

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT  
CHANDIGARH**

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**CRM-A-380-2020 (O&M)**  
**Reserved on: 27.04.2022**  
**Pronounced on: 10.05.2022**

**HARVINDER KUKREJA**

**...APPELLANT**

**VERSUS**

**VINOD KUMAR**

**....RESPONDENT**

**CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ**

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**Argued by:** Mr. D.K. Prajapati, Advocate  
for the appellant.

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**VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J.**

1. The instant appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 13.01.2020, passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Faridabad, whereby the Magistrate has dismissed the Criminal Complaint bearing No.2858 dated 07.06.2017 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, titled as 'Harvinder Kukreja Vs. Mr. Vinod Kumar' and acquitted the respondent of the notice of accusation served upon him.

2. Before advertng to the merits of the instant case, certain facts as are necessary to be referred to for appreciation of the appeal are being extracted as under:-

2.1 The appellant-complainant instituted the above mentioned complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 claiming that the respondent-accused had friendly relations with him since long. It was claimed that in the month of April, 2016, the respondent-accused approached the

appellant-complainant for taking a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- for personal use. Considering the long-standing friendly relationship, the petitioner-complainant claims to have advanced the said amount to the respondent-accused. A cheque bearing No.150158 dated 14.04.2017 amounting to Rs.5,00,000/- is claimed to have been issued by the respondent-accused in favour of the appellant-complainant in discharge of the said liability. Upon presentation of the said cheque, the same returned unpaid vide return memo dated 17.04.2017 with remarks “Account Closed”. A legal notice was accordingly issued on 08.05.2017 and upon failure on the part of the respondent-accused to remit the payment, the complaint in question was instituted.

2.2 In his preliminary evidence, the complainant stepped into the witness box and placed on record the following documents:

| Exhibit No. | Description of document         |
|-------------|---------------------------------|
| Ex.C1       | Original cheque no.150158       |
| Ex.C2       | Return memo dated 17.04.2017    |
| Ex.C3       | Legal Notice dated 08.05.2017   |
| Ex.C4       | Postal receipt dated 08.05.2017 |

2.3 Upon issuance of notice, the respondent-accused put in appearance before the Trial Court and secured bail. Notice of accusation was served upon the respondent-accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. An application under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was filed on behalf of the respondent-accused seeking recall of the complainant for his cross-examination and upon completion of the cross-examination, the case was fixed for evidence of the respondent-accused.

2.4 In his defence evidence, the respondent-accused examined the following witnesses:

| Sr. No. | Name.                                                                |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DW-1    | Shri Naveen Kumar, Sr. Tax Assistant, Income Tax Officer, Faridabad. |
| DW-2    | Shri Tek Chand, Ahlmad.                                              |

2.5 The following document was also tendered by the respondent-accused in his defence evidence:

| Sr. No.  | Description of document                               |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Ex.DW1/A | ITR Record of Harvinder Kukreja from 2013 to 2015-16. |

2.6 After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the stand taken by the respondent-accused in his plea of defence recorded under Section 263(g) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), wherein the respondent-accused had denied issuance of cheque against any legally enforceable debt or liability. It was submitted that the appellant-complainant was involved in the business of chit fund (committee business) and the cheque in question had been given as a security. Even though the amount of Rs.2,80,000/-, owed by the respondent-accused, was paid to the appellant-complainant, still the said security cheque was not returned by the appellant-complainant to the respondent-accused nor had he given any receipt of the said payment. It was told by the appellant-complainant to the respondent-accused that the cheque in question was not traceable and as soon as the same would be traced out, he would hand over the same to the respondent-accused. It is contended that only a sum of Rs.20,000/- was remained to be repaid, however, the cheque in question was misused, even though the respondent-accused was ready and willing to remit the balance amount of Rs.20,000/-. After considering

the stand taken by both the parties and evidence led by them with respect to their respective stands, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the presumption with respect to the cheque having been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt has not been established and that in the absence of the money transaction having been proved on file and also on account of failure to establish any prior acquaintance/friendly relationship, it cannot be assumed that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was not actually owed by the respondent-accused and the cheque in question was never issued in discharge of any such liability. The respondent-accused was accordingly acquitted after taking into consideration various judicial pronouncements.

3. Aggrieved thereof, the instant leave to appeal had been preferred.
4. A perusal of the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Faridabad, shows that following discrepancies were noticed by the Trial Court:
  - (i) It was noticed by the trial Court that even though it was claimed by the appellant-complainant that the respondent-accused had availed of a friendly loan of Rs.5,00,000/-, however, no documentary evidence in the form of any receipt, affidavit or pro-note or any writing acknowledging the receipt of the said amount has been produced by the appellant-complainant to establish that a huge amount of Rs.5,00,000/- had been advanced by him to the respondent-accused.
  - (ii) It was also noticed by the Trial Court that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is relatively a large sum of money and it is incomprehensible and highly improbable that any person shall advance such a huge amount without executing any written proof/document.
  - (iii) That even though the appellant-complainant claims that he had long-standing friendly and cordial relations with the respondent-accused, however, such friendly relationship was not established.

The appellant-complainant had no knowledge about the year when the respondent-accused was married; he had no knowledge about the academic qualification or any other usual or normal details of the respondent-accused.

- (iv) That the appellant-complainant acknowledged that he is educated and claimed to be involved in the business of sale-purchase of the vehicles in the name of Noni Motors, but he could not tell the address of the same, which creates shadow of doubt upon his financial capacity to advance such a huge amount.
- (v) That the Trial Court also noticed that the appellant-complainant claimed that his monthly income was Rs.50,000/-, but he was not filing Income Tax Return(s). The said fact was noticed to be false as ITR of the appellant-complainant was duly proved and exhibited by the respondent-accused while leading his defence evidence and a bare perusal of the same shows that there is no mention of any loan transaction in the said ITR. Besides, no list of debtor and creditors has been attached alongwith the ITR in question.
- (vi) That the appellant-complainant could not even mention a date when the amount in question was advanced to the respondent-accused. Despite being a huge amount, there was no corresponding withdrawal entry in his bank account statement.
- (vii) That even though the appellant-complainant claimed to have arranged for the money by selling his house, however, no such document pertaining to the sale of house has been produced on record. Even otherwise, it is highly improbable that a person would sell his house to extend a friendly loan to an acquaintance.
- (viii) It was also noticed that there is no valid explanation as to why the entire transaction was carried out in cash and at one point of time.
- (ix) That the Trial Court further noticed that even though the appellant-complainant had claimed that the above fact of advancing the amount to the respondent-accused was in the knowledge of his (complainant's) wife also, however, his wife did not step into the witness box. There is no valid reason or explanation as to why the

appellant-complainant chose to withhold the best evidence i.e. the eye-witness to the transaction.

- (x) Furthermore, the Trial Court also noticed that the appellant-complainant acknowledged that he could not place any evidence in order to establish that the loan could have been advanced to the respondent-accused.
- (xi) It was noticed by the Trial Court that the appellant-complainant failed to establish the transaction of advancing loan of Rs.5,00,000/- and has further failed to establish the existence of any friendly relationship between the parties and has failed to give any proof as regards his financial capacity to advance such a huge amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the respondent-accused without any valid explanation.

5. After taking a note of the aforesaid discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, the judgment of acquittal was passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Faridabad and the complaint in question was dismissed.

### **ARGUMENTS:**

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently argued that the judgment passed by the learned trial Court suffers from illegality and perversity. The respondent-accused did not dispute his signatures on the cheque in question. In view of the presumption contemplated under Section 118 read with Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the onus to prove his innocence was to be discharged by the respondent-accused. He submits that the Trial Court committed an error in ignoring the presumption in law and casting a negative burden on the petitioner, contrary to the statutory mandate.

7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant-complainant and have gone through the evidence adduced before the Court below.

**ANALYSIS**

8. As the argument of the appellant is that there was a presumption of liability against the respondent-accused, it is necessary to examine and refer to the position in law as regards presumption under Section 118/139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

**LEGAL POSITION REGARDING PRESUMPTION UNDER NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT:**

9. The presumption enshrined under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not absolute and is rather a rebuttable presumption. The accused would be discharged of the presumption, the moment an accused raises reasonable suspicion with respect to the due execution of the cheque. It is not incumbent upon an accused to lead evidence and even subjecting the complainant to cross-examination on such aspects can be taken as sufficient grounds to shift the burden upon the complainant to establish that the debt in question was duly advanced to the drawer of the cheque. Once such suspicion is created by an accused, the burden of proof would thereafter shift upon the complainant to prove that the cheque had been executed in discharge of a pre-existing liability or legally enforceable debt. Existence of legally enforceable debt is a pre-requisite for issuance of a cheque.

10. It is a settled proposition of law that presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact, such a presumption is a rebuttable presumption and the drawer of the cheque may dispel the same. The aforesaid position in law stands settled in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of **Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16.** While dealing with the aspect of presumption in terms of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

'21. The appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the 'discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability' is answered by the third presumption available to the Bank under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability.

22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court "shall presume" the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in *State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61*, **it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established.** "It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused" (*ibid*). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact **unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact.**

23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn

*from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists" .*  
***Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'.***

24. Judicial statements have differed as to the quantum of rebutting evidence required. In ***Kundan Lal Rallaram vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316***, this Court held that the presumption of law under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be rebutted, in certain circumstances, by a presumption of fact raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The decision must be limited to the facts of that case. The more authoritative view has been laid down in the subsequent decision of the ***Constitution Bench in Dhanvantraï Balwantraï Desai vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575***, where this Court reiterated the principle enunciated in *State of Madras vs Vaidyanath Iyer (Supra)* and clarified that the distinction between the two kinds of presumption lay not only in the mandate to the Court, but also in the nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence" of the accused. On the other hand in the case of a mandatory presumption "the burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is **where a presumption is raised under S.114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the**

*explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted....."*

(Emphasis supplied)

It was, thus, held that the obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumption of law or fact, unless, the accused adduces evidence showing reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. Thus, if the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, there is no discretion left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion; however, the same does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. The rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable; the standard of reasonability being that of a 'prudent man'.

11. Reference is also necessary to be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of **Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513**. The relevant extract of the same is as under:-

*'13. In a significant departure from the general rule applicable to contracts, Section 118 of the Act provides certain presumptions to be raised. This Section lays down some special rules of evidence relating to presumptions. The reason for these presumptions is that, negotiable instrument passes from hand to*

*hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the Act provides presumptions to be raised until the contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to date of instrument, (iii) as to time of acceptance, (iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of indorsements, (vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder being a holder in due course.*

*14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.*

*15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) "may presume" (rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable) and (3) "conclusive presumptions" (irrebuttable). The term 'presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the "presumed fact" drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means "taking as true without examination or proof".*

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*16. Section 4 of the Evidence Act inter-alia defines the words 'may presume' and 'shall presume' as follows: -*

*"(a) 'may presume' - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as*

*proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it.*

*(b) 'shall presume' - Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved."*

*In the former case the Court has an option to raise the presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved.*

*17. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability.*

*18. Applying the definition of the word 'proved' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists.*

19. *The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over.*

20. *The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act*

*upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.*

*21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue.'*

(Emphasis supplied)

12. The law is thus well settled that in order to rebut the statutory presumption, an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. The Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible, nor contemplated. At the same

time, bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt would not serve the purpose of the accused. To disprove the presumption, an accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or that their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist.

13. In the matter of **Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed on the matter of presumption cast under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and held as under:-

*'26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.*

*27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better*

*described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof.*

*28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.'*

14. In the matter of **John K. Abraham Vs. Simon C. Abraham And Another (2014) 2 SCC 236**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in order to draw presumption under Section 118 read with Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, burden lies on the complainant to show, (i) that he had the requisite funds for advancing the sum of money/loan in question to the accused, (ii) that the issuance of cheque by accused in support of repayment of money advanced was true and, (iii) that the accused was bound to make payment as had been agreed while issuing cheque in favour of the complainant. Taking note of the fact that the complainant was not aware of the date when the substantial amount was advanced by him to the accused and his failure to produce relevant documents in support of

the alleged source for advancing money to an accused, the judgment convicting the accused was set aside by holding the same to be perverse. The relevant facts noticed from the aforesaid judgment are extracted as under:-

*'6. When we examine the case of the respondent-complainant as projected before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the material evidence placed before the trial Court, we find that the trial Court had noted certain vital defects in the case of the respondent-complainant. Such defects noted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate were as under:*

***a) Though the respondent as PW-1 deposed that the accused received the money at his house also stated that he did not remember the date when the said sum of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid to him.***

***b) As regards the source for advancing the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- , the respondent claimed that the same was from and out of the sale consideration of his share in the family property, apart from a sum of Rs.50,000/-, which he availed by way of loan from the co-operative society of the college where he was employed. Though the respondent stated before the Court below that he would be in a position to produce the documents in support of the said stand, it was noted that no documents were placed before the Court below.***

***c) In the course of cross-examination, the respondent stated that the cheque was signed on the date when the payment was made, nevertheless he stated that he was not aware of the date when he paid the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-.***

***d) According to the respondent, the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused himself and the very next moment he made a contradictory statement that the cheque was not in the handwriting of the appellant and that he (complainant) wrote the same.***

e) The respondent also stated that the amount in words was written by him.

f) The trial Court has also noted that it was not the case of the respondent that the writing in the cheque and filling up of the figures were with the consent of the accused appellant.

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**9. It has to be stated that in order to draw the presumption under Section 118 read along with 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the burden was heavily upon the complainant to have shown that he had required funds for having advanced the money to the accused; that the issuance of the cheque in support of the said payment advanced was true and that the accused was bound to make the payment as had been agreed while issuing the cheque in favour of the complainant.**

10. Keeping the said statutory requirements in mind, when we examine the facts as admitted by the respondent-complainant, as rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge, the respondent was not even aware of the date when substantial amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was advanced by him to the appellant, that he was not sure as to who wrote the cheque, that he was not even aware when exactly and where exactly the transaction took place for which the cheque came to be issued by the appellant. Apart from the said serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, he further admitted as PW.1 by stating once in the course of the cross- examination that the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused and the very next moment taking a diametrically opposite stand that it is not in the handwriting of the accused and that it was written by the complainant himself, by further reiterating that the amount in words was written by him.

11. We find that the various defects in the evidence of respondent, as noted by the trial Court, which we have set out in

*paragraph 7 of the judgment, were simply brushed aside by the High Court without assigning any valid reason. Such a serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, which strikes at the root of a complaint under Section 138, having been noted by the learned trial Judge, which factor was failed to be examined by the High Court while reversing the judgment of the trial Court, in our considered opinion would vitiate the ultimate conclusion reached by it. In effect, the conclusion of the learned Judge of the High Court would amount to a perverse one and, therefore, the said judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.'*

(Emphasis supplied)

15. In the matter of **Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418**, while dealing with the standard of proof and the presumption drawn under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

*'14. Justice S.B. Sinha in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani Vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 had considered Sections 118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act, 1881. It was held that presumptions both under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature. Explaining the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" referring to an earlier judgment, following was held in paragraph No.28:-*

*"28. What would be the effect of the expressions "may presume", 'shall presume" and "conclusive proof" has been considered by this Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1, in the following terms: (SCC pp. 30-31, para 52)*

*"It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies 'shall be presumed' and 'may be presumed' in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis-à-vis the absence thereof in relation to the*

*lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words 'shall presume' would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions 'may presume' and 'shall presume' have been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'."*

*15. It was noted that the expression "shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous with conclusive proof. Referring to definition of words "proved" and "disproved" under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, following was laid down in paragraph No.30:*

*"30. Applying the said definitions of "proved" or "disproved" to the principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, **it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not exist.** For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon."*

*16. This Court held that **what is needed is to raise a probable defence, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence and even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon.** Dealing with standard of proof, following was observed in paragraph No.32:-*

*"32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can*

*be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.”*

*17. In Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, this Court held that an accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. Following was laid down in Paragraph No.32:-*

***“32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.”***

*18. This Court again reiterated that whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is “preponderance of probabilities”. In paragraph No.34, following was laid down:-*

*“34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is “preponderance of probabilities”. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.”*

*25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarize the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:-*

*(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.*

*(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.*

*(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.*

*(iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.*

*26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of the PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque was issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000/- taken by the accused, the PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs. 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000/- being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs.50,000/- with regard to which complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ex.D2, there was burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his*

*cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.'*

(Emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the same shows that the failure of the complainant to display his financial capacity to advance the amount alleged to have been lent would shift the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity to lend the money as well as the other circumstances to establish existence of consideration for issuance of cheque. After noticing that there was no evidence led before the Court to indicate the financial capacity of the complainant to lend the money in question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the judgment of conviction suffered perversity and was thus, liable to be set aside. It was observed that the accused had raised a probable defence and that the complainant failed to prove his financial capacity on the basis of evidence led by him and thus, ordered acquittal of the accused.

16. This position of law has recently been affirmed by a 3 Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Triyambak S. Hegde Vs. Sripat** reported as **(2022) 1 Supreme Court Cases 742- decided on 23.09.2021.** The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:

*"14. The above noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain, until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this court in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr.(1999) 7 SCC 510 wherein it is held as hereunder:*

*"9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the*

*discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Trial Court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect.”*

15. *The learned counsel for the respondent has however referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 wherein it is held as hereunder:*

*“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:*

*25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.*

*25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.*

*25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.*

*25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.*

*25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.*

*26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on the cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque was issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000/- taken by the accused, PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs.8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence in the*

*evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000/- being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs.50,000/- with regard to which Complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D2, there was burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.”*

\*\*\*\*\*

*17. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court needs no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. In, Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption, the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the transaction between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in view the various transactions and extent of amount involved. However, the legal position relating to presumption arising under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act on signature being admitted has been reiterated. Hence, whether there is rebuttal or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”*

### **LEGAL POSITION IN APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL**

16. The same now leads to the scope of interference by the Court while hearing appeal against acquittal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of **M. G. Aggarwal versus State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200**, the relevant part is extracted as under:

*“(16) Section 423(1) prescribes the powers of the appellate Court in disposing of appeals preferred before it and clauses (a) and (b) deal with appeals against acquittals and appeals against convictions respectively. There is no doubt that the*

*power conferred by clause (a) which deals with an appeal against an order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred by clause (b) which deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High Court's powers in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeal in question is one against acquittal or against conviction. That is one aspect of the question. The other aspect of the question centres round the approach which the High Court adopts in dealing with appeals against orders of acquittal. In dealing with such appeals, the High Court; naturally bears in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt will always be present in the mind of the High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which it has in dealing with an appeal against conviction, in-dealing with the former class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence. Sometimes, the width- of the power is emphasized, while on other occasions, the necessity to adopt a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals is emphasized, and the emphasis is expressed in different words or phrases used from time to time. But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in*

*respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This position has been clarified by the Privy Council in **Sheo Swarup v. The King Emperor and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151.***

*(17) Some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasizing the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, "the findings of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons": vide Surajpal Singh V. The State Similarly in Ajmer Singh V. State of Punjab, it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are "very substantial and compelling reasons to do so.") In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for "good and sufficiently cogent reasons" or for "strong reasons". In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended- to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423 (1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused "is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial." Therefore, the test suggested by the expression "substantial and compelling reasons" should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab; and so, it*

*is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterize the findings recorded therein as perverse. Therefore, the question which we have to ask ourselves in the present appeals is whether on the material produced by the prosecution, the High Court was justified in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution case against the appellants had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the contrary view taken by the trial Court was, erroneous. In answering this question, we would, no doubt, consider the salient and broad features of the evidence in order to appreciate the grievance made by the appellants against the conclusions of the High Court. But under Article 136 we would ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the High Court particularly where the said findings are based on appreciation of oral evidence.*

17. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of **Nagbhushan vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 212**, as under:

*“7.2 Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered.*

*7.2.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189, this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:*

*12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of*

*acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. (2010) 2 SCC 445)*

*13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”*

*14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC*

*216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)*

*15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.*

*(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.*

*(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.*

*(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is*

*further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.*

*(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”*

*16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.*

*17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”*

*18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) (i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;*

*(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;*

(iii) *The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;*

(iv) *The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;*

(v) *This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;*

(vi) *This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanpal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.*

*19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." (emphasis supplied)*

**7.2.2** *When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:*

*"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against*

*the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v.State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P.(2009) 10 SCC 636).” (emphasis supplied)*

*7.2.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.*

*7.3 In the case of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:*

*“31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held*

*in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.”*

*31.1 In Sambasivan v. State of Karala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “*

*8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babula Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on*

*the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case."*

*31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Karala (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions*

*Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinized the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.*

*31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10)*

*“5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.PC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.*

*It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour*

*of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.*

*It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.*

*If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.*

*31.4. In K.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”*

*(emphasis supplied)*

18. Thus, the position which emerges from a perusal of the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court through its catena of judgments in matters pertaining to appeals against acquittal can be summarized as under:-

- a) Powers of High Court in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeals are against conviction or acquittal.
- b) In dealing with appeal against acquittal, the High Court bears in mind that the presumption of innocence is strengthened.
- c) As an appellate Court, the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence.
- d) That the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are "very substantial and compelling reasons to do so".
- e) The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, even though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one.
- f) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal, than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

g) The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.

**CONCLUSION**

19. It is evident from a reading of the discrepancies noticed by the Trial Court and the deficiencies culled out in the preceding Paragraph No.4, as well as the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to the guidelines while examining an appeal against an order of acquittal that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a rebuttable presumption, I find that there is no illegality, infirmity, perversity or miscarriage of justice in the judgment dated 13.01.2020 passed by the Trial Court. It cannot be held that the opinion formed by the Trial Court was incomprehensible or was unsustainable upon the reading and interpretation of the evidence or that the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court from a reading of the said evidence were not tenable.

The instant appeal, thus, lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed and the judgment dated 13.01.2020 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Faridabad is upheld.

**(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)**  
**JUDGE**

**May 10, 2022**  
*rajender*

|                                  |               |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| <i>Whether speaking/reasoned</i> | <i>Yes/No</i> |
| <i>Whether reportable</i>        | <i>Yes/No</i> |