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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLREV No. 737 of 2013

From an order dated 02.08.2013 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonepur passed in S.C. No. 92 of 2009 rejecting the application for discharge .

1.Ananda Mallik
2.Sarathi Mallik
3.Asrapi Mallik
4.Gajendra Mallik
5.Banita Mallik

.... **Petitioners**

-versus-

State of Odisha

.... **Opp. Party**

Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Mode :

For Petitioners

: Mr. Himansu Sekhar Mishra,
Advocate

For Opp. Party

: Mr. P.C. Das and Mr.S.N.Nayak
(Addl. Standing Counsel)

CORAM:

JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

.....
Date of Judgment : 22.07.2022

.....
Savitri Ratho, J.

The petitioners have filed this Criminal Revision petition challenging the impugned order dated 02.08.2013 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonepur passed in S.C. No. 92 of 2009 framing charge against them under Sections 304 (B)/306 of IPC. The learned trial court vide order dated 02.08.2013 has rejected

the application filed by the petitioners for discharge and framed charge against them for commission of offences under Sections 498-A/304-B/306/34 Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (in short “DP Act”) .

2. The prosecution case in brief as per the FIR is that the marriage of the Soudamini, daughter of the informant Lokanath Bisi had been solemnized with Ananda Mallik in the month of Baisakh as per vedic rites. On 08.08.1989, her husband and in laws had killed her. He was informed about this over telephone by a person from Lariabahal. Ananda Mallik had relationship with his sister in law and there was demand for dowry and they were not allowing her to come to his house. On receiving the report, Dunguri Police Station P.S. Case No. 57 of 2009 was registered.

3. On completion of investigation, police submitted chargesheet under Sections 498-A/304(B)/306/34 of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act against all the petitioners. After commitment, the case was renumbered as Sessions Case No.92 of 2009 after rejection of the application for discharge by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonapur, charge has been framed against them for commission of the offences under Sections 498 (A)/302/304(B)/34 IPC read with Section 4 of D.P. Act.

4. Petitioner No. 1-Ananda Mallik is the husband of the deceased, Petitioner No.2-Sarathi Mallik is her father in law, Petitioner No.3- Asrapi Mallik is her mother in law, Petitioner No 4-Gajendra Mallik is her brother in law (husband's elder brother) and Petitioner No.5-Banita Mallik is her sister in law.

5. I have heard Mr. H.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the Petitioners and Mr.P.C.Das, learned Additional Standing Counsel, perused the impugned order and the petition filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C in the learned trial Court. I have also gone through the written note of submission filed by the learned Additional Standing Counsel and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section – 161 Cr.P.C which are available in the case diary.

6. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as the offences under Sections-304 (B) and 306 IPC were not made out against the petitioners, a petition under Section 227 Cr.P.C. had been filed with a prayer to discharge them. But the learned trial Court has rejected the application mechanically without referring to the statements of the witnesses or the ingredients of the offences. He has also submitted that the allegations made by the witnesses are general and omnibus in nature without specifying any specific overt act against each of the petitioners and there was

absolutely no material on record even prima facie constitute offences under Sections-304 (B) and 306 IPC as the basic ingredients of the offences were absent .He has also urged that this Court should decide whether the trial court is required to scrutinize the law as well as the contentions raised in the petition for discharge and reflect the same in his order alongwith the availability of the basic ingredients of the offence for which charge is to be framed by referring to the statements of the chargesheet witnesses, so that they can be scrutinized by the higher Court and whether the law of precedents is applicable and what is the law laid down by the Apex Court for disposal of a petition filed under Section – 227 of the Cr.PC ? He has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of **Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi & others vs Jitendra Bhimaraj & others** reported in **AIR 1990 SC 1962 : (1990) 4 SCC 76** and **State of Karnataka vs L. Muniswamy & others** reported in **AIR 1977 SC 1489**,in support of his submissions.

7. Mr. P.C. Das, learned Additional Standing Counsel submits that the offences under Sections 498-A/304-B/306/34 of I.P.C. and Section 4 of the D.P. Act are well made out against all the petitioners and hence charges have been rightly framed against them. The law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and

different High Court is that at the stage of framing of charges, no roving enquiry is permissible and it is only to be seen from the material brought along with the investigation report whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie make out a case against the alleged accused person or not. The learned trial court has perused materials available in the charge sheet and has rightly framed the charges and at the stage of framing charge, the Court is not required to hold an elaborate inquiry and as such only prima facie case is to be seen. As charge has been framed by the learned trial court after going through the material available on record, no interference is warranted in the order. Lokanath Bisi, father of the deceased recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has stated that the deceased was complaining about the cruelty meted on her by the petitioner who was demanding a motor cycle and death took place on 08.08.2009 while the marriage had been solemnized on 19.04.2009 (within barely four months) which is after a period of only 3 to 4 months. He has also stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty in her in laws house on several occasions. His statement is supported by other witnesses. As sufficient materials are available to constitute offences under Sections 498-A/304-B/306/34 of I.P.C. and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, the learned trial court has rightly rejected the

application for discharge filed by the petitioners and framed charge against them for the aforesaid offences. He relies on the decisions reported in **2020 (II) OLR 477, Prasanna Kr Palo vs. State, State by Karnataka Lokayukta v. M.R. Hiremath** reported in **2019 (7) SCC 515** and **Bhavna Bai vs Ghashyam** reported in **(2020)78 OCR (SC) 479**.

8. Sections – 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. provide as follows:

Section - 227 Discharge. *If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted there- with, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this be- half, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.*

228. Framing of charge.

(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub- section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.

In the case of **L Muniswamy** (supra), the Supreme Court after referring to the provision of Section – 227 Cr.PC has held as follows :

... “ It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is of is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.” ...

In the case of **Niranjan Singh Karam Singh** (supra), the Supreme Court after referring to Section 227 of the Cr.P.C has observed as follows :

...“Section 227, introduced for the first time in the New Code, confers a special power on the Judge to discharge an accused at the threshold if 'upon consideration' of the record and documents he considers 'that there is not sufficient ground' for proceeding against the accused. In other words his consideration of the record and document at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for proceeding with the trial against the accused. If he comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under section 228, if not he will discharge the accused. It must be remembered that this section was introduced in the Code to avoid waste of public time over cases which did not disclose a prima facie case and to save the accused from avoidable harassment and expenditure. The next question is what is the scope and ambit of the 'consideration' by the trial court at that stage. Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed? It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon to consider is whether there is

sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution”...

In the case of **MR Hiramath** (supra), the Supreme Court has held that :

*...“It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In the **State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan : (2014) 11 SCC 709** ,adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject; this Court held :*

“29...At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”

In the case of ***Bhavna Bai*** (supra), the High Court holding that, while framing charges, the court should apply the judicial mind and should give reasons in concise manner for framing charges and that the trial court has failed to apply its mind while framing charges quashed the charges against the respondents and discharged them from the offences under Section – 302/34 IPC. The Supreme Court referred to its decision in the case of ***Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another*** (2012) 9 SCC 460, to explain the difference between the requirements of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., and held as follows:

*....“As discussed above, in the present case, upon hearing the parties and considering the allegations in the charge sheet, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The order dated 12.12.2018 framing the charges is not a detailed order. For framing the charges under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons. As pointed out earlier, at the stage of framing the charge, the court is not required to hold an elaborate enquiry; only prima facie case is to be seen. As held in ***Kanti Bhadra Shah and another v. State of West Bengal*** (2000) 1 SCC 722, while exercising power under Section 228*

Crl.P.C., the judge is not required record his reasons for framing the charges against the accused. Upon hearing the parties and based upon the allegations and taking note of the allegations in the charge sheet, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and framed the charges against the accused- respondent Nos.1 and 2. While so, the High Court was not right in interfering with the order of the trial court framing the charges against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and the High Court, in our view, erred in quashing the charges framed against the accused. The impugned order cannot therefore be sustained and is liable to be set aside.”...

In the case of **Amit Kapoor** (supra), the trial Court had framed charge against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 448 and 306 IPC. The High Court quashed the offence under Section 448 IPC which was challenged by the informant. The Supreme Court held as follows :

“.. 19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The

*final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in **State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39**: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4)*

4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If 'the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, 'the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which — ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the

trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction.

Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the

accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227”...

The Supreme Court in the case of **Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Ors. 1979(3) SCC 4**, with regard to scope of Section 227 CrPC has held as follows :

... “ The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”

9. **Section 216** of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows :

“216. Court may alter charge – (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.

(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.

(3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defense or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original charge.

(4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary.

(5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.”

In the case of **Jasvinder Saini vs State (Govt of NCT) : (2013) 7 SCC 256** , the Supreme Court while quashing the charge under Section 302 IPC, has held as follows:

... “11. A plain reading of the above would show that the Court’s power to alter or add any charge is unrestrained provided such addition and/or alteration is made before the judgment is pronounced. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 216 deal with the procedure to be followed once the Court decides to alter or add any charge. Section 217 of the Code deals with the recall of witnesses when the charge is altered or added by the Court after commencement of the trial. There can in the light of the above be no doubt about the competence of the Court to add or alter a charge at any time before the judgment. The circumstances in which such addition or alteration may be made are not, however, stipulated in Section 216. It is all the same trite that the question of any such addition or alternation would generally arise either because the Court finds the charge already framed to be defective for any reason or because such addition is considered necessary after the commencement of

the trial having regard to the evidence that may come before the Court.”..

10. A perusal of the contents of the application filed under Section – 227 Cr.PC in the Court below and the Criminal Revision petition reveals that they are to the effect the ingredients of the offences under Sections-306 and 304-B IPC are not made out for which the petitioners should be discharged. So it is not necessary to discuss or consider if charge under Sections 498 – A IPC and Section 4 D.P. Act have been rightly framed against the petitioners.

11. In order to decide whether the ingredients of the two offences are made out against the petitioners it would be apposite to quote the two provisions.

“Section 304-B Dowry death - (i) *where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative or her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.*

Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (18 of 1961).

Section-306. Abetment of suicide.—*If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”*

The ingredients necessary for attracting Section 304-B IPC are :-

[a] When the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury, or [b] occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. [c] and the aforesaid two facts springs within 7 years of girl's marriage.

[d] and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative.

[e] this is in connection with the demand of dowry.

If these conditions exist, it would constitute a dowry death; and the husband and/or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death.

The ingredients necessary to make out a case under Section 306 IPC are (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

In the present case, it is not in dispute that the deceased Soudamini died of burn injuries, that she died otherwise than under

normal circumstances, and that the death was within a period of 7 years of marriage and she was being treated with cruelty soon before her death. But the only consideration now is if there is any material that this cruelty and / or harassment was for / or in connection with any demand of dowry and / or this cruelty was sufficient for her to take her own life .

12. The grievance of the petitioners is that the learned trial Court has rejected the contentions of the petitioners without referring to any statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC or the ingredients of the offences or the decisions of the Supreme Court. After perusal of the impugned order, I find that the learned trial Court has referred to the contentions of the petitioners and the ingredients of the offences and held that materials are available to make out the offence without referring to the statements of any particular witness.

For exercising power under Section – 227 of the Cr.P.C to discharge an accused , it is not necessary that an application for discharge should be filed and the trial court can also exercise such power suo motu . But as Section – 227 Cr.P.C mandates furnishing of reasons for discharging an accused , so it is mandatory for the trial court to mention the reasons for discharging the accused

whether it discharges such power suo motu or on the basis of an application filed before it by the prosecution or defence. . The object behind such mandate is that the reasons can be scrutinized by the higher court .

Section 228 CrI.P.C does not provide for recording of reasons by the learned trial court for proceeding to frame charge . But when an application for discharge is filed and is rejected by the trial court , brief reasons should be given referring to the materials on the basis of which the trial court is satisfied that a case is made out for framing of charge . The trial court is not required to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or weigh or balance the evidence and probabilities which is a matter for trial , but it has to sift the materials produced by the prosecution in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Neither a detailed discussion or evaluation of the material or reference to judicial pronouncements or a discussion of the provisions of law are necessary . But unless the Court refers to the statements or materials basing on which it is satisfied that a case is made out for framing charge for which it rejects the application for discharge , even though ample materials are available against an accused , it will unnecessarily provide scope for challenge to its

order before the higher court and the higher court will have to sift the materials produced by the prosecution .

13. I have perused the case diary and found that Lokanath Bisi and Mandakini Bisi (parents of the deceased) and grandfather Rama Chandra Bisi have stated that after one or two occasions, the petitioners were not allowing the deceased to go home in spite of her desire to go and the requests and efforts of her father. She had complained that her husband was having relations with his sister in law and had demanded a motorcycle for which he was quarrelling with her. Demand of motorcycle is supported by the statements of other witnesses. In spite of request of the parents and her own request , Petitioner No 1, her husband was not taking her home to visit her parents. Her father - Lokanath Bisi had gone to their house on more than one occasions to take the deceased home with him but the petitioners did not allow her to go, for which he had to return to his house without her. The deceased had informed her father about demand for motorcycle by her husband - petitioner No.1, Ananda Mallik. Baisakhu Mallik, Bina Mallik , Tikemani Hati , Kishore Mallik and some others have stated about breaking open the door of the house to rescue the deceased who was unable to speak and taking her to hospital . As specific allegations are not available

against Petitioner Nos.2 to 5 to have demanded dowry , I am of the opinion that the ingredients necessary to make out an offence under Section – 304-B IPC against them are lacking . The statements recorded in the case diary are sufficient to frame charge for the offence Section – 304 –B IPC against the Petitioner No.1-Ananda Mallik , but not against Petitioner Nos.2 to 5.

14. As regards the offence under Section – 306 IPC, the parents of the deceased have stated that the deceased was disturbed as her husband was having relationship with his sister in law and wanted to go home but the petitioners were not allowing her to go to her parents house , in spite of requests of her father who had come to the house of the petitioners on a number of occasions. I am therefore of the opinion that the materials on record are sufficient to frame charge under Section – 306 IPC against all the petitioners.

15. But as the trial Court in exercise of power under Section 216 Cr.P.C has the power to alter or add any charge any time before the judgment is passed, in case a prima facie appraisal of the evidence adduced before it any time makes out an offence under Section 304-B IPC, it will not be precluded from framing a charge under Section 304-B IPC against Petitioner Nos. 2 to 5. The

observations in this order should not influence the trial court in any manner while conducting the trial .

16. The Criminal Revision is partly allowed. The charge under Section 304-B IPC only is quashed against Petitioner Nos.2 to 5 only. The charge framed against Petitioner No.1 Ananda Mallik for the offences under Sections 498 (A)/ 304 B /306 /34 IPC read with Section 4 of D.P. Act. does not call for any interference . Similarly , charge framed against the Petitioner Nos.2 to 5 for the offences under Sections - 498 (A)/306 / 34 IPC read with Section 4 of D.P. Act does not warrant interference .

17. On account of the interim order passed by this Court on 22.08.2013 and extended from time to time till 26.09.2013, if trial has not progressed, the learned trial Court is requested to take steps for disposal of the trial within six months from receipt of this order .

18. The Criminal Revision is partly allowed.

19. Issue urgent certified copy as per rules.

20. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonapur, forthwith by the Registry.

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(Savitri Ratho)
Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated 22nd July 2022 / puspa