

**277 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M-9859-2019 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 30.11.2022

Prem Singh and another

..... Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ

Present: Mr. Sunny K. Singla, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Mr. Harpreet Singh, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab.
Mr. Himanshu Puri, Advocate for
Mr. Akshit Aggarwal, Advocate, for respondent No.2.

Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (ORAL)

Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR No.220 dated 17.10.2006, registered under Sections 498-A, 406, 506 IPC, at Police Station Tanda, District Hoshiarpur and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including proclamation order dated 03.10.2007 on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-2).

FIR in question was lodged by complainant-respondent No.2 and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their inter se dispute, which is apparent from Compromise Deed, annexed as Annexure P-2. On the basis of the compromise, the petitioners are praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of the Court and thus, the FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that in all there were four accused, out of which two accused, namely, Joginder Singh and Sarabjit Kaur have already been acquitted by the trial Court vide order dated 19.11.2015. He has submitted that the present petitioners are residing abroad and they were declared proclaimed offender vide order dated 03.10.2007, which is also under challenge in this Court. He has submitted that thereafter with the intervention of the respectables, both the parties have amicably resolved all the outstanding issues and as per the compromise arrived at, an amount of Rs.16 lacs as permanent alimony has already been paid to respondent No.2-complainant. He has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, prosecution of the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. He also submits that the declaration of proclaimed offender vide order dated 03.10.2007 also has no consequences once the matter, which is totally matrimonial, has already been settled amicably between the parties.

This Court vide order dated 07.03.2019 directed the parties to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate/trial Court for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the Illaqa Magistrate/trial Court was also directed to send its report.

In pursuance to the same, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dasuya has sent its report dated 02.05.2019 to this Court. With the report, she has also annexed original statement of respondent No.2- Gurpal Kaur and statement of Joginder Singh (power of attorney holder of petitioners, namely, Prem Singh and Arjan Singh) recorded on 10.04.2019 and statement of HC Balwinder Singh recorded on 30.04.2019. On the basis of the statements, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dasuya has

concluded in its report that a genuine compromise has been effected between the parties without any pressure or coercion etc. in any manner. It is further mentioned in the report that the case was registered against four persons, out of which, two accused, namely, Joginder Singh and Sarabjit Kaur were acquitted on 19.11.2015 and the present petitioners i.e. Prem Singh and Arjan Singh were declared proclaimed offender. It is further mentioned in the report that no other case is pending against the petitioners and they were declared proclaimed offender in this case.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dasuya.

A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including **Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675** followed by this Court in Full Bench case of **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052** have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Gian Singh vs State of**

Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303 further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in **State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal**, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like

transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

In view of the judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled as

Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Ors., (1980)

1 SCC 63, Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. aptly summed up the essence of compromise in the following words: "The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion.", this Court finds that the plea taken by the petitioners qualifies for its acceptance on the anvil of the settled law.

Applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments and this High Court it is apparent that when the parties have entered into a compromise, in the nature of cases as prescribed then continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the

Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

In the facts and circumstances, this Court finds that the case in hand squarely falls within the ambit and parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, FIR No.220 dated 17.10.2006, registered under Sections 498-A, 406, 506 IPC, at Police Station Tanda, District Hoshiarpur and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including proclamation order dated 03.10.2007, are hereby quashed qua the petitioners, on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-2).

Needless to say that the parties shall remain bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise and their statements recorded before the Court below.

Petition stands allowed.

30.11.2022
sharmila

(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE

Whether Speaking/Reasoned	:	Yes/No
Whether Reportable	:	Yes/No