

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

Civil Revision Petition No.7726 2018

ORDER:

This Revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dt.08.10.2018 passed in CMA.No.59 of 2018 of the VIII Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, confirming the order dt. 31.07.2018 passed in I.A.No.341 of 2018 in O.S. No.2455 of 2008 of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, R.R.District at L.B.Nagar.

2. The petitioners herein are the Defendant No.s 13 and 14 in the said suit.

THE PLAINT AVERMENTS

3. The said suit was filed by the 1st respondent/plaintiff seeking relief of declaration that Doc.No.106 of 1996 dt. 06.06.1996 canceling a General Power of Attorney dt.13-2-1992 is null and void, to cancel a registered sale deed Doc No.3001 of 1996 dt. 11.09.1996, and for grant of perpetual injunction in favour of the 1st respondent.

4. In the plaint, the 1st respondent/plaintiff alleged that he purchased from the respondent No.s 2 to 4/defendant No.s 1 to 3, an extent of Acs.7.26 gts of land in Survey No.87/A, AA, of Gandhamguda village, Rajendranagar Mandal, R.R.District under agreement of sale Ex.P1/dt. 24.01.1988; that full consideration was paid on 15.10.1991; thereafter, though the 1st respondent insisted on registration of the sale deed, respondent No.s 2 to 4 did not register the said land in his favour and dragged on the matter. According to him, subsequently, the respondent No.s 2 to 4 executed regd. irrevocable

GPA Ex.P2 on 13.02.1992 bearing Doc. No.357 of 1992 in his favour; thereafter, the 1st respondent spent a large sum of money to obtain Occupancy Certificate from the concerned authorities with due process of law, and also carried on works, general clearance, leveling and obtained approved layout from the Grampanchayat apart from advertising in Eenadu news paper on 10.09.1995 for sale of plots; and thereafter, he alienated Ac.0.26 gts of land out of Acs.7.26 gts under a registered sale deeds Ex.P5 and P6 dt. 07.02.1996 leaving the suit scheduled property of extent Acs.7.00.

5. It is further contended that thereafter, the 1st respondent was transferred from Hyderabad to various places and ultimately went to United States of America from where he came back in 2007 to India; that the defendants 6 to 12/ respondent No.s 7 to 13 started interfering with the scheduled property under the guise of certain documents said to have been executed by the respondent No.s 2 to 6 on the basis of a deed No.106/1996 dt. 06.06.1996 canceling the GPA dt.13-2-1992 executed by Respondent No.s 2-6.

6. He contended that he later came to know that the respondent No.s 2 to 6 had alienated the suit schedule property to respondent No.s 7 to 13 under a registered sale deed Ex.P7 (Doc. No.3001 of 1996) dt. 11.09.1996. According to him, he is a valid agreement holder and attorney holder to respondent No.s 2 to 6 as per Ex.P2 the registered irrevocable GPA dt. 13.02.1992; that the respondent No.s 7 to 13 were trying to alienate the suit schedule property; and therefore, the above reliefs need to be granted to him.

**THE AVERNMENTS IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT
NO.S 8-11**

7. Written statement was filed by the Defendant No.s 7 to 10/ respondent No.s 8 to 11 denying the plaint averments and opposing the grant of relief to the 1st respondent.

8. They admitted that the respondent No.s 2 to 4/Defendant No.s 1-4 are the owners of the land in Survey No.87/A, AA, admeasuring Ac.7.00 gts in Gandhamguda village and contended that the defendants 4 and 5/ respondent No.s 5 and 6 were in possession thereof.

9. According to them, the defendant No.s 6 to 10/ respondent No.s 7 to 13 wanted to purchase the property; that they negotiated with the defendant No.s 1 to 5/ respondent No.s 2 to 6 and after satisfying themselves paid valid consideration and purchased the property of Acs.7.00 in Survey No.87 part under Ex.P7, a registered sale deed dt. 11.09.1996 for a valid consideration. They also claimed to have been put in possession by respondent No.s 2 to 6.

10. Alternatively, they also contended that they were in physical peaceful possession to the knowledge of one and all and to the general public and erected the fencing around the property and they also perfected the title by adverse possession.

11. They contended that they are bona fide purchasers for valid sale consideration and they had also invested large sum of money for leveling and clearing the boulders and made it fit for agriculture.

12. They denied the possession of the 1st respondent/plaintiff over the suit schedule property and also contended that the agreement of sale dt. 24.01.1988 relied upon by the 1st respondent/plaintiff is a forged

document. They pointed out that the 1st respondent had not filed a suit for specific performance and whatever rights he had in the said agreement of sale, were lost by the afflux of time; that, therefore, agreement became invalid and he cannot claim any rights under the said document.

13. Further, they contended that the GPA dt. 13.02.1992 executed in favour of the 1st respondent was cancelled on 06.06.1996 by advertising in the Eenadu newspaper on 03.06.1996 and also through the registered notice issued to the 1st respondent and that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation.

14. Further, it is also contended that the 1st respondent was not a party to the sale deed dt. 11.09.1996 executed in favour of the respondent No.s 7 to 13 and so he cannot seek cancellation of the same and he has no locus standi to file the suit.

15. The allegations in the plaint were denied and it is contended that the names of the respondent No.s 7 to 13 were incorporated in the revenue records/pahanies, that pass books and title deeds were issued after proceedings No. ROR/579/1007 dt. 21.07.1997 were conducted by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar Mandal, R.R.District.

THE AVERMENTS IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT NO.13

16. The defendant No.12/Respondent No.13 filed written statement taking the same stand as respondent No.s 8 to 11. He alleged collusion between the 1st respondent and respondent No.s 2 to 6.

17. The petitioners herein were impleaded in the suit as Defendant No.s 13 and 14 vide order dt. 02.07.2018 in I.A. No.325 of 2018 as they had

obtained Ex.P8 and P9 agreements of sale-cum- GPA dt.8.6.2018 and 27.6.2018 from Respondents 7-13.

THE AVERMENTS IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF PETITIONERS

18. The petitioners herein filed a written statement contending that the respondent No.s 7 to 13 had executed a registered agreement of sale-cum-GPA in favour of the petitioners Document No.6689 of 2018 dt. 08.06.2018 for an extent of Ac.2.20 gts and also executed another Agreement of Sale-cum - GPA bearing document No.7649 of 2018 dt. 27.06.2018 for an extent of Acs.4.20 gts; that the entire suit schedule land has been thus sold in favour of the petitioners; and since the date of execution of the above agreements of sale, the petitioners are in possession of the same. They adopted the stand taken by the defendants 1 to 12/ respondent No.s 2 to 14 in all other respects.

I.A. No.341 of 2018, THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION APPLICATION

19. Along with the suit, the 1st respondent/plaintiff filed I.A. No.341 of 2018 seeking the relief of temporary injunction with respect to the suit schedule property by restraining the petitioners from alienating, encumbering, transferring, interfering, creating any mortgage or in any manner dealing with the suit schedule property, pending disposal of the suit.

20. In the said application, the 1st respondent reiterated the contents of the plaint.

21. The petitioners and other respondents filed counter affidavit reiterating the stand taken by them in the written statements.

22. In the trial Court, the 1st respondent filed Exs.P1 to P13, but the respondents did not file any document.

The order dt. 31.07.2018 in I.A.No.341 of 2018

23. By order dt. 31.07.2018, the trial Court granted interim injunction restraining the petitioners from alienating, encumbering, transferring, interfering, creating any mortgage or in any manner dealt with the said suit schedule property until disposal of the suit.

24. After recording the contentions of the parties, the trial Court held that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court permit transfers of property pending litigation, subject to the result of the suit under certain circumstances.

25. It observed that though such transfers may be subject to the result of the suit, if the properties change hands, it would increase the litigation manifold and affect a lot of parties who may have purchased the property or who purchase the property in future, if injunction is not granted.

26. It observed that the suit is yet to be decided and result of the suit cannot be decided in this I.A. and irreparable loss would be caused if the suit is ultimately decreed.

27. The trial court then considered Ex.P7 sale deed dt. 11.09.1996 executed in favour of the respondent no.s.7-13 by respondent no.s.2-6 and observed that this document is also questioned in the suit by the 1st respondent/ plaintiff on the ground that the respondent No.s 2-6 cannot unilaterally cancel Ex. P2, the GPA dt. 13.02.1992 executed by them in favour of the 1st respondent; that the property had already changed hands pending litigation from respondent No.s 7 to 13 to the petitioners under Ex.P9 agreement of sale cum GPA dt. 27.06.2018; that the petitioners had approached HMDA and it had issued Ex.P13 notice to the petitioners

questioning the unauthorised layout made by them and seeking their reply within seven days, but no reply was sent by the petitioners. It also referred to the encumbrance certificate Ex.P10 and Ex.P 11 and observed that there were certain transactions made on 04.07.2018, 19.06.2018, 21.04.2018 apart from others where plot wise sales had occurred and the conduct of the petitioners in alienating the property unauthorisedly is not fair.

28. It also noted that I.A. No.2186 of 2008 was filed by the 1st respondent for temporary injunction against the respondent no.s 7-13 had been dismissed for default on 11.12.2014 and revived in 2018, that the said I.A. was only against the Respondent No.s 7 to 13, and merely because the 1st respondent did not seek to do anything about it, that cannot effect the I.A. No.341 of 2018 where relief is now sought for against the petitioners restraining them from alienating the properties. It observed that dismissal for non-prosecution of the said I.A. No.2186 of 2008 cannot be treated as a decision of the Court.

29. The Court refused to consider objections of the petitioners for marking of Ex.P1 set up by the 1st respondent on the ground that any discussion on the said document is not appropriate and its validity has to be gone into the suit. It also declined to discuss Ex.P2 GPA dt. 13.02.1992 for the same reasons.

30. Though the trial Court noted the decision of the Supreme Court in **Thomson Press (India) Limited Vs., Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and others**¹ that a sale of property pending suit is not void *abinitio*, it held that the decision is applicable to only a suit and not to interlocutory applications. It discussed certain other decisions cited by the

¹ AIR 2013 SC 2389

parties and ultimately concluded that if further alienations are not stopped by grant of temporary injunction, the situation may slip out of the hands.

CMA. No.59 of 2018

31. Challenging the same, the petitioners filed CMA. No.59 of 2018 before the VIII Additional District Judge, R.R. District at L.B.Nagar. The said appeal was also dismissed on 08.10.2018.

32. The lower appellate Court also refused to go into the genuineness and validity of Ex. P1 and P2 on the ground that the said issues can be determined only after full fledged trial and not at interlocutory stage. It held that prima facie, Court can exercise power to grant temporary injunction to preserve the subject matter of the suit in *status quo* for the time being; that the 1st respondent is contending in the suit that respondent No.s 2 to 4 had unilaterally cancelled the irrevocable GPA on 13.02.1992 executed in his favour and that the same is coupled with interest in view of the execution of the agreement of sale Ex.P1 dt. 24.01.1988; there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the main suit as to whether such cancellation unilaterally of the GPA is valid or not, and the plea of limitation and maintainability of the suit raised by petitioners can also be gone into in the trial.

33. It held that though petitioners had pointed out that the 1st respondent had not claimed any possession of the suit scheduled property in the plaint and for the first time, he claimed possession over the suit schedule property in the I.A., this plea is not correct since according to the averments in the plaint, the 1st respondent had attended to the works of clearance, leveling,

getting approved layout from the Grampanchayat for the land and also sold a part of the land of extent of Ac.0.26 gts vide Ex.P5 and P6 sale deeds.

34. Therefore, it concluded that there is evidence on record to show that the petitioners were trying to sell the suit schedule property by way of plots even though the HMDA had observed that the petitioners had not obtained any valid layout; and the trial Court had given valid reasons for grant of temporary injunction pending the suit; and the said order did not warrant any interference in appeal. It therefore directed the trial Court to expeditiously decide the suit.

35. Assailing the same, this Revision is filed.

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONERS IN THE REVISION

36. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court did not properly appreciate the contentions of the petitioners; that in the plaint, which was filed in 2008, the 1st respondent had not asserted his possession of the property in Acs.7.00 and in para 5 he merely stated that “he was *holding* the said land”; in the I.A. No.341 of 2018, in para 6, for the first time, it is alleged that the petitioners had threatened to interfere with his possession over the property; and in the absence of any assertion in the plaint about possession of the 1st respondent, the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court could not have granted temporary injunction in favour of the 1st respondent restraining the petitioners from alienating, encumbering, transferring, interfering, creating any mortgage or in any manner dealing with the suit schedule property pending the suit. He also contended that the GPA Ex.P2 dt. 13.02.1992 executed in favour of the 1st respondent is not coupled with interest. Apart

from that he also pointed out that the 1st respondent had filed I.A. No. 2186 of 2008 against the respondent No.s 2 to 13 to restrain them from alienating the suit schedule property, but the said I.A. had been dismissed for default on 11.02.2014 itself but no steps were taken till 2018 to revive the said I.A.; that there was also no injunction order granted from 2008 to 2018 in favour of the 1st respondent; and therefore, the Courts below could not have granted any interim relief in I.A. No.341 of 2018 to the 1st respondent.

CONTENTIONS OF COUNSEL OFR THE 1ST RESPONDENT

37. The counsel for the 1st respondent supported the orders passed by he Court below and contended that the interlocutory remedy by way of order of grant of injunction is intended to observe and maintain the *status quo* as regards rights of the parties and to protect the 1st respondent / plaintiff against invasion of his rights for which there is no appropriate compensation; and that the 1st respondent had established prima facie case, balance of convenience is in his favor and irreparable injury would be caused to him if interim injunction is not granted. According to him, unilateral cancellation of the GPA Ex.P.2 dt. 13.02.1992 executed in favour of the 1st respondent by the respondent No.s 2 to 4 is not permissible because it is grant of power coupled with interest; and consequently any transfers by respondent No.s 2 to 6 in favour of the respondent No.s 7 to 13 or by respondent No.s 7 to 13 in favour of the petitioners would not be valid.

THE CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT

38. I have noted the contentions of both sides.

39. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the 1st respondent/ plaintiff claims that there is agreement of sale Ex.P.1 executed in his favour by respondent No.s 2 to 4 apart from GPA Ex.P.2 dt. 13.02.1992; and that the respondent no.s 2-4 could not have unilaterally cancelled the GPA under Ex.P8 deed dt.6.6.1996 and then sold to respondent no.s 7-13 under Ex.P7 sale deed dt.11.9.1996; and the latter cannot execute agreement of sale cum GPA to petitioners on 27.6.2018.

40. According to the petitioners, the said GPA Ex.P.2 dt. 13.02.1992 was cancelled on 06.06.1996 under Ex.P8 by respondent No.s 2 to 4 and they then executed Ex.P7 sale deed dt. 11.09.1996 in favour of the respondent No.s 7 to 13; and respondent No.s 7 to 13 then sold the plaint schedule property to the petitioners under Ex.P9 agreement of sale cum GPA dt. 27.06.2018.

41. It is also to be noted that in the plaint, the 1st respondent did not assert his possession over the Acs.7.00 of land which he claimed to have purchased under Ex.P1 dt. 24.01.1988 from the respondent No.s 2 to 4. Even according to his pleading in para 4, he was transferred from Hyderabad to Bangalore and then to Chennai and later to the United States of India and merely stated in para 5 that he was *holding* the said land. Though he did say that he had attended to the works of clearance, leveling, getting approved layout from the Grampanchayat for the land, this was prior to his being transferred from Hyderabad. No dates of his transfer from Hyderabad are mentioned.

42. But in I.A. No.341 of 2018 he pleaded in para 6 for the first time that the petitioners are threatening to interfere over his possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the I.A. No revenue

record is filed by him to show his possession of the plaint schedule property as on date of filing of the I.A.No.341 of 2018.

43. Therefore, *prima facie*, the courts below ought not to have presumed his possession of the plaint schedule property on the date of filing of I.A. No.341 of 2018.

44. It is also not in dispute that though the 1st respondent/plaintiff filed I.A. No.2186 of 2008 against the respondent No.s 7 to 13 invoking Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC to restrain them from alienating the suit schedule property, but no interim order was granted in favour of the 1st respondent in the said I.A. and it was dismissed for default on 11.12.2014 and it was later revived only in 2018. So between 2008 and 2018 there was no interim order in favour of the 1st respondent. This conduct of the 1st respondent also suggests that he was probably not in possession of the suit schedule property and so he did not press for any orders in the said I.A.

45. Moreover, it is not the case of the 1st respondent that he had filed suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale Ex.P1 dt. 24.01.1988 and for execution of registered sale deed by respondent No.s 2 to 4. This fact is also not taken note of by both the Courts below.

46. *Prima facie*, there cannot be any transfer of any title either under agreement of sale or under a GPA.

47. In **Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and Others**² it was held that there cannot be any transfer of title under sale agreements or GPAs. It was observed:

² 2012 (1) SCC 656.

“18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.

19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.

... ..

23. Therefore, an SA/GPA/will transaction does not convey any title nor creates any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank, that the “concept of power-of-attorney sales has been recognised as a mode of transaction” when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/will are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/will transactions are some kind of a recognised or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognise or accept SA/GPA/will transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law.

24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognised or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognised as deeds

of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53-A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in municipal or revenue records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA sales.”

48. In the absence of any registered sale deed in favour of the 1st respondent and in the absence of any pleading in the plaint that the 1st respondent was in possession of the suit schedule property, the Courts below could not have taken a view that the 1st respondent has a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is in his favour.

49. I am also of the opinion that when the trial court had taken the view that it will not express any opinion about admissibility or rejection of Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and the lower appellate court had also taken the view that it will not go into the genuineness or validity of these documents, they erred because they need to consider the same to come to a conclusion about the 1st respondent having *prima-facie* case.

50. Also as held in **Thomson Press (India) Limited** (1 supra) a *pendente lite* transfer is not void ab initio. It observed :

“ 26. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the ground that it is necessary for the administration of justice that the decision of a court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigating parties but on those who derive title pendente lite. The provision of this section does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation.

27. Discussing the principles of *lis pendens*, the Privy Council in **Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Sk. Sukur Mohammed**³ observed as under: (IA p. 170)

“... The broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The applicability of the section cannot depend on matters of proof or the strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in *bona fide* proceedings. To apply any such test is to misconceive the object of the enactment and, in the view of the Board, the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in this respect in laying stress, as he did, on the fact that the agreement of 8-6-1932, had not been registered.”

28. In **Kedar Nath Lal v. Ganesh Ram**⁴ this Court referred the earlier decision in **Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag**⁵ and observed: (**Kedar Nath Lal case**, SCC p. 792, para 17)

“17. ... ‘16. ... The purchaser pendente lite under this doctrine is bound by the result of the litigation on the principle that since the result must bind the party to it so must it bind the person deriving his right, title and interest from or through him. This principle is well illustrated in **Radhamadhub Holder v. Monohur Mookerji** where the facts were almost similar to those in the instant case. It is true that Section 52 strictly speaking does not apply to involuntary alienations such as court sales but it is well established that the principle of *lis pendens* applies to such alienations. (See **Nilakant Banerji v. Suresh Chunder Mullick and Moti Lal v. Karrab-ul-Din**)’ (**Samarendra Nath case**¹¹, AIR p. 1445, para 16)”

29. The aforesaid Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act again came up for consideration before this Court in **Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh**⁶ and Their Lordships with approval of the principles laid down in **Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami**⁷ reiterated: (**Rajender Singh case**¹⁵, SCC p. 711, para 15)

“15. The doctrine of *lis pendens* was intended to strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject-matter of litigation from the ambit of the court’s power to decide a pending dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be bound, by an application of the doctrine,

³ AIR 1948 PC 147

⁴ AII 1970 SC 1717

⁵ AIR 1967 SC 1440

⁶ 1973 2 SCC 705

⁷ 1972 2 SCC 200

by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. The whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property, which are the subject-matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the court so as to prevent the object of a pending action from being defeated.”

51. Therefore, merely because there is some material placed by the 1st respondent to show that there were alienations pending suit, or that there is likelihood further alienations, it cannot be said that there is any irreparable injury likely to be caused to the 1st respondent warranting grant of temporary injunction in his favour by the Courts below.

52. Though the counsel for the 1st respondent sought to contend that even the HMDA had issued notice to the 1st respondent that the layout prepared by the petitioners is not valid, and public interest is likely to be affected if sale transactions are allowed in the said land, I am not impressed by the said contention for the reason that it is the lookout by the purchasers to verify all aspects before they purchase the plots being allegedly sold by the petitioners and the 1st respondent cannot take advantage of the same and seek temporary injunction against the petitioners.

53. I am of the opinion that without considering the aspects of the prima facie case and balance of convenience, irreparable injury, the Courts below have perversely granted the relief to the 1st respondent and the said orders therefore, cannot be sustained.

54. Accordingly, the Revision Petition is allowed and the order dt. 08.10.2018 passed in CMA. No.59 of 2018 of the VIII Additional District Judge, R.R.District at L.B.Nagar confirming the order dt. 31.07.2018 passed in I.A. No.341 of 2018 in O.S. No.2455 of 2008 by

the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, R.R.District at L.B.Nagar is set aside, and the said I.A. No.341 of 2008 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

55. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending shall stand closed.

JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

Date: 04.04.2019
LSK



THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

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