

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

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**Date of decision: 02.04.2022
CRM-M-5989-2022(O&M)**

SANJEEV DHUNNA AND OTHERS

....Petitioners

Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

...Respondents
CRM-M-5994-2022 (O&M)

SOM NATH AND OTHERS

....Petitioners

Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ

Present : Mr. Vishnu Dutt, Advocate
for the petitioners in CRM-M-5989-2022 and
for respondent Nos.2 to 5 in CRM-M-5994-2022.

Mr. Naveen Bawa, Advocate
for the petitioners in CRM-M-5994-2022 and
for respondent Nos.2 to 4 in CRM-M-5989-2022.

Mr. Karanbir Singh, AAG Punjab.

VINOD S. BHARDWAJ. J. (ORAL)

By virtue of this common judgment, the above-mentioned petitions shall stand disposed off as the petitions arise out of the same FIR.

By means of the instant petition(s), the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been invoked for seeking quashing of cross case bearing GD No.056 dated 07.05.2019 registered under Sections 323, 324, 341, 506, 427 and 34 of the IPC registered at Police Station Haibowal, Ludhiana and in case bearing FIR No.092 dated 07.05.2019 under Sections 323, 324, 341, 506, 354-A, 427, 148, 149 of the IPC (Sections 341 and 354-A IPC deleted later on)

registered at Police Station Haibowal, District Ludhiana and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise dated 15.12.2021 (Annexure P-2) entered between the parties.

2 The parties were directed to appear before the learned trial Court/Illaq Magistrate vide order dated 11.02.2022 of this Court to get their statements recorded regarding the compromise arrived at between the parties and a report in this regard was called for.

3. Pursuant to the said order, report has been received from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana vide Memo No.45/46 dated 22.03.2022. The relevant extracted of the report is reproduced as under:-

2.It is humbly submitted that present FIR has been got registered on dated 07.05.2019 under Sections 323,324,341,506,354-A, 427,148,149 (Sections 341 and 354-A IPC deleted lateron), PS Haibowal, Ludhiana alongwith cross DDR being GD No.56 dated 07.05. 2019, under section 323,324,341,506,427,34 of IPC, PS Haibowal, Ludhiana.

3. As regarding cross DDR being GD No.56 dated 07.05.2019, complainant Somnath Sharma son of Hira Lal, resident of H.No.6545, Tarsem Colony, Jassian Road, Ludhiana suffered statement as to compromise and stated that the present case has been got registered by him against the accused Persons namely Sanjiv Kumar, Gagandeep and Harmesh Lal. The present matter has been compromised with accused persons with the intervention of respectables. He has also brought his original Aadhar Card as identity proof and copy of same is Ex.C1. He entered into compromise with his free consent, without any pressure and coercion. Copy of Compromise deed is placed on record and the same is Ex.CI. He has no objection if the above mentioned DDR be quashed by the Hon'ble High Court.

4. *Injured Sanjay Verma son of Charanjit Lal Verma, resident of House no.6542, Street no.2, Tarsem Colony, Jassian Road, Ludhiana have also suffered statement that the present case has been got registered by the complainant against the accused persons namely Sanjiv Kumar, Gagandeep and Harmesh Lal. He is the injured in this case. Now, with the intervention of respectables the matter has been compromised between the parties. He has also brought his original Aadhar Card as identity proof and copy of same is Ex. C4. He entered into compromise with his free consent, without any pressure and coercion. Copy of Compromise deed is placed on record and the same is Ex.CA. He has no objection if the above mentioned case is quashed by the Hon'ble High Court.*

5. *Similarly, accused Sanjiv Kumar son of Harmesh Lal, Gagandesph son of Harmesh Lal and Harmesh Lal son of Jagan Nath, all residents of H.No.6542, Street no.2, Tarsem Colony, Jassian Road, Ludhiana have also suffered joint statement that the present case has been got registered against them by the complainant namely Somnath. They have compromised the matter with the complainant with intervention of respectables. Compromise deed is placed on record and same is Ex.CA. We entered into compromise with their free consent, without any pressure and coercion. We have also brought on record their original Aadhar Card as identity proof and copy of same is Ex.C2, Ex.C3 and Ex. C4. They also stated that they have not been declared as proclaimed offender in his case as well as in any other case. (Original statements are being submitted here with for kind perusal).*

6. *On 15.03.2022 statement of ASI Prem Chand recorded, he suffered statement that no accused is proclaimed absconder in this case.*

7. *From the statements suffered by the above stated parties, I am satisfied that parties have voluntarily entered into compromise with each other qua FIR No .92 dated 07.05.2019*

and DDR No 56 dated 07.05.2019 and it appears to be genuine one, voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence in any manner. As such, a valid compromise has been arrived at between the parties. The queries in the order dated 11.02.2022 passed by Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court is answered as under:-

1) Three persons namely Sanjiv Kumar, Gagandeep Dhunna and Harmesh Lal are arrayed as accused in DDR bearing GD no.56 dated 07.05.2019.

ii) None of the accused has been declared as a proclaimed offender in this case.

iii) The case is at the beginning stage for notice to accused, after presentation of challan/report u/s 173 Cr.P.C.

iv) The compromise is genuine, voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence.

4. Learned State counsel does not dispute the factum of the compromise effected amongst the parties and does not have any serious objection to the resolution of the dispute amongst the parties.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents reiterates the settlement and their concurrence to the GD as well as FIR and all the other consequential proceeding being quashed.

6. The Full Bench of this Court in the matter of “***Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another***” reported as (***Punjab and Haryana High Court***) : 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 has been observed as under:

'(28) To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the ends of justice".

(29) In Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya

Sawhney and Ors., Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. aptly summoned up the essence of compromise in the following words:

“The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion.”

(30) The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice.

(31) No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

(32) The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.

(33) The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable

offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

(34) The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.

7. The legal principles as laid down for quashing of the judgment were also approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of '**Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another,(2012)10 SCC303'**. Still further, the broad principles for exercising the powers under Section 482 were summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of '**Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and another"** (2017) 9 SCC 641', the same are extracted as under:

16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :

16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the

ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16.2 The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3 In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

16.4 While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16.5 The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

16.6 In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

16.7 As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element

of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16.8 Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

16.9 In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10 There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

8. It is evident that in view of the amicable resolution of the issues amongst the parties, no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings. The furtherance of the proceedings is likely to be a waste of judicial time and there appears to be no chances of conviction.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of '**Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 834**', that the matters which can be categorized as personal in nature or in the matter in which the nature of injuries do not exhibit mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest, the Court can quash the FIR in view of the settlement arrived at amongst the parties. The

observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted as under:-

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.

10. The following facts emerge from the perusal of the case as well as the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom calling for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC:-

- i. The offence in question cannot be said to be serious or heinous in nature as the injuries caused on the person of the complainant are on the non-vital parts of the body;
- ii. The case is still at the initial stages for notice to be issued accused after presentation of challan. The trial has thus not commenced and even the FIR in question was registered in May 2019;
- iii. The parties happen to be residing in adjacent localities and have chosen to amicably resolve their differences;
- iv. Acceptance of the prayer is most likely to promote peace, harmony and mutual co-existence;
- v. Offence in question cannot be termed as grave or shocking to the

conscience of the Court;

- vi. Continuation of the proceedings cannot be said to be necessary and to be serving larger public interest;
- vii. Continuation of the proceedings is not likely to yield any fruitful result and would only be a waste of judicial time. It would amount to burdening the system of administration of criminal justice for no purpose;
- viii. Petitioners do not suffer from any criminal antecedents and are not involved in any other case during the pendency of the instant FIR.
- ix. The intent of the parties to resolve their dispute and to live peacefully and harmoniously needs to be duly recorded and respected. There is no compelling circumstance that would mandate that such a request ought to be declined.

11. In view of the report of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in *Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others (2012) 10 SCC 303*, as well as *Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 834* and also by the Full Bench of this Court in *Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052*, the instant petition is allowed. The aforesaid cross case bearing GD No.056 dated 07.05.2019 registered under Sections 323, 324, 341, 506, 427 and 34 of the IPC registered at Police Station Haibowal, Ludhiana and case bearing FIR No.092 dated 07.05.2019 under Sections 323, 324, 341, 506, 354-A, 427, 148, 149 of the IPC (Sections 341 and 354-A IPC deleted later on) registered at Police Station Haibowal, District Ludhiana and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, **are hereby quashed** qua the

petitioners in view of compromise dated 15.12.2021 (Annexure P-2). However, the same would be subject to payment of costs of Rs.40,000/- to be deposited by the petitioners (Rs.20,000/- to be deposited by the petitioners in CRM-M-5989-2022 and Rs.20,000/- to be deposited by the petitioners in CRM-M-5994-2022) with the '**Poor Patients Welfare Funds at PGIMER Chandigarh**' within one month from receipt of certified copy of this order.

Petition is allowed.

(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE

April 02, 2022
S.Sharma(syr)

Whether speaking/reasoned	:	Yes/No
Whether reportable	:	Yes/No