

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of Order: February 13, 2019

+ CRL.M.C. 289/2019

NITIN SHAKYA & ORS. Petitioners

Through: Petitioner No.1 in person

Versus

STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. Respondents

Through: Mr. M.P.Singh, Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent-State
with SI Ajeet Singh
Respondent No.2 in person

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR

ORDER
(ORAL)

Quashing of FIR No. 221/2013, under Sections 498-A/406/34 of IPC, registered at police station Sagarpur, Delhi is sought on the basis of *Settlement Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*) reached between the parties.

Petitioner No.1 is present in person and has chosen to argue himself.

Upon notice, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondent No.2, present in the Court, is complainant/first-informant of the FIR in question and she has been identified to be so, by SI Ajeet Singh on the basis of identity proof

produced by her.

Respondent No.2 present in the Court submits that FIR No. 1319/2014, registered at police station Vasant Kunj, New Delhi has been closed as untraced and as per *Settlement Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*), petitioner has to give “*no objection*” to quashing of this FIR. Petitioner, present in the Court, submits that since *Settlement-Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*) is being acted upon, therefore, he has *no objection* to quashing of FIR No. 1319/2014, registered at police station Vasant Kunj, New Delhi.

Respondent No.2 further submits that terms of *Settlement Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*) have been acted upon but the dowry articles have not been returned. There is no whisper of dowry articles in *Settlement Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*) and so, I take no notice of it.

Supreme Court in *Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Vs. State of Gujarat* (2017) 9 SCC 641 has reiterated the parameters for exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR / criminal complaint, which are as under:-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the

offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

Since the subject matter of this FIR, which is essentially matrimonial, now stands settled between parties in terms of *Settlement-Agreement* of 4th January, 2017 (*Annexure-B*), therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

In the peculiarity of this case, this petition is allowed subject to costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid by first petitioner to respondent No.2/complainant. Respondent No. 2 confirms that she has now received cost of ₹1,00,000/- by Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS).

In view of above, FIR No. 221/2013, under Sections 498-A/406/34 of IPC, registered at police station Sagarpur, Delhi and also FIR No.

1319/2014, registered at police station Vasant Kunj, New Delhi and proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed qua petitioners.

This petition is accordingly disposed of.

Dasti.

(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE

FEBRUARY 13, 2019

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