



WEB COPY

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 28.04.2022

CORAM :

THE HON'BLE MR.MUNISHWAR NATH BHANDARI,
CHIEF JUSTICE

AND

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY

W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005

W.P.No.26079 of 2001

1. Sarojini Kittu (Died)
2. Chandraleka
3. Mrinalini
4. Chitrалека

.. Petitioners

(P3, P4 substituted as LRs of deceased first petitioner
vide order, dated 07.02.2022 made in W.M.P.No.28770 of 2021
in W.P.No.26079 of 2001)

Versus

1. State of Tamil Nadu
rep. by the Secretary to Government,
Law Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai - 600 009.
2. The Assistant Commissioner,
(Land Reforms), Erode.
3. S.Balusamy
4. S.Palaniammal
5. S.Dhanalakshmi
6. S.Pangajam
7. M.Kuppuraj
8. R.Arumugam
9. Banumathy
10. Prithviraj

(R3 to R8 are impleaded as per the order made in
W.M.P.No.8407 of 2019, dated 20.08.2019)

(R9, R10 substituted as LRs of deceased first petitioner
vide order, dated 07.02.2022 made in W.M.P.No.28770 of 2021
in W.P.No.26079 of 2001) .. Respondents



W.A.No.1215 of 2005:

1. Sarojini Kittu
2. Chandraleka

.. Appellants

WEB COPY

Versus

1. The Assistant Commissioner
(Land Reforms), Erode.

2. The Land Tribunal
(District Revenue Officer),
Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005.

.. Respondents

Prayer in W.P.No.26079 of 2001 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Declaration to declare that the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) 2nd Amendment Act, 1994, Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1996 as ultra vires, arbitrary, unenforceable, unconstitutional and strike down the same.

Prayer in W.A.No.1215 of 2055 : Writ Appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set aside the order, dated 16.04.2004 in W.P.No.9924 of 2004.

Prayer in W.P.NO.9924 of 2004 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issu a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the Second Respondent in L.T.C.M.A.No.4 of 2002 dated 20.12.2003 on the file of the Second Respondent and quash the same.

In W.P.No.26079 of 2001

For Petitioners : Mr.R.Krishnan
for Mr.A.Sivaji

For Respondents : Mr.S.Silambanan,
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.B.Vijay
for RR-1 and 2

K.Doraisamy, Senior Counsel
for M/s.Muthumani Doraisamy
for RR-3 to 8

In W.A.No.1215 of 2005

For Appellants : Mr.R.Krishnan
for Mr.A.Sivaji



WEB COPY

For Respondents : Mr.S.Silambanan,
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.B.Vijay
for RR-1 and 2

COMMON JUDGMENT

D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J.

The above Writ Petition and the Writ Appeal relate to the same parties and connected proceedings and hence are taken up and disposed off by this common judgment.

Heard Mr.R.Krishnan, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Mr.S.Silambanan, Additional Advocate General for the respondents 1 and 2 and K.Doraisamy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 3 to 8.

W.P.No.26079 of 2001:

2. The Writ Petition in W.P.No.26079 of 2001 was originally filed by the deceased first petitioner, namely Sarojini Kittu and her daughter i.e., second petitioner, namely Chandraleka. Pending the Writ Petition, the first petitioner died and as such, apart from the second petitioner, who is already on record, the other legal heirs, namely the petitioner Nos.3 and 4 were brought on record.

3. The prayer in the Writ Petition is to issue a Writ of Declaration, declaring that the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) 2nd Amendment Act, 1994 (Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1996) as ultra vires, arbitrary, unenforceable and unconstitutional.

4. The case of the petitioners is that under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land), 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961), action was initiated against the son of the deceased first petitioner, namely one V.K.Balu @ Palanisamy on the premise that he was holding agricultural land more than the ceiling limit of 15 standard acres, as prescribed by the Act. According to the second respondent, the said landowner was holding 69.22 ordinary acres, which is equivalent to 20.585 standard acres in Vellankinar village, Coimbatore Taluk. However, the said landowner, by registered settlement deed, dated 02.02.2000, settled 12.66 ordinary acres and 7.96 ordinary acres in favour of the deceased first petitioner and the second petitioner respectively and therefore, once the land covered under the settlement deed is excluded, then the balance land available with the land owner was only 13.610 standard acres and therefore, further proceedings were to be dropped. It is the



further case of the petitioner that there has been several appeals and revisions etc., arising out of the transaction, but, however, for the purposes of the Writ Petition, suffice it to say that even though the respondents had closed the proceedings and several orders were passed in favour of the landowner, the first respondent brought in an amendment to Section 22 of the Act, enabling the authorities to reopen the proceedings even after such statutory/quasi judicial orders and the amendment also has retrospective effect and therefore, the petitioners are directly affected by the said amendment and hence, the present Writ Petition is filed challenging the constitutional validity of the same.

5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that the impugned Act 11 of 1996, more specifically Section 6 of the Act empowers the authority to reopen any proceedings under Section 22 of the Act inspite of the fact that it reached finality by the judicial decisions and therefore, has the effect of overruling judicial decisions has become final between the parties and hence unconstitutional. The learned Counsel submitted that the legislative powers cannot be used to overreach judicial powers and hence, the impugned amendment should be held as unconstitutional. The learned Counsel would also rely upon the judgment reported in Re- Cauvery River Water Tribunal¹. The learned Counsel would also submit that the impugned amendment now reopens after 28 years when the rights of the parties have become final and the accrued rights in the interval cannot be upset by the amendment Act and therefore, the impugned amendment is illegal.

6. It is the further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even though the impugned amendment passed in the guise of giving effect in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in S.L.P.(c).Nos.2542 to 2544 of 1972, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was passed in the year 1979, but, however, only after 17 years, the impugned amendment is brought out in 1996 and as such, the same is illegal and especially while deciding above matters, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had not expressly given power to the State Government to bring in any such amendment. For the proposition that the legislative action cannot have the effect of nullifying judicial decisions, the learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment in State of Haryana & Others Vs. Karnal Co-op., Farmers Society Ltd & Others² and would pray that the impugned amendment should be struck down.

1 AIR 1992 SC 522

2 AIR 1994 SC 1



7. Opposing the said submissions, Mr.S.Silambanan, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2, would submit that neither the legislative power of the State to bring in an amendment is questioned nor the validity is assailed for violation of any other constitutional provision. The only ground of attack is that the act retrospectively attempts to overrule judicial decisions. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the said contention is factually incorrect as this Court in S.Naganatha Ayyar And Ors. Vs. The Authorised Officer And Ors³ held that as far as the transactions which are effected after the commencement of the act before the notified date, all the authorities have to look into whether the transaction was bona fide or not and only if it is not bona fide, the same can be declared as void under Section 22 of the Act. However, on appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and Another Vs. S.Naganatha Ayyar and Others⁴, held that there is no question of any bonafide or otherwise in respect of the transactions and held that such an interpretation cannot be made to Section 22 as the same would defeat the very object of the act. Therefore, the amendment is brought only give effect to the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and therefore, cannot be attacked as if it tries to overreach the judicial pronouncements. He would further submit that the very same act was challenged before this Court in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P.Nos.19088 of 1997 etc., and by a judgment, dated 13.03.2009, a learned Judge of this Court had considered all the submissions made including those made by the petitioners herein in this petition and had answered the same against the petitioners and had upheld the validity of the impugned act and therefore, submitted that there are no merits in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners.

8. Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 8 would submit that factually on 04.04.1990, a draft statement under Section 10(i) was also published and on 23.08.1990, an order under Section 10(5) was also passed and on 09.01.1991, a final statement under Section 12 was also published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. Along with the other lands acquired, apart from from the land consisting of these surplus lands, on 26.09.1991, they were assigned portions of the land in question. The petitioners also filed W.P.Nos.8598 and 8599 of 2004, challenging the validity of the draft statement as well as the final statement and both the Writ Petitions were dismissed by a judgment, dated 07.06.2011 after considering the same on merits. Therefore, he would submit that there is nothing in the Writ Petition or in the connected Writ

3 (1971) 1 MLJ 274

4 (1979) 3 SCC 466



Appeal to be further adjudicated and prays for dismissal of both the matters.

9. To appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, before the impugned amendment, Section 22 of the Act stood as follows:-

" 22. [Transfer or partition] made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, but before the notified date. - (1) Where, on and after the date of the commencement of this Act, but before the notified date, any person has transferred any land held by sale, gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death), exchange, surrender, settlement or in any other manner whatsoever except by request [or has effected a partition of his holding or part thereof], the authorised officer with in whose jurisdiction such land, holding or the major part thereof situated may after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer [or partition] and after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make [declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition, as the case may be], defeats any of the provisions of this Act.

(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), if any transfer or partition has the effect of reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling area, such transfer or partition, whether bona fide or not, shall be construed as defeating the provisions of this Act."

10. By the impugned amendment, clause (2) was added to the Section 22 and Section 5 of the amending Act providing for validation and Section 6 of the amending Act providing for reopening of cases. The amending provisions are extracted hereunder:-

"4. The principal Act shall, on and from the 6th day of April 1960, have effect, as if, section 22 had been renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section and after sub-section (1) as to renumbered, the following sub-section had been added, namely:-----

"(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), if any transfer or partition has the effect of reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling area, such



WEB COPY

transfer or partition, whether bonafide or not, shall be construed as defeating the provisions of this Act.”

5. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, all acts done or proceedings taken in respect of cases falling under Section 22 of the principal Act by the authorised officer before the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, which are in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the principal Act, as amended by section 4 of this Act, shall, for all purposes be deemed to be, and to have always been, validly done or taken in accordance with law, as if section 22 of the principal Act as amended by section 4 of this Act had been in force at all materials times when such acts or proceedings were done or taken.

6. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, but subject to the provisions of section 21-A of the principal Act, any proceeding taken or order passed under the principal Act which has been disposed of before the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, contrary to the provisions of section 22 of the principal Act, as amended by section 4 of this Act, shall be reopened and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section 22 of the principal Act as so amended :

Provided that no such proceedings or order shall be reopened under this section after the expiry of a period of five years from the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette :

Provided further that no such proceeding or order shall be reopened unless the person affected has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

11. Now, the primary question is that whether these provisions for validation as well as reopening of cases which are even covered by the quasi judicial/judicial orders inter-parties can be reopened and whether such a provision would stand



the scrutiny of law. In this regard, firstly, it has to be seen that the alleged orders upon which rights are claimed by the petitioners, are arising directly from or by following the dictum of the judgment of this Court in S.Naganatha Ayyar And Ors. Vs. The Authorised Officer And Ors.⁵ Once the said judgment is reversed on appeal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by its decision in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and Another Vs. S.Naganatha Ayyar and Others⁶ and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India did not expressly make the overruling of the legal position prospective then it is deemed that the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is to be taken into account as such from the date of provision coming into force. It goes without saying that the dictum of the judgment applies retrospectively and will be applicable to all pending proceedings. Therefore, no exception can be taken for the retrospective application of the impugned enactment, which only gives a statutory recognition to the already existing position of law and therefore, is only clarificatory in nature and thus can be of retrospective operation.

12. As far as the rights being created by orders in the interregnum is concerned, in a similar situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arooran Sugars Limited⁷ had held that such subsequent judgments are based on the pre-amended provision and once such position is effaced by the amendment with retrospective effect then the Act, giving full effect to the provision, cannot be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder for ready reference:-

" 16. The scope of a non obstante clause and of Validating Act has been examined by this Court from time to time. Reference in this connection be made to the judgment in the case of Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [(1969) 2 SCC 283] , where Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench said : (SCC pp. 286-87, para 4)

"When a legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condition, of course, is that the

5 Refer Footnote No.3

6 Refer Footnote No.4

7 (1997) 1 SCC 326



WEB COPY

legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not possess or exercise. A court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law."

The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd.



WEB COPY

v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional."

Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India.



13. As a matter of fact, the learned Judge has considered this issue in detail in the judgment, dated 13.03.2009 in W.P.No.19088 of 1997 and we are in agreement with the said findings thereto. Therefore, we reject the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned Act 11 of 1996 and uphold the validity of the same.

W.A.No.1215 of 2005:

14. In the instant case, the deceased first petitioner and the second petitioner preferred R.P.No.79 of 1998 against the order of the second respondent in proceeding further with the matter by including the lands covered by the settlement. An order, dated 25.08.2001 was passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms). The order in detail refers to the entire history of the case and ultimately in paragraph Nos.8 and 9 found as follows:-

" 8. The order of Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms) dated 21.12.73 was reopened only as per the High Court ruling in CRP No.706 dt: 6.7.81 and with reference to the provision of the amended Act 11/96.

9. From the above discussed points, it is clearly and beyond any say of doubt understood that the petitioners have no other document to produce except document 582/70 registered on 18.4.70 which is void, under Section 22(2) and (3) of the Amended Act 11/96 and order that the extent noted in the schedule below be included in the holdings of the deceased landowner V.K.Babu @ Palanisamy for the purpose of determination of his holding."

Thus, it may be seen that the prophetic pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Naganatha Ayyar case (cited supra) that the parties would defeat the purposes of the Act, came true in this very case. Even though the settlement deed is dated 02/02/1970, it was presented for registration only on 18.04.1970 after the notification of the act. The finding of the authority is that it has been anti-dated as if it is executed on 02.02.1970 to save its validity and therefore, the authority declared the settlement deed as void and passed the above order.

15. After the said order was passed on 25.08.2001, on 10.12.2001, the above Writ Petition in W.P.No.26079 of 2001 is filed in which the only prayer was to challenge the constitutional validity of the order and not even as a consequential prayer is made against the above said order dated 25.08.2001. However, an interim application is filed to grant stay of the said order and an interim order was passed. Subsequently, as against the very same order, the appellants



preferred L.T.C.M.A.No.4 of 2002 and by an order, dated 20.10.2003, the said appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was reported before the Tribunal that the appellants had also filed W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and in W.M.P.No.38583 of 2001 had obtained an order of absolute stay of operation of the above order of the Assistant Commissioner on 18.03.2002. Stating so, since the matter is already sub-judice before the High Court, the Land Tribunal dismissed the appeal by an order, dated 20.10.2003.

16. Challenging the same, the appellants preferred W.P.No.9924 of 2004 and the same came to be disposed off by the learned Single Judge by the judgment, dated 16.04.2004. The learned Single Judge found that the order impugned in the Writ Petition has already been stayed in the pending Writ Petition No.26079 of 2001. Therefore, the learned Judge found that the petitioners cannot invoke parallel remedies and upheld the order of the Land Tribunal dismissing the appeal as sub-judice. Aggrieved by the same, the present Writ Appeal No.1215 of 2005 is filed.

17. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that when this Court had only granted stay of order under appeal, without keeping the appeal in abeyance it was not open for the Tribunal to have dismissed the appeal itself as sub-judice. The order dated 25.08.2001 was not put to challenge in the above Writ Petition No.26079 of 2001 wherein the prayer was only challenging the constitutional validity of amending act. Therefore, he would submit that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge that there was parallel proceedings and that the appellant was pursuing two remedies is incorrect in law and the appeal has to be decided on merits as the issue of the date of the settlement order has to be gone into on merits in the appeal.

18. We have carefully considered the above submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellants and we are unable to accept the same for the following reasons:-

(i) Firstly, even while challenging the constitutional validity, the petitioners did not make any consequential prayer to challenge the order dated 25.08.2001. The appellants had specifically obtained stay of the operation of the said order. Even after the dismissal of the appeal in L.T.C.M.A.No.4 of 2002 as sub-judice, no prayer was made to amend the consequential relief on the other hand the appellant had thought it fit to challenge the order by way of Writ Petition. Even though the above Writ Petition was pending, as pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 3 to 8, the authorities proceeded to publish the draft statement under



Section 10(5) of the Act and also published final statement under Section 12 of the Act. The petitioners had challenged the same by filing two Writ Petitions in W.P.Nos.8598 and 8599 of 2004 and by the judgment, dated 07.06.2011, a learned Judge had in detail considered the entire proceedings and by relying upon the aforementioned judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and Another Vs. S.Naganatha Ayyar and Others (cited supra), held that all along due notices were served on the petitioners and their transactions are void and upheld the statements. The petitioners have not filed any appeal whatsoever as against the said judgment and the same has become final.

(ii) Secondly, after the judgment of the learned Judge having become final and the lands are also being allotted in favour of the third parties, namely respondents 3 to 8, by way of assigning, belatedly now the said appeal cannot be restored to be determined on merits.

(iii) This apart, the original authority on merits had found that only to defeat the provisions of the Act, the settlement deed which is presented for registration well after the notification, is artificially dated prior to the notified date. Therefore, after lapse of so many years and after much water had flown, there is no question of considering the appeal once again on merits. Once it was the case of the appellants that everything depends upon the validity of the legislation to reopen and once the legislation is held to be valid then the consequential actions which have attained finality are entitled to remain.

(iv) Therefore, in view of the fact that subsequent to the filing of the Writ Petition in the year 2004, in the year 2011 itself, the Writ Petitions filed by the same appellants against the draft statement and final statement having been dismissed, the petitioners having allowed the said order to remain final cannot be now permitted to once again re-agitate the earlier order passed in the appeal and accordingly, we find no merits in the appeal.

(v) The subsequent assignees of the land cannot be eternally made to suffer the litigation especially when the appellants have prolonged the above Writ Petition No.26079 of 2001 for 21 years and the present appeal of the year 2005 for a period of 17 years.

Thus, finding no merits, we dismiss the present Writ Appeal.

The Result :

19. In the result,



(i) W.P.No.26079 of 2001 stands dismissed and W.M.P.Nos.16633 and 16636 of 2020 are closed;

(ii) W.A.No.1215 of 2014 stands dismissed and C.M.P.No.19551 of 2019 is closed;

(iii) There shall be no orders as to costs.

Sd/-
Deputy Registrar(CS)

//True copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

grs

To

1. The Secretary to Government,
Law Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai - 600 009.
2. The Assistant Commissioner,
(Land Reforms), Erode.
3. The Land Tribunal
(District Revenue Officer),
Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005.

+2ccs to Mr.Muthumani Doraisami, Advocate SR.No.29830

+1cc to Government Pleader SR.No.30627, 30629

W.P.No.26079 of 2001
and W.A.No.1215 of 2005

PA(CO)
GMY(27/05/2022)