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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

1. **CRM-M No.32350 of 2019**
Date of Decision: 03.03.2020

Abhimanyu and othersPetitioners
Vs
State of Punjab and anotherRespondents

2. **CRM-M No.21018 of 2019**

Rakesh Kumar & othersPetitioners
Vs
State of Punjab and anotherRespondents

3. **CRM-M No.19188 of 2019**

VandanaPetitioner
Vs
State of Punjab and anotherRespondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH

Present:Mr. Gaurav Goel, Advocate and
Mr. Shiv Kumar, Advocate
for the petitioners in CRM-M No.32350 of 2019.

Mr. J.S. Ghumman, D.A.G., Punjab.

RAJ MOHAN SINGH, J. (Oral)

[1]. Vide this common order CRM-M Nos.32350, 21018 and 19188 of 2019 are being decided.

[2]. CRM-M No.32350 of 2019 has been preferred by petitioners-Abhimanyu, Hariminder Singh, Veenus and Sukhdev Singh for quashing of FIR No.345 dated 28.12.2016 registered under Sections 323/341/506/34 IPC at Police Station Jodhewal,

District Ludhiana on the basis of compromise effected between the parties after impleading the complainant-Vandana @ Bindu as respondent No.2. On 19.11.2019, the petition was ordered to be listed along with CRM-M No.21018 of 2019.

[3]. CRM-M No.21018 of 2019 has arisen from cross-version of the aforesaid FIR No.345 vide DDR No.14 dated 15.12.2016 registered under Sections 323/341/506/34 IPC in the same Police Station. In the aforesaid case, petitioners are Rakesh Kumar, Ripan Kumar and Vandana. Abhimanyu has been impleaded as respondent No.2 besides impleading State of Punjab as respondent No.1. In this petition, petitioners seek quashing of the aforesaid DDR on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties. Vide order dated 19.11.2019, both the parties were directed to appear before the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate for recording their statements in the context of genuineness of the compromise in question.

[4]. CRM-M No.19188 of 2019 has been preferred by the petitioner-Vandana for quashing of FIR No.281 dated 28.09.2016 registered under Sections 420/494/177 IPC read with Section 12 of the Passport Act at Police Station Jodhewal, District Ludhiana on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties. In this petition, Abhimanyu has been impleaded as respondent No.2 besides impleading the State of

Punjab as respondent No.1.

[5]. The controversy in all the aforesaid three cases has been settled by a dint of compromise between the parties. On being referred to the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate, the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana has recorded statements of Vandana, Abhimanyu, Sukhdev Singh, Veenus and Hariminder Singh on 03.10.2019. Thereafter, the Court has also recorded the statement of ASI Gurmukh Singh on 14.11.2019 highlighting the connectivity of FIR No.345 dated 15.12.2016, its cross version and FIR No.281 dated 28.09.2016 viz-a-viz. parties to the *lis*. The aforesaid statements were recorded in CRM-M No.32350 of 2019.

[6]. The trial Court has also recorded statements of Abhimanyu, Vandana, Rakesh Kumar and Ripan Kumar on 10.12.2019 in CRM-M No.21018 of 2019. Similarly in CRM-M No.19188 of 2019, the Court has recorded statements of Abhimanyu and Vandana on 03.10.2019 in the context of genuineness of the compromise in question. Statement of ASI Gurmukh Singh has also been recorded on 14.11.2019 to the same effect as was recorded in connected case.

[7]. After recording the statements of the parties in all the aforesaid three cases, the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana has endorsed the factum of compromise in

compliance of the query poised by this Court. The Court has verified that the parties have entered into a valid compromise and the matter has been amicably settled without any pressure, coercion or undue influence.

[8]. On the basis of report submitted by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran, this Court is of the opinion that a valid compromise has been entered into between the parties.

[9]. The extent and sweep of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing criminal prosecution on merits as well as on the basis of compromise between the accused and the victim remained question of interpretation since long. The Hon'ble Apex Court after due consideration of judgments in **Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47;** **Bhajan Lal vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604** and **State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489,** has summed up the controversy in **State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and others, 2003(2) RCR (Crl.) 860 (SC).** The legal position summed up in the said judgment is in the following manner:-

“Thus, the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of

superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words "Nothing in this Code". Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma's case (supra) this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of

revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”

[10]. Full Bench of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Crl.) 1052** considered the scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to hold that High Court has powers to quash prosecution in order to achieve ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law. These powers are not limited to matrimonial dispute alone, rather these powers are unlimited. However these powers are to be exercised very sparingly and with utmost care and caution. There is no statutory bar which can affect the inherent powers of High Court under Section 482

Cr.P.C. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is to be exercised *Ex-Debitia, justitia* to prevent abuse of process of Court.

[11]. In exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., criminal proceedings are not to be quashed where the offence is heinous in nature. Proceedings can only be quashed where the issue is overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil profile arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile and civil or matrimonial nature. In a way dispute may involve wrong which is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have redressed the same by entering into compromise.

[12]. In **Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another** **2012(4) RCR (Crl.) 543**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered necessary imports of all previous precedents and observed in the following manner:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or

F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of

justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

[13]. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there are remote chances of conviction. It would be just and expedient to exercise discretionary power by this Court in terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. and to put an end to the controversy for all times to come. This would be in the interest of justice and would achieve ends of justice for the parties. The compromise would definitely enable the parties to live in peace and the offences are not heinous offences or serious offences of mental depravity, nor it involves offence covered under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Chances of conviction are remote and bleak, therefore, continuation of proceedings would not be in the interest of both the parties and would result in unnecessary vagaries of criminal trial.

[14]. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, I deem it appropriate to quash the FIR No.345 dated 28.12.2016 registered under Sections 323/341/506/34 IPC at Police Station Jodhewal, District Ludhiana (Annexure P-1) its cross version

vide DDR No.14 dated 15.12.2016 registered under Sections 323/341/506/34 IPC in the same Police Station and FIR No.281 dated 28.09.2015 registered under Sections 420/494/177 IPC read with Section 12 of the Passport Act at Police Station Jodhewal, District Ludhiana along with subsequent proceedings arisen thereof (if any), are hereby quashed.

[15]. All the petitions stand disposed of.

March 03, 2020	(RAJ MOHAN SINGH)
Atik	JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whether reportable	Yes/No