

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH.

210

CRM-M-16358-2022

Date of Decision: 01.08.2022

SULTAN SINGH AND ORS.

.....Petitioners

Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR

Present: Mr. Anupinder Singh Brar, Advocate
for the petitioners.

Mr. Bhupender Beniwal, AAG, Punjab
for respondent No. 1.

Mr. Gurinder Singh Goraya, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. (ORAL)

1. Through the instant petition, filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 191 dated 14.07.2019 registered at Police Station Sadar Dhuri, District Sangrur, constituting therein offences, under Sections 148, 149, 307, 323, 325, 341, 506 IPC, and, also of all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, hence on the basis of compromise dated -14.03.2022 (Annexure P-2), arrived at between the parties.

2. When the instant petition came up for hearing on 22.04.2022, this Court made directions upon, the Illaqa Magistrate concerned, to make a report with respect to the veracity of the compromise. The learned Illaqa Magistrate was also directed to disclose in his report, whether after

completion of investigation, report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been

filed, whether charge has been drawn against the accused; and whether the prosecution evidence has commenced. The afore order makes it apparent that the petitioners had depended, upon, a compromise/settlement, arrived at, in respect of the FIR (supra) with the complainant-respondent No. 2.

3. The afore made orders on 22.04.2022 by this Court, has been complied with by the learned Illaqa Magistrate concerned, and, the elicited report has been placed on record. A perusal of the report, transmitted to this Court, by the learned Magistrate concerned, reveals that the settlement /compromise, arrived at *inter se* the petitioners, and, respondent No. 2, is a sequel of both, being *ad idem qua* it, besides the compromise / settlement being a sequel of no pressure or coercion, being exercised upon each other. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has reported that the settlement /compromise, depended upon by the petitioners, for seeking the quashing of the FIR (supra), is both voluntary, and, genuine.

4. The learned counsel for the parties stated at the Bar, before this Court, that all the concerned have signed the compromise deed.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the State, submits that in view of the injuries, as became entailed upon the victim, thereupon, he contends that the prayed for indulgence for quashing the FIR, and, all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, in view of the compromise drawn amongst them, cannot be accepted. However, since the victim has at the pre trial stage made a compromise in respect of the penal occurrences with the accused, and, necessarily for begetting harmony, and, solidarity with the petitioners, who are residing in his neighbourhood, thereupon, when in the face of the accused becoming subjected to trial, there is every possibility of the victim resiling from his previous statement recorded in

writing, thereupon, resulting in a verdict of acquittal being pronounced upon the accused. In consequence, when the chances of the petitioners being convicted are remote as well as bleak. In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides would defeat the ends of justice.

6. Learned State Counsel has further contended before this Court, that the relief, as claimed by the petitioners, in the petition, cannot be granted, as some of the offences constituted against the accused-petitioners, inasmuch as, those under Sections 148/149/307/325 of the IPC, are non-compoundable.

7. However, for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, the afore prayer, as made by the learned State counsel, cannot be accepted by this Court. The further pre-eminent reason for dispelling the vigour of afore made argument, is rested, upon the factum of also a statement, being made before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that though the charges have been framed, but the prosecution evidence has not yet commenced.

8. The effect of the afore statement, as made with extreme vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and, also the effect of the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the State, is that the relevant parameters as encapsulated in a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in case titled as, ***Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another*** 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543, inasmuch as a postulate/occurring therein, that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as vested in the High Court, for the quashing of criminal proceedings, and, of FIR or complaint, through recourse being made to the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

rather being distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court, hence for compounding the relevant offence, being enjoined to become tested viz-a-viz the facts in hand, for apposite application thereon. However, it has also been held therein, the afore power vested in the High Court, is of the widest plenitude, with no statutory limitation, being placed thereon, yet it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice, and, to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. Though no straightjacket formula, has been contemplated therein, for recourse being made to the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence for quashing of an FIR, or criminal proceedings or complaint, yet the essential rubric viz-a-viz its valid exercising, is comprised in the principle, that if the accused and the complainant rather enter into a valid *ad idem* settlement, and, when thereupon the conviction of the accused becomes remote and bleak. Consequently, it has been mandated, that unless the offence sought to be quashed, through the exercising of the power vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not serious and heinous, inasmuch as the afore, do not embody offences appertaining to murder, rape, dacoity etc., and, or when the offences are in relation to special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants, while working in that capacity, thereupon it can be permissibly exercised. However, upon evident existences of embargos (supra), spelt in the verdict (supra), thereupon, the High Courts are barred, through recouring the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence, to quash the FIR or quash the criminal proceedings appertaining to serious/heinous offences (supra).

9. It is apt to extract the relevant paragraph of the verdict made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ***Gian Singh***'s case (supra).

“ The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominately civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

10. Since the offences, under Sections 148/149/307/325 of the IPC, do not, for reasons (supra) *prima facie*, appear to be so grave, and, nor so heinous, so as to attract the rigour of the embargo (supra) foisted upon the

High Court in verdict (supra). Therefore, the settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being reversed. Consequently, even if the afore offences are non compoundable, this Court does not deem it fit to accept the contention(s) of the learned State counsel, that this Court, may not through recouring the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the FIR, especially when the prosecution evidence has not commenced.

11. Furthermore, an immense support to the afore made view, is also derived from the judgment rendered by this Court in case titled as *Vinod @ Boda and others versus State of Haryana and another 2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 571*, wherein also, the above view has been reiterated.

12. There is merit in the petition, and, the same is allowed. Consequently, after accepting the report of the learned Magistrate concerned, this Court proceeds to quash the FIR (supra).

13. Accordingly, the FIR (supra), and, also all the consequential proceedings, hence arising therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioners.

(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE

01.08.2022
Kavneet Singh

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No