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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M No.34689 of 2019

Date of Decision: 14.02.2020

Subeg Singh @ Shubeg Singh and others

.....Petitioners

Vs

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH

Present: Mr. S.K. Arya, Advocate
for the petitioners.

Mr. Ramandeep Sandhu, Sr. DAG, Punjab.

Mr. Jolly Sharma, Advocate
for respondent No.2.

RAJ MOHAN SINGH, J. (Oral)

[1]. Petitioners have preferred this petition for quashing of FIR No.118 dated 06.07.2019 registered under Sections 452, 323, 148, 149 IPC at Police Station Dharamkot, District Moga and all the subsequent proceedings arising in pursuance thereof on the basis of compromise.

[2]. This Court vide order dated 19.09.2019 directed both the parties to appear before the *Ilqa* Magistrate/Trial Court upto 30.10.2019 for recording their statements in the context of

genuineness of the compromise in question. The trial Court was also directed to record its satisfaction with regard to the genuineness of the compromise entered into between the parties. The said order reads as under:-

“This petition has been filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 118 dated 06.07.2019, registered for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 452/323/148/149 of the IPC, at Police Station Dharamkot, District Moga, as also all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the petitioners and respondent no 2. A copy of the compromise deed has been annexed as Annexure P-2 with the petition.

Notice of motion.

On the asking of the Court, Mr. A.P.S. Gill, D.A.G., Punjab, accepts notice on behalf of respondent no. 1.

Mr. Jolly Sharma, Advocate, appears and accepts notice on behalf of respondent no. 2 and has filed his power of attorney in Court today which is taken on record.

Requisite number of copies of the petition be handed over to learned counsel for the respondents during the course of the day.

Adjourned to 09.12.2019.

In the meanwhile, the petitioners as also respondent no. 2, would appear before the learned Area Magistrate up-to 30.10.2019 to record their statements. That court would satisfy itself with regard to the authenticity of the compromise reached and the fact that it has been arrived at without any kind of undue influence or pressure, and would thereafter send its report to this Court, before the

next date of hearing.

The Area Magistrate would also verify whether there is any other person involved in the occurrence, who is not a party to the present petition and whose consent for the compromise would be required, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the FIR sought to be quashed can be so quashed.

Learned State counsel would also determine as to whether any other criminal cases of like nature or otherwise, are pending against the petitioners.”

[3]. In pursuance of aforesaid order, a report dated 06.12.2019 has been received from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Moga in which factum of compromise has been endorsed in full compliance of the query poised by this Court. The trial Court has reported in the following manner:-

“It is further submitted that as per the statement of ASI Paramjit Kaur, No.627/Moga, posted at Police Station Dharamkot, District Moga, there are 06 persons arrayed as accused in the present FIR and none of them has been declared proclaimed offender till date. As per further statement of ASI Paramjit Kaur, none of the accused arrayed in the present FIR is involved in any other criminal case.”

The trial Court has verified that the parties have entered into a valid compromise and the matter has been amicably settled without any pressure coercion or undue influence.

[4]. On the basis of report submitted by the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Moga, this Court is of the opinion that a valid compromise has been entered into between the parties.

[5]. The extent and sweep of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing criminal prosecution on merits as well as on the basis of compromise between the accused and the victim remained question of interpretation since long. The Hon'ble Apex Court after due consideration of judgments in **Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47; Bhajan Lal vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604** and **State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489**, has summed up the controversy in **State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and others, 2003(2) RCR (Crl.) 860 (SC)**. The legal position summed up in the said judgment is in the following manner:-

“Thus, the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an

interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words "Nothing in this Code". Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma's case (supra) this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally

exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”

[6]. Full Bench of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Crl.) 1052** considered the scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to hold that High Court has powers to quash prosecution in order to achieve ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law. These powers are not limited to matrimonial dispute alone, rather these powers are unlimited. However these powers are to be exercised very sparingly and with utmost care and caution. There is no statutory bar which can affect the inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is to be exercised *Ex-Debitia, justitia* to prevent abuse of process of Court.

[7]. In exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., criminal proceedings are not to be quashed where the

offence is heinous in nature. Proceedings can only be quashed where the issue is overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil profile arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile and civil or matrimonial nature. In a way dispute may involve wrong which is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have redressed the same by entering into compromise.

[8]. In **Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another** **2012(4) RCR (Crl.) 543**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered necessary imports of all previous precedents and observed in the following manner:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot

be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be

well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

[9]. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there are remote chances of conviction. It would be just and expedient to exercise discretionary power by this Court in terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. and to put an end to the controversy for all times to come. This would be in the interest of justice and would achieve ends of justice for the parties. The compromise would definitely enable the parties to live in peace and the offences are not heinous offences of serious offence of mental depravity, nor it involves offence covered under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Chances of conviction are remote and bleak, therefore, continuation of proceedings would not be in the interest of both the parties and would result in unnecessary vagaries of criminal trial.

[10]. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, I deem it appropriate to quash the FIR No.118 dated 06.07.2019 registered under Sections 452, 323, 148, 149 IPC at Police Station Dharamkot, District Moga along with subsequent proceedings arisen thereof (if any), are hereby quashed.

[11]. Petition stands disposed of.

February 14, 2020

Prince

**(RAJ MOHAN SINGH)
JUDGE**

Whether speaking/reasoned

Yes/No

Whether reportable

Yes/No