

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M No. 10593 of 2021

Date of Decision: 13.05.2022

Harpreet Kaur

..... Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

..... Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR

Present: Mr. Ritesh Pandey, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Bhupender Beniwal, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab
for respondent No. 1 / State.

Mr. Manoj Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No. 2.

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. (ORAL)

1. Through the instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner is seeking quashing of FIR No. 83 of 30.08.2017 (Annexure P-1), registered at Police Station Dera Baba Nanak, Batala, District Batala, constituting therein offences under Sections 279 & 427 of the IPC (Section 304-A of the IPC added later on), and, also of all the subsequent proceedings, as, arise therefrom, on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-2).

2. When the instant petition came up for hearing on 08.03.2021, this Court made directions upon the Illaqa Magistrate concerned, to make a report with respect to the following:-

“ (i) Number of persons arrayed as accused in FIR.

(ii) whether any accused is proclaimed offender.

(iii) whether the compromise is genuine, voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence.

(iv) whether the accused persons are involved in any other case or not.

(v) *Current stage of the case.*”

3. The afore order makes it apparent that the petitioner had depended, upon, a compromise/settlement, arrived at, in respect of the FIR (supra) with the complainant-respondent No. 2 (Sapna Devi).

4. The afore made order by this Court on 08.03.2021, has been complied with by the learned Illaqa Magistrate concerned, and, the elicited report has been placed on record. A perusal of the report, transmitted to this Court, by the learned Magistrate concerned, reveals that the settlement / compromise, arrived at *inter se* the petitioner, and, respondent No. 2, is a sequel of both, being *ad idem qua* it, besides the compromise / settlement being a sequel of no pressure or coercion, being exercised upon each other. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has reported that the settlement / compromise, depended upon by the petitioner, for seeking quashing of the FIR (supra), is both voluntary, and, genuine.

5. The learned counsel for the parties stated at the Bar, before this Court, that all the concerned have signed the compromise deed.

6. Furthermore, the learned State Counsel, on instructions, meted to him, by the Investigating Officer (IO) concerned, submits that after filing the challan, the case is pending for opening of prosecution evidence.

7. However, the learned counsel appearing for the State, has contended before this Court, that the relief, as claimed by the petitioner, in the petition, cannot be granted, as some of the offences constituted against the accused-petitioner, inasmuch as those under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC, are non-compoundable.

8. Since, co-respondent No. 2 (Sapna Devi) is an ocular witness to the ill-fated occurrence, and, is also, the informant, besides is the aggrieved, and, when prior to the framing of a charge, in respect of FIR (supra), she has compounded the offence (supra), through hers entering into a compromise, with the accused, thereupon, it appears that she would definitely resile from her previously recorded statement by the police officer, and, the result thereof, would be, that there being the bleakest and remotest chances of the accused-petitioner receiving a verdict of conviction. Therefore, yet, in view of the compromise drawn amongst the concerned, rather subjecting the accused to face trial in respect of petition FIR, obvious would result in bringing unwanted pain of harassment, and, humiliation upon the petitioner concerned.

9. The further pre-eminent reason for dispelling the vigour of afore made argument, is rested, upon the factum of also a statement, being made before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that after filing the challan, the case is pending for opening of prosecution evidence.

10. The effect of the afore statement, as made with extreme vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and, also the effect of the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the State, is that the relevant parameters as encapsulated in a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in case titled as, ***Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543***, inasmuch as a postulate/occurring therein, that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as vested in the High Court, for quashing of criminal proceedings, as/of FIR or complaint, through recourse being made to the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., rather

being distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court, hence for compounding the relevant offence, being enjoined to become tested vis-a-vis the facts in hand, for apposite application thereon. However, it has also been held therein, the afore power vested in the High Court, is of the widest plenitude, with no statutory limitation, being placed thereon, yet it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice, and, to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. Though no straightjacket formula, has been contemplated therein, for recourse being made to the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence for quashing of an FIR, or criminal proceedings or complaint, yet the essential rubric *vis-a-vis* its valid exercising, is comprised in the principle, that if the accused and the complainant rather enter into a valid *ad idem* settlement, and, when thereupon the conviction of the accused becomes remote and bleak. Consequently, it has been mandated, that unless the offence sought to be quashed, through the exercising of the power vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not serious and heinous, inasmuch as the afore, do not embody offences appertaining to murder, rape, dacoity etc., and, or when the offences are in relation to special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants, while working in that capacity, thereupon it can be permissibly exercised. However, upon evident existences of embargos (supra), spelt in the verdict (supra), thereupon, the High Courts are barred, through recouring the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence, to quash the FIR or quash the criminal proceedings appertaining to serious/heinous offences (supra).

11. It is apt to extract the relevant paragraph of the verdict made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ***Gian Singh***'s case (supra).

“ The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise

with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

12. Since, for the reasons (supra), the offences, under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC do not, *prima facie*, appear to be so grave and nor are so heinous, so as to attract the rigour of the embargo (supra) foisted upon the High Court in verdict (supra). Therefore, the settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being revered. Consequently, even if the afore offences are non-compoundable, this Court does not deem it fit to accept the contention(s) of the learned State counsel, that this Court, may not through recouring the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the FIR, especially when the case is pending for opening of prosecution evidence. In aftermath when rather thereupons, the chances of the petitioner being convicted are remote as well as bleak. In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides would defeat the ends of justice.

13. Furthermore, an immense support to the afore made view, is also derived from the judgment rendered by this Court in case titled as ***Vinod @ Boda and others versus State of Haryana and another 2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 571***, wherein also, the above view has been reiterated.

14. There is merit in the petition, and, the same is allowed.

Consequently, after accepting the report of the learned Magistrate concerned,

this Court proceeds to quash the FIR (supra).

15. Accordingly, the FIR (supra), and, also all the consequential proceedings, hence arising therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.

May 13, 2022
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(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE

<i>Whether Speaking/reasoned</i>	<i>Yes/No</i>
<i>Whether Reportable</i>	<i>Yes/No</i>