

**HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA**

**THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN**  
**AND**  
**THE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE SHAMEEM AKTHER**

**Writ Petition No.43980 of 2018**

Date: 20.06.2019

Between:

Angadi Uma

...Petitioner

And

The State of Telangana,  
Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government (POLL),  
General Administration (Special Law and Order) Department,  
Secretariat,  
Hyderabad, and another.

...Respondents

Counsel for the petitioner : Mr. P. Prabhakar Reddy

Counsel for the respondents: Mr. S. Sharath Kumar  
Special Government Pleader

**The Court made the following:**

**ORDER:** (Per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice Raghvendra Singh Chauhan)

The wife of the detenu, Angadi Suresh, has filed the present Habeas Corpus Petition, *inter alia*, on the ground that for a series of theft cases in which her husband is allegedly involved, the Collector & District Magistrate, the respondent No.2, has passed a preventive detention order on 17.07.2018. The said order was subsequently confirmed by the order, dated 12.10.2018, passed by the Principal Secretary to Government, the respondent No.1.

The petitioner submits that on 17.07.2018, the respondent No.2 had passed the impugned detention order ostensibly on the ground that her husband was involved in cases falling under Sections 379, 457 and 380 IPC, in six theft cases, which were registered against the detenu between 19.10.2017 to 06.03.2018. Subsequently, the said detention order was confirmed by the order, dated 12.10.2018. Hence, the present petition before this Court.

Mr. Prabhakar Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that a distinction has to be made between "law and order" and "disturbance of public order". The detenu is alleged to have committed series of thefts. However, the detenu is so poor that he has not even managed to submit the sureties despite the fact that bails were granted by the learned trial Court. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, individual cases of theft would fall within the ambit of

law and order problem, as such cases can be dealt with easily under the normal criminal justice system. In order to deal with these cases, the draconian preventive detention laws need not be invoked. Therefore, the invoking of the provisions of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act is an abuse of the process of law, and the action smacks of colourable exercise of power.

Secondly, it is a classic case where the defenseless and voiceless persons may have been arrested, and may have been falsely implicated by the Police in order to claim that it has “cracked a large number of theft cases”. Although the Police claims that articles were recovered, the articles were never even subjected to a test identification parade. Therefore, the omission on the part of the Police clearly reveals that they are trying to falsely implicate the detenu. Lastly, that such indiscriminating use of the preventive detention laws are in violation of right to life and personal liberty, which is guaranteed by the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, both the impugned orders deserve to be set aside by this Court.

On the other hand, Mr. Sharath, the learned Special Government Pleader, submits that even a series of thefts are likely to cause panic and insecurity in the minds of the people. Since these six theft cases were committed by the detenu within

a period of one year, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned orders. Hence, the learned Counsel has supported the impugned orders.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the impugned orders.

In the case of **Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar**<sup>1</sup>, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

*"54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression 'public order' take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish 'public order' from 'law and order' because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law*

---

<sup>1</sup> AIR 1966 SC 740

*and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.”*

In the case of **Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal**<sup>2</sup>, the Supreme Court has opined as under:

*“The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call ‘order publique’ and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?”*

There are two glaring facets of this case which have drawn the attention of this Court: firstly, the detenu was arrested on 11.04.2018 in Crime No.40 of 2018. It is during the interrogation that, allegedly, the detenu made “a confessional statement”, wherein he admitted his involvement in the other five theft cases which were committed in the year 2017.

---

<sup>2</sup> (1972) 3 SCC 831

Secondly, despite the fact that the detenu was repeatedly granted bail by the learned trial Court, he could not be released on the bail, as he was unable to furnish the sureties required by the bail order. Thus, the detenu happens to be an extremely poor person, who could not be set at liberty only because of his poverty. Instances are not lacking where the voiceless and defenseless persons are rounded up by Police, and are forced “to confess” their involvement in crime. According to criminal psychology, due to fear and coercion, even the innocent men and women are likely to confess to a crime, although such crimes may not have been committed by them. Such “confessions” are merely a means to escape the torture to which they are subjected. At times, the Police use certain means, which although are illegal, but help the Police in “cracking a case” and in claiming that they have “solved the crime”. Therefore, *prima facie*, a grave possibility does exist that the detenu has been forced to confess to his involvement in cases of 2017 and 2018.

Even otherwise, a series of thefts can easily be dealt within the ambit and scope of the general criminal justice administration. In catena of cases the Apex Court had already opined that the draconian power of preventive detention, which instantly deprives a person of his personal liberty, forces a person to be kept in custody without a fair trial and, that too, only on presumptions and suppositions, such powers should be exercised with care and caution. Since the cases of theft are

against particular individuals, clearly such cases fall within the ambit of “law and order problem”. Therefore, the respondent No.2 was unjustified in issuing the preventive detention order, dated 17.07.2018.

Even while passing the confirmation order, dated 12.10.2018, the respondent No.1 has failed to notice that the detenu continues to languish as an under-trial in the jail, as he could not furnish the sureties asked for in the bail orders. Once the detenu was already confined, the question of confirming the detention order would not even arise.

For the reasons stated above, this Writ Petition is, hereby, allowed. The impugned orders, dated 17.07.2018 and 12.10.2018, are set aside. The respondents are directed to release the detenu forthwith from preventive detention. However, in case the detenu is unable to furnish the sureties as required by the bail order, he shall continue to be an under-trial in the criminal cases in which he is allegedly involved.

The miscellaneous petitions pending in this Writ Petition, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.

---

**RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN, ACJ**

---

**Dr. SHAMEEM AKTHER, J**

20.06.2019  
vs