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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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W.P.(C) 8171/2019

KRISHNA

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber and Mr. Bhanu
Gupta, Advocates.

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

..... Respondents

Through: Mr. D.S. Mehandru, Ms. Aakanksha
Kaul, Ms. Navneet Kaur and Mr.
Prabudh Singh, Advocates for UOI/R-
1 to 4.

CORAM:

JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR

JUSTICE TALWANT SINGH

ORDER

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17.12.2019

Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:

1. Aggrieved by an order dated 12th December, 2018, terminating him from service for not qualifying in the recruitment for the post of Constable ('GD') in the Central Industrial Security Force ('CISF'), the Petitioner has filed the present petition seeking its annulment. He has also challenged an order dated 2nd April, 2019, passed by the Inspector General of Police ('IGP') (PERS), rejecting his appeal.

2. The facts in brief are that the Staff Selection Commission ('SSC') (Respondent No.4) issued an advertisement on 24th January, 2015, for filling up the posts of Constables (GD) in the Central Armed Police Forces ('CAPF'), NIAM and SSF and Rifle Men (GD) in Assam Rifles,

Examination, 2015. The Petitioner applied for the post of constable under the ST quota. He states that he belongs to Dhanka Caste/Tribe, which is recognized as Scheduled Caste/Tribe under the Constitution (Schedule Castes) Order, 1950, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) (Union Territory) Order, 1950.

3. On 25th July, 2015, while he was called for the Physical Standard Test / Physical Efficiency Test, the Petitioner submitted documents of proof of being eligible to apply under the ST quota. The Petitioner was called for the written exam and later on 12th May, 2016 underwent medical examination, where again he submitted his domicile document and caste certificate, for verification. On 14th March, 2017, the Respondents issued a call letter, stating that the Petitioner had been provisionally selected for appointment as Constable (GD) in the CISF. The Petitioner completed his training successfully at RTC, Deoli and was posted to BSP, Bhilai in Chhattisgarh.

4. On 3rd December, 2018, the Respondents issued to the Petitioner a show cause notice ('SCN'), stating *inter alia* that the Petitioner had been declared non-qualified by the SSC for recruitment as Constable (GD), as he belonged to Dhanka caste of Rajasthan, recognized as an ST in Rajasthan, which was not notified in the Central List for the NCT of Delhi. In his reply dated 6th December, 2018, the Petitioner *inter alia* stated that his father used to work in Delhi, and the Petitioner accordingly was born and brought up in Delhi. He explains that Dhanka and Dhanak are two separate castes. The former is notified as scheduled caste in Rajasthan, whereas the latter was notified as scheduled caste in Delhi. He had applied under the ST quota, since he has an

ST certificate, certifying that his caste, as a caste, belongs to the ST in Rajasthan State.

5. By the order dated 12th December, 2018, the Petitioner's services were terminated on the same grounds, as stated in the SCN. After the Petitioner's appeal against the termination was rejected on 2nd April, 2019, the present petition was filed.

6. Pursuant to the notice issued in the petition, a counter affidavit had been filed, by the Respondents, raising two objections. The first is concerning the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, by pointing out that the Petitioner at that relevant point in time, was in Bhilai. The second ground is the repetition of what is stated in the SCN, namely, that the Petitioner belongs to Dhanka caste of Rajasthan, which is recognized in Rajasthan as ST, but is not notified in the Central List of the NCT of Delhi, where the Petitioner is domiciled. In response to the plea of the Petitioner, there is no specific denial of the legal position in that regard in the counter affidavit, except reiterating the submissions already made on merits. A separate counter affidavit has been filed by the SSC, where again, no submissions were made on legal issues.

7. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Ankur Chhibber, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents.

8. With regard to the preliminary objection of the Respondents on the ground of jurisdiction, the Court negatives it on the strength of an order

dated 24th August, 2012 the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6020/2012 (*Abrar Ali v. CISF*), which reads thus:

“2. Leave granted.

3. The Writ Petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the Delhi High Court vide order dated May 2011 by holding that no cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. From the impugned order, it appears that the High Court considered the aspect of jurisdiction with reference to Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. We are afraid; the impugned order cannot be sustained as the High Court overlooked Article 226 (1) of the Constitution of India. The appellant approached Delhi High Court as the headquarter of respondent No. 1- Central Industrial Security Force - is located in Delhi. The jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court in the matter is, thus, clearly referable to Article 226 (1).

4. We, accordingly, allow the Appeal and set aside the impugned order and restore writ petition being writ petition (Civil) no. 1241 of 2011 titled "Abrar Ali Vs. C.I.S.F. & Ors." to the Delhi High Court for consideration in accordance of law. No orders as to costs.”

Consequently, the preliminary objection is rejected.”

9. As far as the merits is concerned, the stand adopted by the Respondents in the present case appears to be based on an earlier understanding of the legal position, as expressed by the Supreme Court in *Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (2009) 15 SCC 458*. However, it appears that the said decision, which was by a Bench of two Judges, was contrary to a decision of a larger Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court in *S. Pushpa v. Sivachanmugavelu (2005) 3 SCC 1*, which had held that that unlike in the case of States, Union Territories (‘UTs’) are within the

administrative control of the Union Government. It was held that consequently any SC or ST notified as such by the President would be entitled to the benefits of the reservation of all UTs.

10. In *State of Uttaranchal v. Sandeep Kumar Singh* (2010) 12 SCC 794, the correctness of the decision in *Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board* (*supra*), which had characterized the decision of the larger Bench in *S. Pushpa v Sivachanmugavelu* (*supra*), as being *obiter dicta* and not binding, was doubted as under:

“9. ...Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any other employment under the State. Clauses (3) to (5), however, lay down several exceptions to the above rule of equal opportunity. Article 16(4) is an enabling provision and confers a discretionary power on the State to make reservation in the matter of appointments in favour of "backward classes of citizens" which in its opinion are not adequately represented either numerically or qualitatively in services of the State. But it confers no constitutional right upon the members of the backward classes to claim reservation. Article 16(4) is not controlled by a Presidential Order issued under Article 341 (1) or Article 342(1) of the Constitution in the sense that reservation in the matter of appointment on posts may be made in a State or Union Territory only for such Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which are mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Presidential Order for that particular State or Union Territory. This article does not say that only such Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which are mentioned in the Presidential Order issued for a particular State alone would be recognised as backward classes of citizens and none else. If a State or Union Territory makes a provision whereunder the benefit of reservation is extended only to such Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes which are recognized as such in relation to that State or Union Territory then such a provision

would be perfectly valid. However, there would be no infraction of clause (4) of Article 16 if a Union Territory by virtue of its peculiar position being governed by the President as laid down in Article 239 extends the benefit of reservation even to such migrant Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes who are not mentioned in the Schedule to the Presidential Order issued for such Union Territory. The UT of Pondicherry having adopted a policy of the Central Government where under all Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, irrespective of their State are eligible for posts which are reserved for SC/ST candidates, no legal infirmity can be ascribed to such a policy and the same cannot be held to be contrary to any provision of law.

10. A two Judge Bench in *Subhash Chandra & Anr. vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board & Ors.* held that the dicta in *S. Pushpa case* is an obiter and does not lay down any binding ratio. We may notice that a three Judge Bench in *S. Pushpa case* relied on *Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao; Action Committee* cases and understood the ratio of those judgments in a particular manner. In our considered opinion, it was not open to a two Judge Bench to say that the decision of a three Judge Bench rendered following the Constitution Bench judgments to be per incuriam.

11. In *Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673* a Constitution Bench of this Court in categorical terms held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. A Bench of lesser Coram cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger Coram. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser Coram can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger Coram than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the

view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a Coram larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

12. In our view, a two Judge Bench of this Court could not have held the decision rendered by a three Judge Bench in *S. Pushpa case* to be obiter and per incuriam.

13. A very important question of law as to interpretation of Articles 16 (4), 341 and 342 arises for consideration in this appeal. Whether Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1) or Article 342(1) of the Constitution has any bearing on the State's action in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State? The extent and nature of interplay and interaction among Articles 16(4), 341 (1) and 342(1) of the Constitution is required to be resolved.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, therefore, in our view, it would be appropriate that this case is placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a Bench of appropriate strength. The registry is, accordingly, directed to place the papers before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions."

11. It may be noticed at this stage that both in *Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College (1990) 3 SCC 130* and *Action Committee v. Union of India (1994) 5 SCC 244*, the Supreme Court, while considering the question clarified that the rule under which the benefits of reservation to migrant SCs of one State against quotas for SCs in other States, would not apply in the case of UTs. A larger Bench of three Judges in *S. Pushpa v. Sivachanmugavelu (supra)*, after discussing both the above decisions, in the context of the UT of Pondicherry observed as under:

“16. These documents show that the Government of Pondicherry has throughout been proceeding on the basis that being a Union Territory, all orders regarding reservation for SC/ST in respect of posts/services under the Central Government are applicable to posts/services under the Pondicherry Administration as well. Since all SC/ST candidates which have been recognised as such under the orders issued by the President from time to time irrespective of the State/Union Territory, in relation to which particular castes or tribes have been recognised as SCs/STs are eligible for reserved posts/services under the Central Government, they are also eligible for reserved posts/services under the Pondicherry Administration. Consequently, all SC/ST candidates from outside the UT of Pondicherry would also be eligible for posts reserved for SC/ST candidates in the Pondicherry Administration. Therefore, right from the inception, this policy is being consistently followed by the Pondicherry Administration whereunder migrant SC/ST candidates are held to be eligible for reserved posts in the Pondicherry Administration.

17. We do not find anything inherently wrong or any infraction of any constitutional provision in such a policy. The principle enunciated in *Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao* cannot have application here as UT of Pondicherry is not a State. As shown above, a Union Territory is administered by the President through an Administrator appointed by him. In the context of Article 246, Union Territories are excluded from the ambit of the expression "State" occurring therein. This was clearly explained by a Constitution Bench in *T.M. Kannian v. ITO* [AIR 1968 SC 637]. In *New Delhi Municipal Council v. State of Punjab* [(1997) 7SCC 339] the majority has approved the ratio of *T.M. Kannian* and has held that the Union Territories are not States for the purpose of Part XI of the Constitution (para 145). The Tribunal has, therefore, clearly erred in applying the ratio of *Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao* in setting aside the selection and appointment of migrant SC candidates.

20.A fortiori, for the purpose of identification, it becomes equally important to know who would be deemed to be Scheduled Caste in relation to that State or Union Territory. This exercise has to be done strictly in accordance with the Presidential Order and a migrant Scheduled Caste of another State cannot be taken into consideration otherwise it may affect the number of seats which have to be reserved in the House of the People or Legislative Assembly. Though, a migrant SC/ST person of another State may not be deemed to be so within the meaning of Articles 341 and 342 after migration to another State but it does not mean that he ceases to be an SC/ST altogether and becomes a member of a forward caste.

21. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any other employment under the State. Clauses (3) to (5), however, lay down several exceptions to the above rule of equal opportunity. Article 16(4) is an enabling provision and confers a discretionary power on the State to make reservation in the matter of appointments in favour of backward classes of citizens which in its opinion are not adequately represented either numerically or qualitatively in services of the State. But it confers no constitutional right upon the members of the backward classes to claim reservation. Article 16(4) is not controlled by a Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1) or Article 342(1) of the Constitution in the sense that reservation in the matter of appointment on posts may be made in a State or Union Territory only for such Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which are mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Presidential Order for that particular State or Union Territory. This article does not say that only such Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which are mentioned in the Presidential Order issued for a particular State alone would be recognised as backward classes of citizens and none else. If a State or Union Territory makes a provision whereunder the benefit of reservation is extended only to such Scheduled

Castes or Scheduled Tribes which are recognised as such in relation to that State or Union Territory then such a provision would be perfectly valid. However, there would be no infraction of clause (4) of Article 16 if a Union Territory by virtue of its peculiar position being governed by the President as laid down in Article 239 extends the benefit of reservation even to such migrant Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes who are not mentioned in the Schedule to the Presidential Order issued for such Union Territory. The UT of Pondicherry having adopted a policy of the Central Government whereunder all Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, irrespective of their State are eligible for posts which are reserved for SC/ST candidates, no legal infirmity can be ascribed to such a policy and the same cannot be held to be contrary to any provision of law."

12. In light of the above dichotomy in the decisions, a Division Bench of this Court in a decision dated 25th July, 2011 in W.P.(C) No.610/2011 (***Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board v. Mukesh Kumar***) referred the issue to a larger Bench of three Judges. By a decision dated 12th September, 2012, in W.P.(C) 5390/2010 (***Deepak Kumar v. District & Sessions Judge, Delhi***), the Full Bench of this Court, after discussing extensively the entire case law, summarized the legal position as under:

“(1) The decisions in *Marri*, *Action Committee*, *Milind* and *Channaiah* have all held that Scheduled Caste and Tribe citizens moving from one State to another cannot claim reservation benefits, whether or not their caste is notified in the state where they migrate to, since the exercise of notifying scheduled castes or tribes is region (state) specific, i.e. "in relation" to the state of their origin. These judgments also took note of the Presidential Notifications, which had enjoined such citizens to be "residents" in relation to the state which provided for such reservations.

(2) The considerations which apply to Scheduled Caste and Tribe citizens who migrate from state to state, apply equally in respect of those who migrate from a State to a Union Territory, in view of the text of Articles 341 (1) and 342 (1), i.e. only those castes and tribes who are notified in relation to the concerned Union Territory, are entitled to such benefits. This is reinforced by the Presidential Notification in relation to Union Territories, of 1951. Only Parliament can add to such notification and include other castes, or tribes, in view of Articles 341 (2), Article 342 (2) which is also reinforced by Article 16 (3). States cannot legislate on this aspect; nor can the executive - Union or state, add to or alter the castes, or tribes in any notification in relation to a state or Union Territory, either through state legislation or through policies or circulars. Differentiation between residents of states, who migrate to states, and residents of states who migrate to Union Territories would result in invidious discrimination and over-classification thus denying equal access to reservation benefits, to those who are residents of Union Territories, and whose castes or tribes are included in the Presidential Order in respect of such Union Territories. The *Pushpa* interpretation has led to peculiar consequences, whereby:

(i) The resident of a state, belonging to a scheduled caste, notified in that state, cannot claim reservation benefit, if he takes up residence in another state, whether or not his caste is included in the latter State's list of scheduled castes;

(ii) However, the resident of a state who moves to a Union Territory would be entitled to carry his reservation benefit, and status as member of scheduled caste, even if his caste is not included as a scheduled caste, for that Union Territory;

(iii) The resident of a Union Territory would however, be denied the benefit of reservation, if he moves to a State, because he is not a resident scheduled caste of that State.

(iv) The resident of a Union Territory which later becomes a State, however, can insist that after such event, residents of other states, whose castes may or may not be notified, as scheduled castes, cannot be treated as such members in such newly formed states;

(v) Conversely, the Scheduled Caste resident of a state which is converted into a Union Territory, cannot protest against the treatment of Scheduled Caste residents of other states as members of Scheduled Caste of the Union Territory, even though their castes are not included in the list of such castes, for the Union Territory.

(3) The ruling in *Pushpa* is clear that if the resident of a state, whose caste is notified as Scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, moves to a Union Territory, he carries with him the right to claim that benefit, in relation to the Union Territory, even though if he moves to another state, he is denied such benefit (as a result of the rulings in *Marri* and *Action Committee*). The ruling in *Pushpa*, being specific about this aspect vis-a-vis Union Territories, is binding; it was rendered by a Bench of three judges.

(4) The later ruling in *Subhash Chandra* doubted the judgment in *Pushpa*, holding that it did not appreciate the earlier larger Bench judgments in the correct perspective. Yet, *Subhash Chandra* cannot be said to have overruled *Pushpa*, since it was rendered by a smaller Bench of two judges. This approach of *Subhash Chandra* has been doubted, and the question as to the correct view has been referred to a Constitution Bench in the *State of Uttaranchal* case.

(5) By virtue of the specific ruling applicable in the case of Union Territories, in *Pushpa*, whatever may be the doubts entertained as to the soundness of its reasoning, the High Courts have to apply its ratio, as it is by a formation of three judges; the said decision did notice the earlier judgments in *Marri* and *Action Committee*. Article 141 and the discipline enjoined by

the doctrine of precedent compels this Court to follow the *Pushpa* ruling.

(6) In matters pertaining to incidence of employment, such as seniority, promotion and accelerated seniority or promotional benefits, flowing out of Articles 16 (4A) and (4B) of the Constitution, there may be need for clarity, whichever rule is ultimately preferred - i.e. the *Pushpa* view or the *Marri* and *Action Committee* view. In such event, it may be necessary for the guidance of decision makers and High Courts, to spell out whether the correct view should be applied prospectively. Furthermore, it may be also necessary to clarify what would be meant by prospective application of the correct rule, and whether such employment benefits flowing after recruitment, would be altered if the *Marri* view is to be preferred.”

13. More recently, the Supreme Court in ***Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board*** (2018) 10 SCC 312 has reiterated the special status that the NCT of Delhi enjoys by virtue of Article 239AA of the Constitution:

“National Capital Territory of Delhi

64. In case of National Capital Territory of Delhi, especially, to make the picture even clearer, a reference may be made to “Delhi Administration Subordinate Service Rules, 1967”. Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules is to the following effect:

“3. *Constitution of service and its classification.*-(1) On and from the date of commencement of these Rules, there shall be constituted *one Central Civil Service, known as the Subordinate Service of the Delhi Administration.*

(2) The Service shall have four Grades, namely—

Grade I

Grade II

Grade III

Grade IV

(3) The posts in Grade I shall be Central Civil posts, Class II Group “B” (Gazetted) and those in Grades II, III and IV shall be Central Civil posts Group “C” (Non-Gazetted).

(4) Members of the service shall, in the normal course be eligible for appointment to various Grades of the service to which they belong and not to the other service.” (*emphasis supplied*)

65. Subordinate services in the National Capital Territory of Delhi are, therefore, clearly Central Civil Services. The affidavit of the Union of India also points out this feature by stating that,

“The posts in CCS Group C are in the subordinate services. The equivalent in the Union Territory of Delhi is the Delhi Administrative Subordinate Services (DASS) and the recruiting agency in the place of Staff Selection Commission is the Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board (DSSSB). Members of the Delhi Administrative Subordinate Services are the feeder cadre for Central Civil Services Group B (DANICS). It is for these reasons that the policy (of pan India eligibility) is consistently adopted.” [P. 6, para (b) of the affidavit.]

66. A combined reading of these provisions of the DASS Rules, 1967 and CCS Rules, 1965, therefore, more than adequately explains the nature of Subordinate Services in the NCT of Delhi. These clearly are General Central Services and perhaps, it is owing to this state of affairs that the Union of India in its affidavit has stated that,

“Members of the Delhi Administrative Subordinate Services are the feeder cadre for Central Civil Services Group B (DANICS). It is for these reasons that the policy (of pan India eligibility) is consistently adopted.”

67. While examining the validity of reservation of seats in medical colleges for local candidates in Delhi, this Court in *Jagdish Saran v. Union of India* [*Jagdish Saran v. Union of India*, (1980) 2 SCC 768] had made certain observations with regard to the special status that the capital city enjoys, which today, has come to be known as the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The observations of this Court in paras 10 and 56 may be usefully recapitulated and, therefore, is set out below: (SCC pp. 773 & 789)

“10. The capital city is not just a part of India. It is miniaturised India, a fact often forgotten by the administration in the field of culture and education, especially vis-à-vis regional, minorities. It is megapolitan and people from all parts flock to this outsized city. But we cannot exaggerate this factor, for the presence of the farther regions like the South and the North-east, population wise, is minimal and precarious. Shri Balakrishnan insisted that the University was sustained by Central Government finances, collected from the whole country, and the benefits must likewise belong to all qualified students from everywhere. These are valuable aspects to shape policy but the court must test constitutionality and no more. To that extent alone we will weigh these factors in moulding our verdict.

56. We may wind-up by articulating the core thought that vitalises our approach. Anyone who lives inside India can never be considered an “outsider” in Delhi. The people in the States are caught in a happy network of mutuality, woven into a lovely garment of humanity, whose warp and woof is India. This is the underlying fundamental of the preambular resolve registered in our National Parchment. So we insist that blind and bigoted local patriotism in xenophobic exclusivism is destructive of our Freedom and only if compelling considerations of gross injustice, desperate backwardness and glaring inequality desiderate such a purposeful course can protective discrimination

gain entrance into the portals of college campuses. The administration has a constitutional responsibility not to be a mere thermometer where mercury rises with populist pressure but to be a thermostat that transforms the mores of groups to stay in the conscience of the nation viz. the Constitution.”

68. The affidavit of the Union of India does not touch upon the details of subordinate services in other Union Territories. Neither the authorities of the other Union Territories have laid before the Court any relevant material in this regard. We, therefore, refrain from addressing the issue in question as far as other Union Territories are concerned and have confined our discussions and the consequential views only to the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

69. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in terms of the views expressed in para 38 of this opinion. We further hold that so far as the National Capital Territory of Delhi is concerned the pan India Reservation Rule in force is in accord with the constitutional scheme relating to services under the Union and the States/Union Territories.”

14. Recently, this Court in an order dated 24th September, 2019, in W.P.(C) No.7474/2017 (**Rohit Kumar Meena v. Union of India**), allowed the plea of another Constable (GD), who had been appointed in the CISF under the Delhi quota of ST, although he belonged to the Meena caste, which was designated as ST in the State of Rajasthan, and he did not figure in the Central List of STs for Delhi. In doing so, this Court followed the decision of the Full Bench in **Deepak Kumar v. District & Sessions Judge, Delhi** (*supra*).

15. For all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court sets aside the impugned order dated 12th December, 2018, terminating the services of the Petitioner and the further appellate order dated 2nd April, 2019, dismissing the Petitioner's appeal. The Petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. The period between the date of his termination, and his date of reinstatement would be treated as a period 'in service', for all practical purposes, including notional fixation of pay, seniority, and other incidental benefits. The Petitioner, however, would not be entitled to any arrears of pay. The consequential orders will now be issued not later than eight weeks from today.

S. MURALIDHAR, J.

TALWANT SINGH, J.

DECEMBER 17, 2019

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