

**IN THE PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT  
CHANDIGARH**

**238**

**CRM-M-8891-2020 (O&M)**

**Date of Decision: 21.04.2022**

**JATINDER KUMAR**

... Petitioner

Versus

**STATE OF U.T. CHANDIGARH AND ANOTHER**

... Respondents

**CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ**

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Present: Mr. Hittan Nehra, Advocate  
for the petitioner.

Mr. Shashank Bhandari, Addl. P.P., U.T., Chandigarh.

Ms. Loveleen Kaur, Advocate  
for respondent No.2-complainant.

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**VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (ORAL)**

By means of the instant petition, the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been invoked for seeking quashing of FIR No.97 dated 10.05.2018 under Sections 341, 307, 34 of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, registered at Police Station North, Sector-3, Chandigarh and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of compromise dated 07.11.2019 (Annexure P-2) entered between the parties.

2           The parties were directed to appear before the learned trial Court/Illaq Magistrate vide order dated 07.02.2022 of this Court, to get their statements recorded regarding the compromise arrived at between the parties and a report in this regard was called for.

3.           Pursuant to the said order, report has been received from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh vide Memo No.CJM-AHL-2022/141

dated 03.03.2022. The relevant extract of the report is reproduced as under:-

*“In view of the above statements, compromise as effected between the complainant and accused Jatinder Kumar appears to be genuine and effected without any fear, pressure or undue influence. Three accused namely (1) Jatinder Kumar son of Sh. Kamlesh, (2) Yogesh son of Sh. Narinder Kumar, and (3) Parmod Rishi Dev son of Sh. Nageshwar Rishi Dev have been implicated as accused in this case FIR and they have not been declared proclaimed offender in this case. As per report of Ahlmad of this Court, neither challan has been filed till date in this case before the Court nor any remand papers are pending and only FIR has been received in the Court. Copies of statements of parties are enclsod herewith for information and necessary action please.”*

4. Learned State counsel does not dispute the factum of the compromise amongst the parties, however, he prays that as Section 34 of IPC has been attracted in the instant case, therefore, the FIR in question ought not be quashed despite the compromise effected between the parties.

5. Ms. Loveleen Kaur, Advocate appears on behalf of respondent No.2-complainant and reiterates the settlement and her concurrence to the FIR and all the other consequential proceedings being quashed.

6. The Full Bench of this Court in the matter of **“Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another”** reported as **(Punjab and Haryana High Court) : 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052** has observed as under:

*'(28) To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the ends of justice".*

(29) *In Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Ors.*, Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. aptly summoned up the essence of compromise in the following words:

*“The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion.”*

(30) *The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice.*

(31) *No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.*

(32) *The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.*

(33) *The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482.*

*Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.*

*(34) The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.*

7. The legal principles as laid down for quashing of the judgment were also approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of '**Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another,(2012) 10 SCC 303'**. Furthermore, the broad principles for exercising the powers under Section 482 were summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of '**Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and another"** (2017) 9 SCC 641'.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further places reliance upon the judgment/order passed in the matters of **Rajvir Singh and others Vs. State**

*of Punjab and another bearing CRM-M-27630-2020 decided on 05.03.2021; Raman Singh @ Laddi and another Vs. State of Punjab and another bearing CRM-M-12223-2021 decided on 08.03.2022; Mrs. Poonam Khanna Vs. State and others, reported as 2018(2) AD(Delhi) 372; Lovely Salhotra and another Vs. State NCT of Delhi and another, reported as 2017(3) RCR (Criminal) 85; Sunil Tomar Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and another, reported as 2022 SCC Online Del. 1027; Sharvan and others Vs. State of Haryana and others bearing CRM-M-28980 of 2020 decided on 22.02.2021; and Rahul Mattu and others Vs. State of Punjab and another bearing CRM-M-29493-2020 decided on 25.02.2021.*

8. It is evident that in view of the amicable resolution of the issues amongst the parties, no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings. The furtherance of the proceedings is likely to be a waste of judicial time and there appears to be no chances of conviction.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of '*Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 834*', that the matters which can be categorized as personal in nature or in the matter in which the nature of injuries do not exhibit mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest, the Court can quash the FIR in view of the settlement arrived at amongst the parties. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted as under:-

*19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a*

*High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.*

10. The following relevant factors emerge from perusal of the case as well as the subsequent developments supplementing a case for invocation of the powers under Section 482 CrPC:-

- (i) That the dispute was primarily a money dispute between the co-accused Yogesh and the complainant and that a scuffle had taken place *inter se* between them. Since the petitioner was known to both of them, he was called at the spot to resolve the issue, but he was arraigned as an accused.
- (ii) It is further evident that even as per the allegations, the gunshot could not be fired on account of the bullet being stuck in the barrel. It is, thus, a case of 'no injury'. Even though, the FIR was registered under Section 307 of IPC, however, taking into consideration the fact that there is no consequential injury endangering any person, the offence cannot be termed as prohibited on account of its social repercussions.
- (iii) That the petitioner is 29 years old and is in the prime of his youth. Continued incarceration of the petitioner is likely to have serious

impact on his career and future prospects.

- (iv) Even though the FIR in question was registered on 10.05.2018, however, the investigation has not yet culminated into filing of a final report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C.
- (v) The offence in question cannot be said to be heinous or as an offence that would be shocking to the conscience of the society or public at large. It can also not be termed as one shocking to the conscience of the Court;
- (vi) Continuation of the proceedings and forcing the parties to undergo rigours of criminal proceedings is not likely to sub-serve any large public interest;
- (vii) The proceedings are likely to end in futility for want of parties to support the case of the prosecution;
- (viii) No larger public purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings;
- (ix) Parties do not suffer any criminal antecedents and have not indulged in any such or similar case during the pendency of the case or after registration of the FIR.
- (x) The complainant is not likely to support the case of the prosecution. Continuation of the proceedings is likely to be a waste of judicial time. The object of law is well served when the parties resolve their differences and choose to peacefully co-exist and live in harmony.
- (xi) That merely because the petitioner has been roped in as an accused under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC, the same cannot be taken as a bar against the exercise of Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

11. In view of the report of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in *Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others (2012) 10 SCC 303*, as well as *Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 834* and also by the Full Bench of this Court in *Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052*, the instant petition is allowed. The aforesaid FIR No.97 dated 10.05.2018 under Sections 341, 307, 34 of the IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959, registered at Police Station North, Sector-3, Chandigarh and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, **are hereby quashed** qua the petitioner in view of compromise dated 07.11.2019 (Annexure P-2). However, the same would be subject to payment of costs of Rs.15,000/- to be deposited by the petitioner with the 'Poor Patients Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh', within one month from receipt of certified copy of this order.

Hence, the petition is allowed accordingly.

(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)  
JUDGE

21.04.2022  
rajender

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No