

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK**CRA No.113 of 2000**

**(An appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973)**

BasudevSoren

....

Appellant***-versus-******State of Odisha***

....

Respondent**Advocates appeared in this case:*****For Appellant***

:

Mr. Akash Bhuyan, Advocate***For Respondent***

:

**Mr. P.K. Muduli
Addl. Government Advocate**

**CORAM:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAİK**

**JUDGMENT
23.03.2022**

Dr. S. Muralidhar, CJ.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19th April, 2000 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rairangpur in S.T. Case No.28/230 of 1999 convicting the Appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.

2. The case of the prosecution is that one Dula Tudu of village Kochagobara @ Sangobara went to the house of one Dikuram Tudu at 6 am on 9th June, 1999 and informed him that while he and his wife were going to their paddy field near Bihar Border M.I.P. Project Canal, they found the dead body of a male person with bleeding injuries. Thereupon, Dikuram Tudu went to the M.I.P. Canal along with Bhadu Kandan Tudu, Mohan Tudu, Raj Kishore Tudu, Sidhilal, Mohana Tudu, Nimai Hembram and others. They found the dead body as described by Dula Tudu and proceeded to register an FIR with the O.I.C., Tiring Police Station. Thereafter the police registered P.S. Case No.32 of 1999.

3. An inquest was held over the dead body in the presence of the father of the deceased. The dead body was thereafter sent for post-mortem examination. The O.I.C. seized the blood-stained earth, the sample earth and blood-stained hair and wearing apparels of the deceased.

4. On 13th June, 1999, the present Appellant was arrested. He is stated to have made a statement (Ext.12) in presence of witnesses on 15th June, 1999. He took the investigating team to village Rajabasa for recovery of the weapon of offence and wearing apparels. There the accused led the Investigating Officer (I.O.) and others to the rear side of the house and dug the earth and produced the 'Katari' (M.O.I) and one navy blue coloured banian (M.O.III) and one navy coloured napkin (M.O. II). Thereafter the accused is stated to have led the I.O. and the witnesses to Dunguri

pond. He is stated to have entered the pond and brought out a red colour Gamuchha stained with blood (M.O.V).

5. The weapon of offence was sent to the Medical Officer. The other material objects were sent to the D.S.F.S.L. Bhubaneswar for chemical examination. A charge sheet was submitted against the accused on 10th September, 1999. The defence plea was one of the complete denial. In his statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused alleged that the Rajnagar P.S. personnel assaulted him and they took him to Tiring P.S. where again he was assaulted by the I.O. He contended that the case was falsely foisted on him.

6. Sixteen witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The defence examined no witness. The case was based on circumstantial evidence and the question addressed by the trial Court was whether the accused had intentionally committed the murder of the deceased Bagun @ Janha Sai.

7. From the evidence of PW 15, the mother of the deceased, it transpired that on the night of the occurrence, while the deceased was taking dinner, the accused came there and asked the deceased to accompany him. At the instance of the accused, the deceased went with him. On the following morning, one of the villagers informed PW 15 that her son was lying dead in the canal. In the cross-examination, PW 15 stated that she had not been examined by the police, although she was not in the list of witnesses filed along with the chargesheet. PW 13 was the father of the deceased.

He himself did not see the deceased go away with the accused but stated that he had heard from PW 15, his wife that the deceased had proceeded with the accused at around 8 pm.

8. Addressing the issue of whether the long gap between the time when the accused was last seen with the deceased and the time when the dead body was discovered, the trial Court referred to the evidence of PW 14, who was a Specialist in Medicine in S.D. Hospital in Rairangpur. He conducted the post-mortem on 10th June, 1999 and opined that the time since death was about 36-40 hours prior to the time of examination. From this, the trial Court concluded that the murder had taken place between 11 pm and 12 midnight. In light of the last seen evidence, the trial Court concluded that it was the accused, who killed the son of PWs 13 and 15.

9. The trial Court referred to the evidence of PW 11, Daman Majhi and PW 16, Golak Behari Mohapatra, S.I. of Police, Tiring PS in the context of the reliance by the prosecution on the statement by the accused while in custody which led to the recovery of the material objects. The trial Court noted that the defence counsel had been unable to shake the PWs and there was, therefore, nothing to disbelieve their evidence which corroborated each other in material particulars. The veracity of PW 11 was unable to be shaken in cross-examination. It was concluded that M.O. I, the katari, was the weapon used by the accused to cause the fatal injuries to the deceased. PW 16 also spoke of the

recovery of the blood stained Gamuchha from the pond at the instance of the accused.

10. The injuries on the deceased were proved by PW 14. He found the following injuries:

"One incised wound 2"x^{1/2}"x^{1/2}", one incised wound of size 2"x^{1/2}"x1"x1", one incised wound 1"x^{1/2}"x^{1/2}" and all were present on right side of forearm, across and near wrist joint and all were blackish brown in colour, inflicted by heavy sharp cutting weapon, one incised wound of size 3"x^{1/2}"x^{1/2}" near middle of right forearm, blackish, inflicted by sharp cutting weapon,

one incised wound 3"x2^{1/2}"x3" on left side of head near occipite, blackish brown in colour having blood clots. The cranial bone was fractured and the brain matter had come out,

one incised wound 2"x1"x^{1/2}" over right side of head inflicted by heavy sharp cutting weapon brownish black in colour."

11. It was sought to be contended in the trial Court by the learned counsel for the defence that M.O. I had been recovered from an open field and that the accused had not made any statement leading to such recovery. The trial Court, however, disbelieved this contention. On the recovery of blood stained gamuchha kept hidden, the trial Court rejected the argument that some other person might have thrown the seized gamuchha in the Dunguri pond.

12. On carefully analyzing the entire evidence, the trial Court concluded as under:

"From the evidence of P.W. 16 it is clear that the accused had confessed his guilt before him and P.W. 11 and thereafter the accused gave recovery of the articles from the backside of his house as well as from the Dunguri pond. So leading to discovery and the statements of the parents of the deceased shows that the accused had an intention and a bad motive to kill the deceased, Bagun Sai. However, it is clear that the accused had an intention to kill the deceased and in fact he had killed the deceased Bagun Sai by means of M.O.I. -Katari."

13. This Court has heard the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant and the learned AGA for the State.

14. Since this is a case based on circumstantial evidence the law in this regard requires to be recapitulated before proceeding to examine the evidence. In *Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 2 SCC 35*, the legal principles governing a case of circumstantial evidence were explained thus:

"13. Since this is a case of circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to find whether the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are established by satisfactory evidence, often described as 'clear and cogent' and secondly, whether the circumstances are of such a nature as to exclude every other hypothesis save the one that the appellant is guilty of the offences of which he is charged. In other words, the circumstances have to be of such a nature as to be consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him."

15. In *Tanviben Pankaj Kumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997)*

7 SCC 156, the Supreme Court reiterated as under:

“45. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the *Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes; unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between normal certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions (Jawaharlal Das v State of Orissa 1991 (3) SCC 27.*”

16. In the present case, the prosecution seeks to establish the following circumstances which according to it form a continuous

chain and further that each of the links in the chain has been substantiated by it by the evidence brought on record:

- (i) That the deceased was last seen with the accused as per the evidence of PW-15, the mother of the deceased, who stated that the accused came to the house of the deceased on the previous night around 8.00 PM and asked the deceased to accompany him.
- (ii) That the death of the deceased was homicidal. The injuries on the deceased could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon which was MO-I.
- (iii) That the accused, while in custody, made statements admissible under Section 27 of Evidence Act which led to the recovery of the weapon of offence, the wearing apparels of the accused.
- (iv) MO-I was stained with human blood. The red colour gamuchha (MO-5) which the accused held, unearthed from the Dunguri pond was also stained with blood.

17. It must be noted here that the trial Court did not give much importance to the absence of motive while referring to certain decisions, it was held that success or failure in prosecution case is not dependent on the proof or non-proof of the motive and that non-proof of motive is no reason to disbelieve an otherwise convincing and trustworthy evidence.

18. It must also be noted that in relation to the plea of the accused in the statement under Section 313 CrPC that he was tortured in police custody and forced to make a confession and that the

injuries on his person substantiates this, the trial Court held that the medical examination took place upon a reference made by the IO to the Medical Officer, which revealed his having six simple injuries. It was accordingly concluded by the trial Court that it could not have been by the IO who assaulted the accused.

19. Mr. Akash Bhuyan, learned counsel for the accused pointed out that the last seen evidence in the present case was not a reliable one and that the gap between the time when the accused was last seen and the time when the dead body discovered was not proximate, thereby ruling out the possibility of the accused being the author of the crime. It is submitted that PW-11 is an interested witness who spoke in the Court for the first time. He was trying to save his nephew from being implicated in the offence as the author of the crime and therefore his evidence was not trustworthy.

20. Mr. Bhuyan further emphasized that in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive is one of the crucial links in the chain of circumstances. Absence of proof of motive could be fatal to the case of the prosecution. Lastly, it is submitted that none of the wearing apparels of the accused was shown to have any human blood much less blood matching the blood group of the deceased. The injuries on the accused substantiated his plea that he was tortured in police custody. The evidence of the prosecution did not conclusively prove the guilt of the accused and he was accordingly entitled to the benefit of doubt.

21. Mr. Janmejaya Katikia, learned Additional Government Advocate, submitted that the absence of motive in a case like the present one cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. Reliance was placed on the decision in ***Surinder Singh vs. State*** **2021 SCC OnLine SC 1135**. On the evidence regarding the circumstance of 'last seen', Mr. Katikia submitted that PW-15, although an interested witness, was reliable and trustworthy and clearly spoke of the accused being the person with whom the deceased went on the previous night after which the dead body of the deceased was discovered. Relying on the decision in ***Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509***, Mr. Katikia submitted that the last seen evidence pointed unmistakably to the guilt of the accused and when seen with other circumstances, including the recoveries made at the instance of the accused, was sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused.

22. The above submissions have been considered. The Court will now proceed to discuss each of the links in the chain of circumstances, as projected by the prosecution. First is the link of 'last seen'. The decision in ***Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh(supra)*** is instructive in this regard. The legal position was explained in the said decision in Para-19 as under:

"19. It is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded against the accused merely on the ground that the accused was last seen with the deceased. In other words, a conviction cannot be based on the only circumstance of last seen

together. The conduct of the accused and the fact of last seen together plus other circumstances have to be looked into. Normally, last seen theory comes into play when the time gap, between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead, is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the perpetrator of the crime becomes impossible. It will be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. However, if the prosecution, on the basis of reliable evidence, establishes that the missing person was seen in the company of the accused and was never seen thereafter, it is obligatory on the part of the accused to explain the circumstances in which the missing person and the accused parted company. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in *Sahadevan v. State*. In such a situation, the proximity of time between the event of last seen together and the recovery of the dead body or the skeleton, as the case may be, may not be of much consequence. PWs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10 have all deposed that the accused was last seen with Diana. But, as already indicated, to record a conviction, that itself would not be sufficient and the prosecution has to complete the chain of circumstances to bring home the guilt of the accused."

23. Therefore, the mere fact of the accused being last seen with the deceased is not conclusive of the guilt of the accused. This is required to be viewed in the context of all other links in the chain of circumstances, each of which have to be conclusively proved.

24. There is but one prosecution witness in the present case in talks of the deceased being last seen with the accused. That witness is PW-15, the mother of the deceased. Her evidence is that of an 'interested' witness and has to be evaluated with a degree of caution. In *Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish Singh (2005) 10 SCC 498*, it was held:

"7. ...The requirement of law is that the testimony of inimical witnesses has to be considered with caution. If otherwise the witnesses are true and reliable their testimony cannot be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical witnesses. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false implication. It also can be a ground for assault. Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to examine the testimony of inimical witnesses with due caution and diligence."

25. In her cross-examination, PW-15 states 'it is a fact that I have not stated before the police that the accused called my son to his house'. Further, interestingly, she is unable to deny that there could have been other persons present along with the accused when her son was called away. She states in her cross-examination that 'while the accused was inside the Court yard, at that time, I cannot say who were staying in the outside of the court yard. I cannot say if any other persons were accompanied with my son from the outside.' She explains that she was standing inside the court yard and that she 'did not see any other person outside'. All of the above statements go to show that PW-15, who for some reason did not tell the police about the accused calling

the deceased to his house, does not rule out the possibility of there being other persons present when the deceased was called away.

26. Turning to the evidence of PW-13, the father of the deceased, he also does not corroborate PW-15 since he himself did not see the accused taking the deceased away. In his examination-in-chief PW-13 only states that 'my wife told me that the accused called my son to elsewhere'. This is, therefore, hearsay evidence and therefore not admissible. The net result is that it is only PW-15 and no one else, who purportedly saw the accused calling the deceased away on the previous night. The Court does not consider the evidence of PW-15 to be reliable on account of her admission in her cross-examination, that she never told the police at any point of time that the accused called away the deceased. Her evidence does not inspire confidence.

27. In *Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 6 SCC 403*, the Supreme Court explained:

“28. With the development of law, the theory of last seen has become a definite tool in the hands of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. This concept is also accepted in various judgments of this Court. The Court has taken the consistent view that where the only circumstantial evidence taken resort to by the prosecution is that the accused and deceased were last seen together, it may raise suspicion but it is not independently sufficient to lead to a finding of guilt.

29. In *Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar [1994 Supp.(2) SCC 372]*, this Court took the view that where the appellant was alleged to have gone to the house of one

Sitaram in the evening of 19th July, 1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram, the evidence was very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it was accepted that they were there, it would, at best, amount to be the evidence of the appellants having been last seen together with the deceased. The Court further observed that:

“ 31.it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record a finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction, on that basis alone, can be founded.”

30. Even in the case of *State of Karnataka v. M.V. Mahesh* [(2003) 3 SCC 353], this Court held that merely being last seen together is not enough. What has to be established in a case of this nature is definite evidence to indicate that the deceased had been done to death of which the respondent is or must be aware as also proximate to the time of being last seen together. No such clinching evidence is put forth. It is no doubt true that even in the absence corpus delicti it is possible to establish in an appropriate case commission of murder on appropriate material being made available to the Court.

31. In the case of *State of U.P. v. Satish* [(2005) 3 SCC 114], this Court had stated that the principle of last seen comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.

32. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. But this theory should be applied while taking into consideration the case of the prosecution in its entirety and keeping in mind the

circumstances that precede and follow the point of being so last seen.”

28. In the absence of any independent evidence in this regard, it would be difficult to conclude that this important link of ‘last seen’ in the chain of circumstances has been convincingly proved by the prosecution.

29. The gap between the time when the deceased went away with the accused and the time when the body was discovered, it is not so proximate as to rule out the possibility of the accused not being present with the deceased at the time of the death. The informant filed a report before the Police at 10 am on the following day and the Investigating Officer (IO) visited the spot at 12 noon. There is every possibility that between 8 pm the previous evening when the accused allegedly called away the deceased and the discovery of the said dead body at 10 am the next day, there was more than a 12-hour gap. This does not rule out the possibility of some other person being the author of the crime.

30. The Court next takes up the discussion of the evidence of recovery of the weapon of offence and the wearing apparels of the accused on the basis of the statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act while in police custody. At this juncture, it must be noticed that as many as six prosecution witnesses turned hostile. PW-10, who also turned hostile, states that that the police had obtained his signatures and those of the other recovery

witness, PW-11, Daman Majhi, on blank papers. PW-10 states that he was not present at the time of search. He states in his examination-in-chief:

"It is not a fact that I have stated before the police that the accused has made confession before the police that he gave recovery of the articles and weapon of offence to the police and the police seized the same in my presence.

Cross-examination (by the PP):

I put my signature on blank papers at the instance of police. So also police obtained the signatures of Daman Majhi. I and Daman gave signatures in some plain papers at the police station."

31. In other words, PW-10 throws grave doubts even on the veracity of the evidence of PW-11, whose evidence was relied upon by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court. PW-11, in his cross-examination, admits to his being the uncle of Baset Majhi who was also been detained in the police station when the investigation was in progress. The evidence of PW-11 is, therefore, not said to be that of an entirely independent witness, who was disinterested in the outcome of the case.

32. The third element which is relevant for the purpose for appreciating the evidence concerning the alleged recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the accused is whether such statement leading to the unearthing of the weapon was made freely and voluntarily. In his statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused stated that he was subjected to torture. The Medical

Officer (PW-9) who examined him noticed the following six injuries on the accused:

"(i) Abrasion, irregular, inflected with discharge, reddish-white, at centre with scab formation at periphery of size 1"x1", situated on right lower limb 1" below patella.

(ii) Abrasion with scab formation 1/2"x1/2" right patella.

(iii) Abrasion scab formation 1/2"x1/2" 1/2" below the 2nd injury.

(iv) Abrasion scab formation 1/2"x1/2" right elbow extensor surface.

(v) Abrasion with scab formation 1/2"x1/2" left elbow extensor surface.

(vi) Abrasion healed 1/4"x1/4" on middle finger of left hand proximal end adjacent to the nail."

33. PW-9 opined that:

"All the injuries were simple in nature, might have been caused by hard and blunt weapon. Age of the injuries within 4 to 6 days from the time of examination."

34. The aforementioned injuries do bear out the allegation of the accused that he was subjected to violence while in custody. It was incumbent on the police to explain the above injuries on the accused since it happened while the accused was in police custody. The voluntariness of the statement of the accused leading to the discovery of weapon is also therefore doubtful. Consequently, the Court is not satisfied that the prosecution has been able to show that the accused made a voluntary statement while in police custody which led to the discovery of the weapon of offence.

35. Turning now to the fourth circumstance of the presence of human blood on the MO-1 and the wearing apparels of the accused, the trial Court appears to have adopted a strange reasoning that since it is the IO, who sent the accused for medical examination, it could not be said that the IO had himself inflicted the injuries on the accused. Merely because the IO referred the accused for medical examination would not *ipso facto* mean that he was not responsible for the injuries that the accused received while in police custody.

36. Turning next to the forensic evidence, the blood-stained hair of the deceased did not reveal the blood group. As far as the wearing apparels of the accused were concerned, these were exhibits i, j and k. There was no blood on any of them. Even on the Katari (MO-1), there was no blood. Importantly, the nail scrapping of the accused which was collected during investigation showed no presence of blood. In other words, there was nothing to connect the accused with the deceased as far as the Serologist's report was concerned. This is an important piece of evidence which extends to the accused the benefit of doubt, but which was not discussed at all by the trial Court. Therefore, this important link in the chain of circumstances could not be established by the prosecution.

37. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the absence of proof of motive can be critically fatal to the case of the prosecution. The

observation in *Surinder Singh v. State (supra)* was in the context of a case of direct evidence and not a case of circumstantial evidence. It was explained in the said decision as under:

"22. It is significant to note that 'motive' is distinct from 'object and means' which innervates or provokes an action. Unlike 'intention', 'motive' is not the yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive would not constitute an offence but it may not be true when an unlawful act is committed with best of the motive. Unearthing 'motive' is akin to an exercise of manual brain-mapping. At times, it becomes herculean task to ascertain the traces of a 'motive'.

23. This Court has time and again ruled:

"that in case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy." [See: *Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra and Bipin Kumar Mondal vs. State of West Bengal*]

24. We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is infallibly a crucial factor, and is a

substantial aid for evincing the commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point towards the guilt of the accused and testaments of eye-witnesses to the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record."

38. Therefore, there is a distinction between cases of direct evidence where motive may not be a critical factor and cases of circumstantial evidence where motive does constitute a critical link in the chain of circumstances. In the present case, not only has the prosecution miserably failed to prove any motive for crime, the evidence of the PWs themselves indicate that the accused and the deceased were in fact not inimical to each other. PW-12 states that "the accused and the deceased were both bosom friends". This is from the witness who has not been declared hostile by the prosecution. While discussing the aspect of motive, the trial Court has completely overlooked the above evidence. In the above circumstance, PW-12 himself stating that they were close friends and PW-15, the mother and PW-13, the father of the deceased not stating anything to the contrary, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove motive. The prosecution has miserably failed to do so and therefore an important link of chain of circumstance is not proved.

39. The net result of the above discussion is that none of the links in the chain of circumstances have been established convincingly

by the prosecution. In *Brajesh Mavi v. The State (2012) 7 SCC 45* the Supreme Court explained:

“27.from the several decisions of this court available on the issue the said principles can be summed up by stating that not only the prosecution must prove and establish the incriminating circumstance(s) against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt but the said circumstance(s) must give rise to only one conclusion to the exclusion of all others, namely, that it is accused and nobody else who had committed the crime.”

40. Consequently, the Court is satisfied that the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside. The accused is acquitted of the offence under Section 302 IPC. The bail bonds, furnished by the accused, are hereby discharged.

41. The appeal is allowed in the above terms, but in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.

(S. Muralidhar)
Chief Justice

(R.K. Pattanaik)
Judge

S. Behera/S.K.Jena/PA