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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **CRL.M.C. 2183/2019**

AJAY SINGH & ORS

..... Petitioners

Through Ms. Sunaina Valecha, Adv. with
Petitioners in person

versus

STATE & ANR

..... Respondents

Through Ms. Meenakshi Dahiya, APP
W/SI Shiksha, PS Sector-23, Dwarka
ASI Satbir Singh
Mr. Vinod Kumar Dubey, Adv. for R-2
with respondent No.2 in person

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ANU MALHOTRA

ORDER

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30.01.2020

Vide the present petition, the petitioners seek quashing of the FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 submitting to the effect that a settlement has been arrived at between the petitioners and the respondent no.2 and no useful purpose would be served by the continuation of the proceedings in relation to the FIR in question.

The Investigating Officer of the case has identified the petitioner nos.1 to 5 present today in Court as being the accused arrayed in the FIR in question and has also identified respondent no.2 present in Court today as being the complainant of the said FIR.

The affidavit of the respondent no.2 in response to the petition has been submitted and taken on record whereby she affirms the factum of a settlement having been arrived at between her and the petitioners and she does not oppose the prayer made by the petitioner seeking quashing of the FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The respondent no.2 has produced her original Aadhar Card, copy of which is on the record as Ex.CW2/A. The respondent no.2 in her examination on oath by the Court has affirmed having signed her affidavit in support of the averments made in the petition Ex.CW2/B and the statement made by her during the course of proceedings in bail matter No.938/18 dated 24.2.2018 in FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka before Special Judge, CBI (PC Act), Dwarka Courts, Delhi which bears her signatures thereon as visible at Point A on Ex.CW2/C. She stated that she has signed these documents voluntarily of her own accord without any duress, coercion or pressure from any quarter. The marriage between the respondent No.2 and the petitioner No.1 has since been dissolved by a decree of divorce through mutual consent dated 2.11.2018 in HMA No. 2899/18 of the Court of Judge, Family Courts, Dwarka, New Delhi which is Ex. CW2/D. In terms of the settlement between the respondent No.3 and the petitioners, a total sum of Rs.10.50 lakhs had been agreed to be paid to her by the petitioner No.1 out of which Rs.7.00 lakhs have been to her previously and the balance sum of Rs.3.50 lakhs has been handed over to her by the petitioner No.1 in the form of a demand draft No.354811 dated 28.1.2020 drawn on

Union Bank of India in her name copy of which is Ex.CW2/E and that there are no claims of hers left against the petitioners now.

She has further stated that in view of the settlement between her and the petitioners, she has no opposition to the prayer made by the petitioners seeking quashing of the FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka nor does she wants the petitioners to be punished in relation thereto. She has further stated that she is a graduate and that she has made her statement after understanding its implications.

On behalf of the State, there is no opposition to the prayer made by the petitioners seeking the quashing of the FIR in question in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties.

There appears no reason to disbelieve the statement made by the respondent no.2 that she has arrived at a settlement with the petitioners voluntarily and after understanding the implications thereof in as much as the FIR has emanated from a matrimonial discord which has since been resolved by the reconciliation between the petitioner no.1 and the respondent no.2, it is considered appropriate to put a quietus to the litigation and disputes between the parties for maintenance of peace and harmony between them as also for the well being of the respondent no.2, in terms of the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Narender Singh & Ors. V. State of Punjab***; (2014) 6 SCC 466 wherein it has been observed vide paragraph 31(IV) to the effect:

“31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and

lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under [Section 482](#) of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

.....”

and in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another***, (2012) 10 SCC 303, to the effect : -

“58..... No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction

at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.” [Refer to B.S. Joshi, (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma, (2008) 16 SCC 1.]”

and in view of the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in *Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr.* (2013) 4 SCC 58, to the effect : -

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest

of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed....”

(emphasis supplied),

the FIR No.162/2016 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioners are quashed.

The petition is disposed of.

ANU MALHOTRA, J

JANUARY 30, 2020

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI

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AJAY SINGH & ORS. VS. STATE & ANR.

30.01.2020

CW-1 W/SI Shiksha, PS Dwarka, Sector-23

ON S.A.

I identify the petitioner no.1 Ajay Singh, petitioner No.2 C.L.Premi, petitioner No.3 Devendra Singh, petitioner No.4 Kalpana and petitioner No.5 Vandana Saxena present today in Court as being the accused arrayed in the FIR No.162/2016, PS Dwarka, Sector-23 registered under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and I also identify the respondent no.2 Smt. Kumud as being the complainant of the said FIR.

RO & AC
30.01.2020

ANU MALHOTRA, J

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI

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AJAY SINGH & ORS. VS. STATE & ANR.

30.01.2020

CW-2 Smt. Kumud Adarsh d/o Shri Ram Lachchhan Adarsh aged 39 years r/o Flat No.367, Sanskriti Apartments, Sector 19-B, Dwarka, Delhi.

ON S.A.

I have brought my original proof of identity, copy of which is on the record as Ex.CW2/A. My affidavit annexed to the petition bears my signatures thereon at points A & B thereon on Ex.CW2/B. The statement made by me during the course of proceedings in bail matter No.938/18 dated 24.2.2018 in FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka before Special Judge, CBI (PC Act), Dwarka Courts, Delhi bears my signatures thereon as visible at Point A on Ex.CW2/C. I have signed these documents voluntarily of my own accord without any duress, coercion or pressure from any quarter.

The marriage between me and the petitioner No.1 has since been dissolved by a decree of divorce through mutual consent dated 2.11.2018 in HMA No. 2899/18 of the Court of Judge, Family Courts, Dwarka, New Delhi is Ex. CW2/D. In terms of the settlement between me and the petitioners, a total sum of Rs.10.50 lakhs had been agreed to be paid to me by the petitioner No.1 out of which Rs.7.00 lakhs have been received by me previously and the balance sum of Rs.3.50 lakhs has been handed over to me by the petitioner No.1 in the form of a demand draft No.354811 dated 28.1.2020 drawn on Union Bank of India in my name, copy of which is

Ex.CW2/E and that there are no claims of mine left against the petitioners now.

In view of the settlement between me and the petitioners, I have no opposition to the prayer made by the petitioners seeking quashing of the FIR No.162/16 under Sections 498/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860, PS Dwarka of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 nor do I want the petitioners to be punished in relation thereto. I am a graduate and was working previously in an organization.

I have made my statement after understanding its implications voluntarily of my own accord without any duress, coercion or pressure from any quarter.

RO & AC
30.01.2020

ANU MALHOTRA, J