



BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 04.06.2019

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM

W.P(MD)No. 3463 of 2013

and

MP(MD) No.1 of 2013

WEB COPY

A.Karunanithi

... Petitioner

Vs.

1. The Secretary to Government

Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department
Chepauk, Chennai2.The Director of Town Panchayats
Kuralagam, Chennai3.The District Collector
Trichy District, Trichy4.The Commissioner
Thuraiyur Municipality, Trichy District5. Additional Director
Local Funds Audit
Kuralagam, 4th floor, Chennai

... Respondents

PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the proceedings in Mu.Mu.No.23570/Na.O.Sa (6)/2012 dated 31.08.2012 issued by the 5th Respondent and also the order passed in Na.Ka.No.C1/1125/2000 dated 02.03.2006 issued by the 4th respondent herein and quash the same in so far as the regularization of services of the petitionenr with effect from 23.02.2006 alone and consequently direct the respondents to regularize the petitioners services in the post Cleaner with effect from 23.02.2001 and consequently direct the respondents to incude the name of the petitioner under the Regular Pension Scheme.


For Petitioner : Mr.C. Jeganathan
for M/s.Veera Associates

For Respondents : Mr. S.Dhayalan
1 to 3 Government Advocate

Respondent No.4 :Mr.R.Velmurugan

O R D E R

The order of regularisation regularising the services of the writ petitioner from 02.03.2006 is under challenge in the writ petition and the writ petitioner is seeking a direction to




regularise the services retrospectively with effect from the date on which the writ petitioner had completed one year of service from the consolidated pay salary appointment.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner state that the Government had issued orders in G.O. No.125, dated 27.05.1999 granting the benefit of regularisation on completion of one year of service in the consolidated pay salary. The cases of the similarly placed candidates were considered by the respondents and the benefit of retrospective regularisation was granted to the similarly placed persons as that of the writ petitioner. Thus, the counsel for the writ petitioner state that the very same benefit is to be granted to the writ petitioner also. The similar case referred by the writ petitioner was granted in proceedings, dated 28.11.2001. The learned counsel for the petitioner further states that the similar benefit was granted to many other persons also, during the year 2001.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent states that the writ petitioner was appointed on consolidated pay and the initial appointment of the writ petitioner was not in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. The initial appointment was made without following the procedures contemplated and therefore, the benefit of regularisation itself was a concession granted to the writ petitioner. Thus, the benefit of retrospective regularisation cannot be granted.

4. This Court is of the considered opinion that the regularisation or permanent absorption cannot be granted in violation of the services rules in force. The benefit of regularisation or permanent absorption are to be granted strictly in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. Equal opportunity in public employment is a constitutional mandate. All appointments are to be made under the constitutional scheme and by following the service rules in force. Appointment to the public posts are to be done by the competent authorities strictly following the procedure contemplated for selection of appointment. In the event of not following the recruitment rules, equal opportunities enunciated in the constitution is violated. Large number of young minds of this great nation are preparing for competitive examinations by burning their mid-night lamps to secure public employment. In the event of violation in the recruitment rules, equal opportunities as well as the constitutional rights to all those eligible persons are infringed. Thus, adherence of the constitutional principles are the mandate and the State as a model employer, is bound to follow the constitutional principles and ethos.

5. Under these circumstances, all appointments made in violation of the recruitment rules in force are to be dealt in accordance with the legal principles settled by the Constitutional Bench of the non-judicial Supreme Court of India in the case of **State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi reported in 2006 [4] SCC 1**. The persons appointed



through backdoor and all such irregular or illegal appointments are to be dealt in accordance with the principles settled by the Apex Court of India. Those backdoor appointment cannot be brought under the regular establishment and more specifically, the persons appointed through backdoor must be sent out through the door which they entered into. In the present case on hand, the writ petitioner was admittedly, was appointed as temporary employee on consolidated pay. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was not appointed in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. Thus, the benefit of regularisation granted in proceedings, dated 01.03.2006 itself is a concession granted to the writ petitioner. Thus granting of further concession would not arise at all. Once an employee was granted with concession in regularisation of government absorption in a sanctioned posts in regular time scale, he cannot seek for further concession of retrospective regularisation from the date of completion of one year of service, from the date of grant of consolidated pay. Thus, the very claim is not in consonance with the legal principles settled by the constitution of Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. For better appreciation, the principles laid down by the **Constitutional Bench in Uma Devi case** is extracted hereunder:

"State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi reported in 2006 [4] SCC 1 wherein the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

"4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is



intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten.

5. This Court has also on occasions issued directions which could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably on the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim, or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law as laid down by the Constitution and not to make directions, which at times, even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the Constitution Bench.

12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a



court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme.

13. What is sought to be pitted against this approach, is the so called equity arising out of giving of temporary employment or engagement on daily wages and the continuance of such persons in the engaged work for a certain length of time. Such considerations can have only a limited role to play, when every qualified citizen has a right to apply for appointment, the adoption of the concept of rule of law and the scheme of the Constitution for appointment to posts. It cannot also be forgotten that it is not the role of courts to ignore, encourage or approve appointments made or engagements given outside the constitutional scheme. In effect, orders based on such sentiments or approach would result in perpetuating illegalities and in the jettisoning of the scheme of public employment adopted by us while adopting the Constitution. The approving of such acts also results in depriving many of their opportunity to compete for public employment. We have, therefore, to consider the question objectively and based on the constitutional and statutory provisions. In this context, we have also to bear in mind the exposition of law by a Constitution Bench in *State of Punjab Vs. Jagdip Singh & Ors.* (1964 (4) SCR 964). It was held therein,

"In our opinion, where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status."

26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent -- the



distinction between regularization and making permanent, was not emphasized here -- can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in paragraph 50 of *Piara Singh (supra)* are to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent.

"39. There have been decisions which have taken the cue from the *Dharwad (supra)* case and given directions for regularization, absorption or making permanent, employees engaged or appointed without following the due process or the rules for appointment. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in *The Workmen of Bhurkunda Colliery of M/s Central Coalfields Ltd. Vs. The Management of Bhurkunda Colliery of M/s Central Coalfields Ltd. (JT 2006 (2) SC 1)*, though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. But on a survey of authorities, the predominant view is seen to be that such appointments did not confer any right on the appointees and that the Court cannot direct their absorption or regularization or re-engagement or making them permanent.

"43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or



made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.

"44. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public



employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.


45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and



the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

"49. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution".

6. In the case of Secretary to **School Education Department, Chennai Vs. Govindasamy and others**, reported in **2014 (4) SCC, 769**, the Apex Court in unambiguous terms reiterated that "The High Courts in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not issue direction for regularisation or absorption for continuous service unless the employees are regularised appointed in consonance of in accordance with the relevant rules in open competitive places against the sanctioned vacant posts. The equality class contained in Article, 14 & 16 should be scrupulously



followed and Court should not issue direction for regularisation of service which would be violating of constitutional scheme. While scrutiny for want of compliance with one of the element in the society the process of selection which does not go to the root of process can be regularised backdoor entries appointment contrary to the constitutional scheme and those appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularises. "

7.This being the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court , now the High Court does not grant regularisation in respect of the appointments made in violation of recruitment rules in force. Admittedly, the initial appointment of the writ petitioner in the present post was not in accordance with the recruitment rules and the benefit of regularisation was already granted by proceedings dated 01.03.2006 and the service of the writ petitioner was already regularised and he is working in the sanctioned post in the regular time scale of pay. This being the concession already extended to the writ petitioner, he cannot expect any further concession either from the Government or from the High Court.

8.Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

Sd/-

Assistant Registrar (Crl.Side)

// True Copy //

Sub Assistant Registrar(CS)

To:

1. The Secretary to Government,
Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department,
Chepauk, Chennai.
 - 2.The Director of Town Panchayats,
Kuralagam, Chennai.
 - 3.The District Collector
Trichy District, Trichy.
 - 4.The Commissioner, Thuraiyur Municipality, Trichy District.
 - 5.The Additional Director, Local Fund Audit,
Kuralagam, 4th Floor, Chennai.
- +1 CC to Mr.R.VELMURUGAN, Advocate SR-66960.
+1 CC to Special Government Pleader.

W.P[MD)]No.3463 of 2013
04.06.2019