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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ W.P.(CRL) 206/2019, CRL.M.A. 1446/2019, CRL.M.A. 1447/2019

RANGREZEASAAN KHAN @ AHSAN KHAN & ORS.

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Kartikeya Rastogi, Advocate
alongwith petitioners.

versus

STATE & ANR

..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Piyush Agarwal, Advocate for
State.
Ms. Shabeena Anjum, Advocate for
complainant alongwith complainant.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

ORDER

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22.01.2019

1. By way of this petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 111/2016 registered at Police Station, Gandhi Nagar under sections 498A/406/34 IPC, on a complaint made by the complainant/R2 against the petitioners during the period of estrangement of the matrimonial life. The parties have been blessed with three children and they are all now cohabiting amicably, courtesy the assistance of their elders, well-wishers and the larger circle of their family. The complainant does not have a counsel, accordingly, Ms. Shabeena Anjum, Advocate, who is present in Court, is appointed as her counsel for the day. She states, upon instructions, that the complainant/R-2

does not wish to pursue the matter any further and would rather like to focus on building up her relationship with her husband and her in-laws for the sake of her children. At request of the Court, Ms. Nandita Rao, the learned Additional Standing Counsel for GNCTD has also interacted with the complainant/R-2. She states, upon instructions, that the complainant and her husband/petitioner no. 1 are now cohabiting in a rented accommodation in Ahmedabad with their children and nothing untoward has happened since then.

2. The learned counsel for the State submits that the present case is a matrimonial one and since respondent No.2 has settled all the disputes with the petitioners and does not wish to pursue the case further against them, no purpose would be served if the petitioners are directed to face trial. Therefore, the State has no objection, if this Court allows the present petition.

3. In the aforesaid circumstances and keeping in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, holding that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58.However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal

complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

4. The amicable resolution of cases like the present one is an abiding objective. The dictum of **Gian Singh** (supra) has been affirmed by the Apex Court in **Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466** while observing:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions

which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.*

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On*

the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is*

proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

5. In a similar vein regarding matrimonial disputes the Supreme Court in ***Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58*** held:

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed....”

6. The parties are present in the Court and have been identified by the Investigating Officer. Since respondent No.2 and petitioner No.1 have

started living together as husband and wife and that the complainant/R-2 herself does not wish to pursue the case against the petitioners, the substratum of the complaint/FIR dissipates and any further proceeding apropos the same FIR would be an exercise in futility. It would therefore be in the interest of justice that the FIR be quashed. Consequently, FIR No. 111/2016 registered at Police Station, Gandhi Nagar under sections 498A/406/34 IPC and all proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed against the petitioners.

7. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioners informs the Court, upon instructions, that petitioner no. 1 is likely to purchase an immovable property in the near future and the same shall be purchased in the joint name of petitioner no. 1 and the complainant/R-2. Petitioner no. 1 earns Rs. 11,000/- per month, which is promptly handed over to the wife/R-2. The said amount shall be deposited in the joint account of petitioner no. 1 and the complainant/R-2 for savings. Expenses of the family are met through this earning, through the wife. The learned counsel for petitioner no. 1 further assures that the said petitioner will subscribe to a medical insurance policy for his family for an amount of at least Rs. 5 lacs till the children turn 20 year olds. Their elder daughter is likely to be joining school in a few months and petitioner no. 1 undertakes to pay for her schooling and for their other children as well. Furthermore, the meher amount, if not already paid, would be paid within three months from today.

8. The petition stands disposed-off in the above terms.

NAJMI WAZIRI, J

JANUARY 22, 2019

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