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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Decided on:- 18th July, 2019

+ CRL.M.C. 248/2019 and Crl. M.A. 1060/2019

SHADAB KHAN & ORS

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Sanobar Ali, Advocate

versus

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR Respondents

Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for
State with SI Dharmender, PS Ranjit Nagar

Mr. S.F.Ahmad, Advocate for R-2

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA

ORDER (ORAL)

1. The second respondent was married to the first petitioner as per Muslim Rights and Ceremonies on 01.03.2015. From out of the said wedlock, a male child named Mohammad took birth on 18.12.2015. The marriage ran into rough weather, the second respondent raised allegations of she having been subjected to cruelty and deprived of her *stridhan*, first information report (FIR) no.36/2018 having been registered on 19.01.2018 by police station Ranjit Nagar on her complaint involving offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406, 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), the case being directed against

her husband (first petitioner), his mother (second petitioner), his uncle (third petitioner) and brother-in-law (fourth petitioner). The case arising out of the FIR is still pending investigation with the police.

2. It appears that the dispute between the parties also led to two other cases being preferred, both by the second respondent one under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the other under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC). The second said case came to be dismissed in default on 19.07.2018. Be that as it may, the parties were referred to Delhi Mediation Centre at Tis Hazari courts in the context of the case (CC no.398/2012) arising out of the domestic violence petition where they agreed to settle the matter amicably by executing a settlement deed dated 06.12.2018, copy whereof has been filed with the petition.

3. On notice, the second respondent has entered appearance through counsel and has submitted her affidavit sworn on 14.05.2019. By the said affidavit, she confirms the settlement of the dispute with the first petitioner and others, the parties having already ended their marriage by a divorce as per Muslim law on 19.12.2018, she having already withdrawn petition under Domestic Violence Act having received at that stage, Rs.5 Lakh from the first petitioner, this being the first instalment of the total amount of Rs.10 Lakhs which she has agreed to receive to forgo the cases and towards her full and final claim including on account of maintenance, dower, etc.

4. It appears there was some dispute over custody and control of a motor vehicle (car) which the second respondent has confirmed has been handed over to her by the first petitioner. In terms of the settlement, the first petitioner is to pay Rs.10 Lakhs to the second respondent, she having already received half of the said amount, the balance amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) has been handed over to her in the form of a demand draft bearing no.131291 dated 15.07.2019 drawn on Canara Bank in her name and the same having been received by her.

5. Having regard to the above, the court takes on record the no objection to the quashing petition as confirmed by the second respondent at the hearing.

6. Pertinent to note here that offence under Section 498A IPC is not compoundable. The parties are constrained to move this court for quashing on the basis of amicable resolution arrived at by them in the facts and circumstances noted above.

7. The scope and ambit of the power conferred on this court by Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC) read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in the particular context of prayer for quashing criminal proceedings, has been the subject matter of scrutiny and comment by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. It is well settled that in exercise of this “*inherent*” and “*wholesome power*”, the touchstone is as to whether “*the ends of justice so require*”. This court had the occasion to trace the relevant law on the subject in a batch of matters led by *Yashpal*

Chaudhrani vs. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi), 2019 SCC Online Del 8179 wherein after taking note, *inter alia*, of *State of Karnataka v. L Muniswamy*, (1977) 2 SCC 699; *State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa*, (2002) 3 SCC 89; *B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana*, (2003) 4 SCC 675; *Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.* (2012) 10 SCC 303; *Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi*, (2013) 4 SCC 58; *K Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa*, (2013) 5 SCC 226; *Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab*, (2014) 6 SCC 466; *State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat*, (2014) 4 SCC 149; *Parbhatbhai Aahir Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Kurmur*, (2017) 9 SCC 641 and *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others*, (2019) 5 SCC 688; the broad principles were culled out as under :-

“55. Though the above-noted authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court have consistently laid down the broad principles governing the exercise of power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. PC for bringing an end to the criminal process, for addressing the concerns noted at the outset and future guidance of trial courts, some of the crucial ones may be flagged as under:—

(i). The inherent jurisdiction vested in the High Court, as recognized and preserved by Section 482 Cr. PC, is primarily to “prevent abuse of the process of court” or to “otherwise secure the ends of justice”.

(ii). The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, the prime principle governing the exercise of inherent power being “to do real, complete and substantial justice” for which the court exists.

(iii) *It is the duty of the court to give “adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties” particularly in cases involving compoundable offences, the exercise of inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., however, not being inhibited in case of non-compoundable offences though, for the latter category, such power is to be “exercised sparingly and with caution”.*

(iv). *If the criminal case has “overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character”, particularly if it arises out of “commercial” (financial, mercantile, partnership or such other) transaction - and this would include the “cheque bouncing cases” under Section 138 N.I. Act - or “matrimonial dispute” or “family dispute”, genuine resolution on equitable terms, in entirety, by the parties should result in criminal proceedings being quashed.*

(v). *Since the institution of marriage has an important role to play in the society, the court is to make every effort to encourage the parties to terminate such discord amicably and if it appears that elements of settlement exist, and the parties are willing, they are to be directed to the process of mediation to explore the possibility of settlement, it being desirable to do so even at the “pre-litigation stage”.*

(vi). *While examining the prayer for quashing of a non compoundable offence, on the basis of settlement of the dispute between the wrongful doer and the victim, the High Court is to bear in mind as to whether the possibility of conviction is “remote and oblique” and further, if the continuation of the*

criminal case would lead to “oppression and prejudice” or “extreme injustice” for the accused.

(vii). The considerations which would weigh with Court include the antecedents of the accused, possible lack of bona fides, his past conduct and that includes the question as to whether he had earlier absconded and as to how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise.

(viii). But, the High Court, when called upon to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr. PC to bring the criminal case to an end on the basis of settlement, must steer clear of intervention in “heinous” or “serious” offences, including those involving “mental depravity”, as indeed “economic offences” affecting “the financial and economic well being of the State”, such as murder, attempt to murder, extortion, forgery, rape, dacoity, financial or economic frauds, cases under Arms Act, etc., the reason being that such offences are “not private in nature” but have “a serious impact upon society”, and continuation of trial thereof is essential due to “overriding element of public interest”.

(ix). The court, however, is not to go by mere use of label of a serious offence (e.g. offence under Section 307 IPC), it being open to it to examine, by scrutiny of the evidence gathered, to find as to whether there are sufficient grounds to frame charge for such offence and, in this view, it being “not permissible” to intervene till the matter has been properly investigated.”

8. In a case where criminal proceedings arise essentially out of *matrimonial* dispute and the parties have decided to bury the hatchet, the court must examine if there is any likelihood of the criminal prosecution resulting in conviction. In fact-situation wherein the matrimonial relation has been brought to an end by mutual consent and the parties are eager to move on with their respective lives seeking closure and if there is nothing to indicate lack of *bonafide* on the part of any side, denial of the prayer for quashing the criminal case would restore acrimony rather than bring about peace. Allowing continuance of the criminal action would be fruitless and clearly an abuse of judicial process.

9. The case at hand passes the muster of the above-noted tests.

10. In the above facts and circumstances, the petition is allowed. The crime registered by the police vide FIR 36/2018 under Sections 406, 498A, 34 IPC of Police Station Ranjit Nagar and the proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioners are hereby quashed.

11. The petition and the application filed therewith are disposed of accordingly.

Dasti to both sides.

R.K.GAUBA, J.

JULY 18, 2019/yg