

HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA SINGH
CHAUHAN

AND

THE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE SHAMEEM AKTHER

Writ Petition No.7900 of 2019

Date: 18.07.2019

Between:

B.P.S. Kishore

..Petitioner

And

The State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
General Administration (Law & Order) Dept.,
Secretariat, Hyderabad,
and others.

..Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri Pasham Trivikram Reddy

Counsel for the respondents : The Advocate General

The Court made the following:

ORDER: (Per the Hon'ble Dr. Justice Shameem Akther)

Sri B.P.S. Kishore, the petitioner, has filed this present petition on behalf of his brother-Bommala Dilip Kumar, S/o. Anjaiah, aged 40 years, the detenu, challenging the detention order dated 30.07.2018 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, the respondent No.2, and the confirmation order dated 08.10.2018 passed by the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government of Telangana, the respondent No.1.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the impugned orders.

Briefly, the facts of the case are that by relying on the four recent cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018, the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, the respondent No.2, passed the detention order dated 30.07.2018. According to the respondent No.2, the detenu was involved in as many as eighteen offences of theft of two wheeler vehicles in the limits of Hyderabad and Rachakonda Police Commissionerates. But, merely relying on the four recent cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018, the detention order was passed. Subsequently, by order dated 08.10.2018, the detention order was confirmed by the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government

of Telangana, respondent No.1. Hence, this writ petition before this Court.

Sri Pasham Trivikram Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court:

Firstly, relying only on the four recent cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018, the detention order is passed.

Secondly, curiously, all the cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018 are for the offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC.

Thirdly, such cases can easily be tackled by the criminal justice system by holding a criminal trial. Therefore, all these cases fall within the ambit of “law and order problem”. Relying on the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar¹, learned counsel has pleaded that a distinction has to be maintained between “a law and order problem” and “a public order problem”. Since the cases narrated by the detaining authority do not fall within the ambit of “disturbance of public order”, the detaining authority is unjustified in invoking the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities

¹ AIR 1966 SC 740

Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act. Therefore, the detention of the detenu is patently illegal. Hence, the detaining authority is unjustified in claiming that these cases have created a panic and have “disturbed the public order”.

Fourthly, the detaining authority is not justified in invoking a draconian power under the preventive detention laws. According to the learned counsel, the detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing a detention order. For detention *ipso facto* adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty enjoyed by the people under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Lastly, even while confirming the detention order dated 30.07.2018, the respondent No.1 has not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Instead, the confirmation order dated 08.10.2018 has been passed in a mechanical manner. Admittedly, in the present case, the detenu had not moved any bail petition in any of the crimes registered against him. Thus, the detenu continues to be in judicial custody. Despite the fact that the detenu is in custody, still the preventive detention order has been passed against the detenu. Therefore, even the confirmation order deserves to be set aside by this Court.

On the other hand, Mr. S.Sharath, the learned Special Government Pleader, submits that the nature of offences allegedly committed by the detenu is sufficient to cause a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people at large. Since the *modus* of committing the crimes was theft of two wheeler vehicles, it had created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned orders. Hence, the learned Government Pleader has supported the impugned orders.

In view of the submissions made by both the sides, the point that arises for determination in this Writ Petition is:

“Whether the detention order, dated 30.07.2018, passed by the respondent No.2 and the confirmation order, dated 08.10.2018, passed by the respondent No.1, are liable to be set aside?”

POINT:

In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had clearly opined that there is a vast difference between “law and order” and “public order”. The offences which are committed against a particular individual fall within the ambit of “law and order”. It is only when the public at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, the conduct of a person is said to disturb the public order. Moreover, individual cases can be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Therefore, there is no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws against an individual. For the invoking of such law adversely affects the

fundamental right of personal liberty, which is protected and promoted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, according to the Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Act.

In the case of *Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar*², the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

"54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression 'public order' take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish 'public order' from 'law and order' because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the

² AIR 1966 SC 740

apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.”

In the case of Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal³, the Supreme Court has opined as under:

“The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call ‘order publique’ and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?”

In the present case, the detaining authority relied on four criminal cases registered against the detenu for preventively detaining him vide Crime Nos.168/2018, 125/2018, 124/2018 and 383/2018. We shall present them in

³ (1972) 3 SCC 831

a tabular column the date of occurrence, the date of registration of FIRs, the offences complained of and their nature, such as bailable/non-bailable or cognizable/non-cognizable.

Sl. No.	Crime No.	Date of Occurrence	Date of registration of FIR	Offences	Nature
1.	Crime No.168/2018 of L.B.Nagar (L&O) PS	05.02.2018	09.02.2018	Section 379 of IPC	Cognizable/ Non-Bailable
2.	Crime No.125/2018 of Osmania University PS	19.04.2018	23.04.2018	Section 379 of IPC	Cognizable/ Non-Bailable
3.	124/2018 of Osmania University PS	20.04.2018	20.04.2018	Section 379 of IPC	Cognizable/ Non-Bailable
4.	383/2018 of Uppal PS	Intervening night of 21/22.04.2018	24.04.2018	Section 379 of IPC	Cognizable/ Non-Bailable

A bare perusal of the detention order clearly reveals that the detenu had not moved bail petition in any of the cases, including the cases which were considered as his antecedent criminal history. Thus, the detenu continues to be in judicial custody. However, the apprehension of the detaining authority that there is every possibility of the detenu coming out from the prison by admitting his guilt and securing simple conviction equivalent to his remand period or after the disposal of the cases and in the event of his release on bail, there is imminent possibility of his indulging in similar prejudicial activities unless he is prevented from doing so by an appropriate order of detention, is highly misplaced. It is the bounden duty of the Police to inform the learned Public Prosecutor about the conduct of an accused and to handover

the history-sheet of the accused. If the Police were vigilant enough to collect the data on the alleged offenders, and to furnish the relevant information to the learned Public Prosecutors, the same could be placed by the learned Public Prosecutors before the concerned Court. However, it is the Police that has to take required measures to inform the Public Prosecutor about the criminal history of the offender and appraise the Court about the criminal tendency of the offender to deny the bail. Since the detenu has not been granted bail by the date of order of detention, his coming out from the prison and committing similar offences would not arise. On this sole ground the detention order is liable to be set aside. [Ref. to Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government & another⁴]

Grave as the offences may be, they relate to theft of two wheeler vehicles. So, no inference of disturbance of public order can be drawn. These cases can be tried under the normal criminal law. Hence, there was no need for the detaining authority to pass the detention order. Therefore, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable.

Even while passing the confirmation order dated 08.10.2018, the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government of Telangana, the respondent No.1, has failed to notice that the detenu continues to languish as under-trial in

⁴ (2011) 5 SCC 244

the jail. Once the detenu was already confined, the question of confirming the detention order would not even arise.

For the reasons stated above, the Writ Petition is hereby allowed. The impugned detention order dated 30.07.2018 passed by the respondent No.2, and the confirmation order dated 08.10.2018 passed by the respondent No.1, are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely, Mr. Bommala Dilip Kumar, S/o. Anjaiah, at liberty forthwith, if he is no longer detained in the judicial custody in the criminal cases, which have been registered so far against him.

The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.

RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN, HCJ

Dr. SHAMEEM AKTHER, J

18th July, 2019
Bvv