

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M-34253-2020(O&M)

Date of decision : 03.12.2020

Vinod Kumar and others

... Petitioner(s)

Versus

The State of Punjab and another

... Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ALKA SARIN

Present: Mr. Kashish Garg, Advocate for the petitioners.

Mr. Ramandeep Sandhu, Sr. DAG, Punjab.

Mr. J.K. Singla, Advocate for respondent No.2.

ALKA SARIN, J. (ORAL)

Heard through video conferencing.

The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR bearing No.182 dated 06.10.2020 under Sections 324, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered at Police Station Kotwali Bathinda, District Bathinda and all subsequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR, on the basis of compromise.

On 28.10.2020, the following order was passed:-

“By way of this petition, the petitioners seek quashing of the FIR bearing No.182, dated 06.10.2020, as registered at Police Station Kotwali Bathinda, District Bathinda, under Sections 324, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and all the consequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR, on the ground that the parties have arrived at a compromise in the matter.

Notice of motion.

Mr. Sukhbeer Singh, Asstt. A.G., Punjab, who has joined the proceedings in pursuance of the copy of this petition having been sent to the respondent-State in advance, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.1-State.

Mr. J. K. Singla, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No.2 and his Power of Attorney, as received through E-mail, is placed and taken on the record.

In view of the above-mentioned facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to appear before the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate on 16.11.2020 for getting their statements recorded in respect of the said compromise as stated to have been arrived at between them.

Learned trial Court/Illaq Magistrate, after ensuring the identity of the parties as well as the fact that the statements are being made by them voluntarily and without any pressure from any quarter, shall record the same and will submit its detailed report well before the next date of hearing. The Magistrate shall also report about the veracity of the compromise, apart from describing the names and also the number of the accused involved in the case and shall also inform about the fact as to whether any of the accused has been declared proclaimed offender in the case.

Adjourned to 03.12.2020.”

A report has been received from the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Bhatinda dated 23.11.2020, wherein it has been stated that the compromise has been entered into between the parties voluntarily and without any pressure or coercion. None of the accused has been declared as proclaimed offender in the case. The statements of the parties have also been appended along with the present petition.

The Apex Court in the case of “**Gian Singh V/s State of Punjab & Anr.**” 2012 (10) SCC 303, has held as under:-

“56. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law

and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia, Dharampal, Arun Shankar Shukla, Ishwar Singh, Rumi Dhar (Smt.).28 and Ashok Sadarangani. The principle propounded in Simrikhia that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal, the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Ishwar Singh, the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 Indian Penal Code was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) 28 although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for commission of offences under Section 120B/420/467/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed offences under sections 120B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of

foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma and it was held that B.S. Joshi, and Nikhil Merchant dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.

57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences

under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the law laid down by this Court in “**Kulwinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.**” 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, wherein it has been

held that even in non-compoundable offences, if the parties have entered

into a compromise, this Court has wide powers under Section 482 CrPC. to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of law and secure the ends of justice.

In view of the above and keeping in view the report by the Trial Court that the parties have genuinely entered into a compromise and all the disputes between the parties have been resolved, it would not be in the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceedings.

Resultantly, FIR bearing No.182 dated 06.10.2020 under Sections 324, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered at Police Station Kotwali Bathinda, District Bathinda as well as all the subsequent proceedings arising there-from, stand quashed.

The petition is accordingly allowed.

(ALKA SARIN)
JUDGE

03.12.2020
Yogesh Sharma

NOTE: Whether speaking/non-speaking: Speaking
Whether reportable: YES/NO