

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.19635 of 2021

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Smt Veena Singh Wife of Sri Nirmal Kumar Singh Resident of 146,
Bhikhanpur, Bhatta Road, Gumti No.2, P.S.- Ishakchak, District- Bhagalpur.

... .. Petitioner/s

Versus

1. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi.
3. The State Transport Authority, Bihar, Patna through its Secretary, Office situated at Bisheshwaraiya Bhawan, Baily Road, Patna.
4. State Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
5. The State Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi.

... .. Respondent/s

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Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s	:	Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha, Advocate
		Mr. Randhir Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s	:	Mr. Sarvesh Kumar, G.P.-24

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CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

and

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. KUMAR

ORAL JUDGMENT

(Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE)

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(The proceedings of the Court are being conducted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice/ Hon'ble Judges through Video Conferencing from their residential offices/residences. Also, the Advocates and the Staffs joined the proceedings through Video Conferencing from their residences/offices.)

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Date : 01-02-2022

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Petitioner has prayed for the following relief(s):-



“(i) For issuance of a direction to the State Government of Bihar and State Government of Jharkhand to relax the age of bus covering the distance from 1 kilometre to 250 kilometre per day for the buses upto to age of 15 years old in place of 12 years old by making necessary amendment in their agreement which they resolved and entered in the year 2007 which was published in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 25.5.2007 when both the state entered into an reciprocal transport agreement for operation of bus service in the Inter State route lying between the two states in which one of the conditions for grant of permit has been incorporated at clause 2(x) (Gha) that no permit shall be granted to any vehicle crossed the age of 12 years.

(ii) For issuance of a direction to the State Transport Commissioner, Bihar, Patna to consider the representation filed by the petitioner as contained in Annexure-1 to this petition and allow her to operate her bus bearing its registration number BR-51-7172 Model 2009 on the Inter State route Sultanganj to Jasidih, a distance of 222 Kms up and down trip daily covered with permanent permit no P.St.S 151/2011(JH), the permit renewed upto 21.7.2026 granted and issued by State Transport Authority, Bihar, Patna till completion of 15 years of vehicle age.

(iii) To grant any other relief or reliefs to the petitioner as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case.”

3. After the matter was heard for some time, finding



the Court not to be in favour with the submissions made across the Bar, learned counsel for the petitioner, under instructions, states that petitioner be permitted to take recourse to the remedies provided under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and also approach Respondent No. 3, namely the State Transport Authority, Bihar, Patna through its Secretary, Office situated at Bisheshwaraiya Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna and/or Respondent No. 4, namely State Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, venting out the grievances.

4. Liberty as prayed for is granted.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents states that if such a request is made by the petitioner, the authority concerned shall consider and dispose it of expeditiously and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of its receipt along with a copy of this order.

6. Statement accepted and taken on record.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***D. N. Jeevaraj Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka & Ors, (2016) 2 SCC 653***, paragraphs 34 to 38 observed as under:-

“34. The learned counsel for the parties addressed us on the question of the bona fides of Nagalaxmi Bai in filing a public interest litigation. We leave this question open and do not express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the



decision of the High Court in this regard.

35. However, we note that generally speaking, procedural technicalities ought to take a back seat in public interest litigation. This Court held in *Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P.* [*Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P.*, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] to this effect as follows: (SCC p. 515, para 16)

“16. The writ petitions before us are not inter parties disputes and have been raised by way of public interest litigation and the controversy before the court is as to whether for social safety and for creating a hazardless environment for the people to live in, mining in the area should be permitted or stopped. We may not be taken to have said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not apply. At the same time it has to be remembered that every technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence when a matter of grave public importance is for consideration before the court.”

36. A considerable amount has been said about public interest litigation in *R&M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group*, (2005) 3 SCC 91] and it is not necessary for us to dwell any further on this except to say that in issues pertaining to good governance, the courts ought to be somewhat more liberal in entertaining public interest litigation. However, in matters that may not be of moment or a litigation essentially directed against one organisation or individual (such as the present litigation which was directed only against Sadananda Gowda and later Jeevaraj was impleaded) ought not to be entertained or should be rarely entertained. Other remedies are also available to public spirited litigants and they should be encouraged to avail of such remedies.

37. In such cases, that might not strictly fall in the category of public interest litigation and for which other remedies are available, insofar as the issuance of a writ of mandamus is concerned, this Court held in *Union of India v. S.B. Vohra* [*Union of India v. S.B. Vohra*, (2004) 2 SCC 150: 2004 SCC (L&S) 363] that: (SCC p. 160, paras 12-13)

“12. Mandamus literally means a



command. The essence of mandamus in England was that it was a royal command issued by the King's Bench (now Queen's Bench) directing performance of a public legal duty.

13. A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been granted.”

38. A salutary principle or a well-recognised rule that needs to be kept in mind before issuing a writ of mandamus was stated in *Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India* [*Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India*, (1974) 2 SCC 630] in the following words: (SCC pp. 641-42, paras 24-25)

“24. ... The powers of the High Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to which proceedings for prerogative writs are subject in English practice. Nevertheless, the well-recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a mandamus would issue when there is no failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Even in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties, the salutary general rule, which is subject to certain exceptions, applied by us, as it is in England, when a writ of mandamus is asked for, could be stated as we find it set out in *Halsbury's Laws of England* (3rd Edn.), Vol. 11, p. 106:

‘198. *Demand for performance must precede application.*—As a



general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply, and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce, and that that demand was met by a refusal.'

25. In the cases before us there was no such demand or refusal. Thus, no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ, order, or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution."

8. As such, petition stands disposed of in the following terms:-

(a) Petitioner shall approach the authority concerned i.e. Respondent No. 3, namely the State Transport Authority, Bihar, Patna through its Secretary, Office situated at Bisheshwaraiya Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna and/or Respondent No. 4, namely State Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, within a period of two weeks from today by filing a representation for redressal of the grievance(s);

(b) The said authorities shall consider and dispose it of expeditiously by a reasoned and speaking order preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of its filing along with a copy of this order;



(c) The order assigning reasons shall be communicated to the petitioner;

(d) Needless to add, while considering such representation, principles of natural justice shall be followed and due opportunity of hearing afforded to the parties;

(e) Also, opportunity to place on record all relevant materials/documents shall be granted to the parties;

(f) Equally, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to take recourse to such alternative remedies as are otherwise available in accordance with law;

(g) We are hopeful that as and when petitioner takes recourse to such remedies, as are otherwise available in law, before the appropriate forum, the same shall be dealt with, in accordance with law and with reasonable dispatch;

(h) Liberty reserved to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum/Court, should the need so arise subsequently on the same and subsequent cause of action;

(i) We have not expressed any opinion on merits.
All issues are left open;

(j) The proceedings, during the time of current Pandemic- Covid-19 shall be conducted through digital mode, unless the parties otherwise mutually agree to meet in person



i.e. physical mode;

9. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

10. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(Sanjay Karol, CJ)

(S. Kumar, J)

Amrendra/PKP

AFR/NAFR	
CAV DATE	
Uploading Date	02.02.2022
Transmission Date	

