

**236 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRR-4062-2017 (O&M)

Date of decision-08.01.2020

Sawinder Singh

...Petitioner

Vs.

State of Punjab and others

...Respondents

CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ BAJAJ

Present: Mr. A.K.Walia, Advocate for the petitioner.

Ms. Monika Jalota, DAG, Punjab
for respondent Nos.1 and 3.

Ms. Harpreet Kaur, Advocate for
Mr. J.S.Sidhu, Advocate for respondent No.2.

MANOJ BAJAJ, J. (Oral)

Petitioner has preferred this revision petition to challenge the impugned judgment dated 23.10.2017 passed by the Appellate Court in CRA-93 of 2016 dated 16.02.2016 whereby his conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court vide judgment dated 02.02.2016 in case FIR No.233 dated 07.07.2014 under Sections 353 and 186 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, was upheld.

During the pendency of the present revision petition, parties have arrived at compromise and by moving an application bearing CRM No.26446-2018, they seek disposal of this petition on the basis of compromise dated 12.04.2018 (Annexure P-5) which is taken on record.

Relying upon the compromise, vide order dated 05.07.2019, the parties were directed to appear before the trial Court for recording of their

statements and report was sought regarding compromise.

In deference to the said order, a report dated 27.08.2019 submitted by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patiala reveals that as per statements made by the parties in the Court, they have voluntarily entered into a compromise and the Court is satisfied that the said settlement is without any fear, pressure, threat or coercion and out of their free will. It is also reported that petitioner has not been declared as proclaimed offender.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there is no other case pending against the petitioner.

Learned State counsel as well as counsel for respondent No.2 have not disputed the factum of compromise between the parties.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file.

The Full Bench judgment of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052**, categorically held that the High Court has power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to allow the compounding of non-compoundable offence and same is not confined to matrimonial disputes alone.

The relevant para is extracted below :-

“29. The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Criminal Procedure Code which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar

under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.”

In Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2012 (4)

RCR (Criminal) 543, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also discussed the powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the relevant portion reads as under :-

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes

like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

Since the parties have settled the dispute and decided to live in peace, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there is no impediment in accepting the compromise and allowing the parties to bury the hatchet.

In view of the above, petition is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.02.2016 passed by the trial Court and upheld by the Appellate Court through judgment dated 23.10.2017 are set aside. The FIR No.233 dated 07.07.2014 under Sections 353 and 186 IPC is also ordered to be quashed.

(MANOJ BAJAJ)
JUDGE

08.01.2020
vanita

Whether speaking/reasoned :	Yes	No
Whether Reportable :	Yes	No