

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
Date of Order: February 14, 2019

+ **CRL.M.C. 5042/2018**
DHIRAJ VERMA & ORS.Petitioners
Through: Mr. P.N.Sharma, Advocate

versus

STATE & ANR.Respondents
Through: Ms. Neelam Sharma, Additional
Public Prosecutor for respondent-
State with ASI Devender Gupta
Mr.Mohit Goswami, Advocate
with respondents No. 2 to 4 in
person

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
(ORAL)

Quashing of FIR No. 124/2017, under Sections 308/341/324/34 of IPC, registered at police station Hauz Qazi, Delhi is sought on the basis of Memorandum of Understanding of 24th August, 2018.

Upon notice, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondents No.2 to 4 (as per amended memo of parties), present in the Court are the complainant/party of FIR in question and they have been identified to be so, by ASI Devender Gupta, on the basis of identity proof produced by them.

Respondents No. 2 to 4 present in the Court, submit that the FIR in question was got registered due to misunderstanding between the parties, and now the misunderstanding stands cleared. Respondents No.2 affirms the contents of his affidavit of 6th September, 2018 and Memorandum of

Understanding of 24th August, 2018 supporting this petition and respondents no.2 to 4 submit that to restore cordiality between the parties, who are residing in the same locality, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end.

Supreme Court in *Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Vs. State of Gujarat* (2017) 9 SCC 641 has reiterated the parameters for exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR / criminal complaint, which are as under:-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

Since the misunderstanding which led to registration of the FIR in question now stands cleared between parties, therefore, continuance of

proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed, subject to costs of ₹20,000/- to be deposited by petitioners with *Prime Minister's National Relief Fund* within four weeks from today. Upon placing on record the proof of deposit of costs within a week thereafter and handing over its copy to the Investigating Officer, FIR No. 124/2017, under Sections 308/341/324/34 of IPC, registered at police station Hauz Qazi, Delhi and the proceedings emanating therefrom shall stand quashed *qua* petitioners.

This petition is accordingly disposed of.

Dasti.

(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE

FEBRUARY 14, 2019

v