burden to prove the charge of discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the appellants. It was for them to produce concrete evidence before the court to show that their case was identical to other persons whose land had been released from acquisition and the reasons given by the Government for refusing to release their land are irrelevant or extraneous. Vague and bald assertions made in the writ petition cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile discrimination. That apart, we are prima facie of the view that the Government's decision to withdraw from the acquisition of some parcels of land in favour of some individuals was not in public interest. Such decisions had, to some extent, resulted in defeating the object of planned development of Delhi on which considerable emphasis has been laid by the Full Bench of the High Court and this Court. This being the position, Article 14 cannot be invoked by the appellants for seeking a direction to the respondents to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept of equality enshrined in that Article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities....”

Therefore, in view of the aforesaid the vague and bald assertions made by the petitioners in the petition are of no avail.

15. Mr. Ankur Mittal on the strength of the facts pleaded in the written statement has vehemently contended that the State acquired the land

for the public purpose or utilization of land for residential, commercial, institutional and open space, recreational area in Gurgaon as per the plan prepared under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977. The public purpose is achieved by drawing/approving the lay out plan. As per the lay out plan prepared for the acquisition in question, the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose and it affects the planning of site of 10 plots of 6 marla, 2 nos roads of 10 mtr wide. We have considered this part of argument raised by the respondents and we are in complete agreement with the same as this is an important factor to be kept in mind while dealing with the case arising out of the acquisition of land to achieve the public purpose and it is the state/its authority who is in the best position to decide about utilization of the land acquired, after it having been vested in State.

16. In the instant case, the perusal of the pleadings made in view of the categorical case pleaded by the State, it is unambiguously clear that the petitioners has not only concealed the factum of the constructed portion having been released by the authorities but has positively made wrong statement that his built up house has not been released. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person invoking the writ jurisdiction is under an unwritten contract to not only state true facts but complete facts. From the perusal of the pleadings, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and not only true facts were concealed, rather the misstatement was made to give impression that the built up house constructed has not been released. We clearly deprecate this kind of practice as this fact alone is sufficient to negate the equitable relief being prayed for. However, by recording our anguish, we refrain ourselves in taking up this

issue further and imposition of exemplary costs for having concealed and misstated the facts.

Conclusion

17. As a sequel of the above discussion and in view of law summarized in para 363 of Indore Development Authority (supra), specifically after having recorded that in the case in hand, the physical possession of the land in question excluding the constructed portion of 0B-1B-0B which was released (though concealed by the petitioners) having been taken, satisfying discharging the liability to make the payment of compensation for the land acquired and also considering that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose, we have no hesitation to hold that in the instant case, the state has fully discharged its obligation qua both the contingencies occurring in section 24 (2) of 2013 Act and it being so, the present petition merits dismissal and hence, the instant petition is dismissed.

18. Having dismissed the main writ petition, all pending applications, if any, also meet the same fate. The writ petition is dismissed. Status quo, if any, stands vacated.

(RAVI SHANKER JHA)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(ARUN PALLI)
JUDGE

03.02.2022
ravinder

Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whether reportable	Yes/No