IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Date of Reserving Order 12.02.2019	Date of Pronouncing Order 26.02.2019

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN

Crl.O.P.No.17399 of 2018
and Crl.M.P.No.9003 of 2018

C.Ponnusamy ...Petitioner

Vs.

1.The Inspector of Police,
EDF Team 4,
Central Crime Branch,
Vepery, Chennai 600 007.

2.R.Selvam ...Respondents

PRAYER: Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., to call for the records in Crime No.233 of 2018 dated 04.06.2018 pending investigation on the file of the Inspector of Police, EDF (Team - IV), Central Crime Branch, Chennai and quash the entire proceeding.

For Petitioner : Mr.M.Velmurugan

For Respondents : Mr.M.Mohamed Riyaz,
Additional Public Prosecutor for R1

Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagaraj for R2

O R D E R

The present Criminal Original Petition has been filed to quash the FIR in Crime No.233 of 2018 registered for offences under Sections 420, 506(1) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2.The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the FIR is registered and hence, the petition is not maintainable in law and on facts. It is purely an abuse of process of law and has been filed with a mala fide intention with ulterior motive to harass the petitioner. Thus, a false complaint has been foisted against the petitioner. Further, he submitted that the entire issue is civil in nature and the first respondent has coloured the civil case as criminal offences based on civil litigations. There is no ingredient for the offence under Section 420 of IPC to make out the case of cheating. Even, as per the litigations made in the complaint, all are money transactions between them based on the loan transaction extended based on the property documents given by the petitioner as collateral security.

2.1.On facts, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the second respondent and the petitioner and his brother were known to each other for several years. The petitioner was running the business of supplying centering sheets and allied materials in the name and style of M/s.Om Muruga Enterprises, Chennai. The de-facto complainant also joined as a partner and paid a sum of Rs.6.25 Crores on various dates from the year 2013 to 2014. The petitioner and his brother acknowledged the said payment and executed the documents to that effect. But the petitioner did not induct the de-facto complainant as a partner. Therefore, the de-facto complainant requested the petitioner to return the money, but the petitioner was not able to arrange funds and hence requested further time for repayment and also executed fresh pronotes in favour of the de-facto complainant. Even then, the petitioner could not repay the amount and issued three cheques to the de-facto complainant. The petitioner also requested the de-facto complainant not to present the same and threatened and intimidated the de-facto complainant with dire consequences.

2.2.Further, the learned counsel submitted that even as per the complaint, the petitioner has handed over the original title deeds for repayment of the money to the de-facto complainant to prove that he has no intention to cheat the de-facto complainant from the inception stage or subsequently thereof.

2.3.According to the complaint, the petitioner agreed to pay the interest for the outstanding amount and as such the entire transaction is civil in nature and it would not amount to criminal breach of trust and cheating by inducing the de-facto complainant to part with money. The petitioner also executed fresh pronotes which would go to show that the entire transactions are only civil in nature and he never committed an offence of breach of trust or cheating. The petitioner never threatened the de-facto complainant and only to foist a false case as against the petitioner and with an oblique motive foisted false allegations as against the petitioner to attract the offence under Section 506(1) of IPC.

2.4.The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the case of the petitioner is that in the year 2013, he availed loan to the tune of Rs.1 Crore from the de-facto complainant and executed the cheques, unfilled signed cheques and deposited the title deeds of the property situated at No.4, Tondiarpet High Road, Chennai. Thereafter, the petitioner could not able to pay the exorbitant interest as demanded by the de-facto complainant. Thereafter, on negotiation, the total outstanding amount fixed as Rs.2 Crores and a Memorandum of Understanding was entered between the petitioner and the de-facto complainant on 15.05.2014. As per the Memorandum, the property worth about Rs.1.7 Crores was executed in favour of the de-facto complainant on 08.09.2014 and paid a sum of Rs.40 Lakhs on 12.06.2014. Even then, the de-facto complainant refused to return the documents and demanded further sum of Rs.3.5 Crores. Therefore, the petitioner lodged the complaint before the Commissioner of Police on 20.03.2018. But unfortunately, the Police Officials refused to investigate the complaint, since, it is Civil in nature.

2.5.Therefore, the petitioner filed a Civil Suit in O.S.No.1835 of 2018 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai, for mandatory injunction against the complainant to return the cheques, stamp papers, which were obtained at the time of borrowing loan.

2.6.Immediately, after receipt of the notice from the said Court, the present complaint has been foisted as against the petitioner. Therefore, the entire allegations are civil in nature and there is absolutely no ingredients to attract the offence under Sections 420, 506(1) r/w 34 of IPC as against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the Judgments reported in
a) (2000) 4 SCC 168 Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others -vs- State of Binar and another.
b) (2001) 3 SCC 513 Alpic Finance Ltd., -vs- P.Sadasivan and another.
c) (2002) 1 SCC 241 S.W.Palanitkar and others -vs- State of Bihar and another.
d) (2003) 3 SCC 11 Ajay Mitra -vs- State of M.P and others.
e) (2005) 10 SCC 336 Uma Shankar Gopilika -vs- State of Bihar and another.
f) (2006) 6 SCC 736 Indian Oil Corporation -vs- Nepc India Ltd., and others.
g) (2007) 13 SCC 107 B.Suresh Yadav -vs- Sharifa Bee and another.
h) (2007) 7 SCC 373 Vir Prakash Sharma -vs- Anil Kumar Agarwal and another.
i) (2008) 3 SCC 574 Som Mittal -vs- Government of Karnataka.
j) (2016) 1 SCC 348 International Advanced Research Centre for

Powder Metallulrgy and New Materials (Arci) and others -vs- Nimra Cerglass Technics Private Limited and another.
k) Crl.O.P.No.5776 of 2011 S.S.Janagarajan -vs- The State of Tamil Nadu and another.

He submitted that the above diction laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India squarely applies to this case and prayed for quashing the F.I.R.

3.Per contra, the learned counsel for the second respondent would submit that the petitioner is arrayed as the second accused. The petitioner and his brother were known to the de-facto complainant. They were running a business of supplying centering sheets and allied materials in the name and style of M/s.Om Muruga Enterprises, Chennai. They induced the de-facto complainant to join as a partner in their business, so that they can expand their business in the entire States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.

3.1.On the said promise, the de-facto complainant paid a sum of Rs.6.5 Crores from December 2013 to April 2014. The said payment was duly acknowledged by them and also executed the documents to that effect. The said transaction was also for inducting the de-facto complainant as partner and for buying properties. Further, the petitioner promised that they would pay profit on the outstanding amount and also they deposited the original title deeds. Thereafter, they failed to induct the de-facto complainant as a partner and did not pay any amount as promised by them.

3.2.As such, in the year 2016, the de-facto complainant requested them to return the money. Thereafter, on negotiation, both entered into the memorandum of understanding and even then, they did not comply the terms and conditions imposed on the memorandum of understanding. Thereby, the petitioner and his brother cheated the de-facto complainant. Therefore, he lodged a complaint and the first respondent rightly registered the case in Crime No.233 of 2018 for an offences under Sections 420, 506 (1) r/w 34 of IPC. He further submitted that there are specific allegations averred in the complaint to attract the offences registered as against the petitioner and his brother. Further, he submitted that it is only in FIR stage and it has to be investigated further. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the quash petition.

3.3.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that there are two accused in Crime No.233 of 2018, in which, the petitioner is arrayed as the second accused and the first accused is none other than his own brother. They promised and induced the de-facto complainant to pay a sum of Rs.6.25 Crores for inducting him as a partner in the business running in the name and style of M/s.Om Muruga Enterprises, Chennai. Thereafter, they failed to induct the de-facto complainant as a partner and did not pay any profit to the de-facto complainant as promised by them. He further contended that they are investigating the matter and it cannot be quashed at this stage and prayed for dismissal of the quash petition.

4.Heard, Mr.M.Velmurugan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.M.Mohamed Riyaz, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent and Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagaraj, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent.

5.The petitioner is arrayed as the second accused and there are totally two accused in Crime No.233 of 2018 registered for the offences under Sections 420, 506(1) r/w 34 of IPC by the first respondent herein. The crux of the allegations is that the petitioner and his brother / first accused are running the business in the name and style of M/s.Om Muruga Enterprises at Chennai. They have been known to the de-facto complainant, and they induced the de-facto complainant to pay a sum of Rs.6.5 Crores for inducting the de-facto complainant as one of the partner of their business and also promised to pay the profit from the business. Thereafter, the accused persons failed to induct the de-facto complainant as a partner and also did not pay any profit to the de-facto complainant. Hence, the complaint has been lodged.

6.Admittedly, the petitioner and his brother were running the business supplying the centering sheets and allied materials in the name and style of M/s.Om Muruga Enterprises at Chennai. There is also no quarrel in respect of payment of money of the de-facto complainant to the petitioner. It is also seen from the memorandum of understanding dated 05.09.2014 entered between the petitioner and the de-facto complainant that there are so many terms and conditions imposed by them. Even, according to the memorandum of understanding a sum of Rs.3 Crores was paid by the de-facto complainant to the petitioner. Thereafter, the de-facto complainant was not inducted as a partner of their business and did not pay any profit to the de-facto complainant. Therefore, the averments made in the complaint cannot be termed as civil in nature. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgments reported in
a) (2000) 4 SCC 168 Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others -vs- State of Binar and another, is extracted hereunder:-

> "8.In the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal' this Court in the back drop of interpretation of various relevant provisions

of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, making it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (SCC 00. 378 – 79, para 102)

"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

9.In the decision this Court added a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised 'very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases'."

b) (2006) 6 SCC 736 Indian Oil Corporation -vs- Nepc India Ltd., and others, is extracted hereunder:-

"35.In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma, this Court held : (SCC pp.176-77 paras 14 - 15)

"14.On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest.

15.In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.""

c) (2014) 13 SCC 553 Rashmi Jain -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh and another, is extracted hereunder:-

"6.To take the complaint out of the realm of a purely civil dispute, it is maliciously alleged in the complaint that when Respondent 2 approached the appellant for payment, the appellant stated as follows:

"On 22.03.2009, the applicant met the accused in the market of Bazarganj Saraitareen and asked for his balance amount, but the accused in the presence of two other persons flatly refused to pay the same and threatened the applicant that if he ever asked for the payment again he will be killed and stated that you don't know me. I have not paid to the high and mighty people, who are you. I had to usurp your money and I had done so. Thereafter she went in a car."

In our opinion, the aforesaid averment has been made only to foist criminal liability on the appellant by converting a purely civil dispute into criminal act, alleged to have been committed by the appellant. The allegations are adsurd and outlandish on the face of it; firstly, the appellant is a lady, a widow, who was not accompanied by anybody else at the time of the alleged occurrence; secondly, she, though being a resident of Delhi, misbehaved with number of high and mighty parties with whom she had earlier transacted business at Moradabad. In our opinion, these are allegations which on the face of it, cannot be taken seriously by any reasonable person. The High Court, in our opinion, has committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the criminal petition filed by the appellant on the ground that it involves disputed questions of fact, which can only be gone into by the trial Court."

d) (2016) 1 SCC 348 International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallulrgy and New Materials (Arci) and others -vs- Nimra Cerglass Technics Private Limited and another, is extracted hereunder:-

"15.The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.

16.The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a representation made by the accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the breach of contract in a civil Court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W.Palanitkar -vs- State of Bihar, this Court held as under: (SCC p.250, para 21)

''21....In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that the committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating.''

The above view in Palanitkar case was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain -vs- State of U.P."

7.No doubt to attract the offence under Sections 420 there must be dishonest inducement to deliver the property and there must be mens – rea at the time of making inducement. Making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredient to constitute the offence of cheating. It is seen from the above Judgments that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, repeatedly held that where the allegations made in the FIR did not disclose a cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by the Police Officer. Whereas, in the case of hand, there is an inducement by the petitioner and his brother to pay a large sum to that on the false promise that he would be inducted as one of the

partner of their business and also promised to pay the profit. Therefore, the above Judgments are not helpful to the petitioner to quash the FIR.

8.The learned counsel for the second respondent relied upon the Judgments reported in
a) (2013)10 SCC 581Vinod Raghuvanshi -vs- Ajay Arora and others, is extracted hereunder:-

"30.It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the Court should not "kill a stillborn child", and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the Court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the Court Judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial Court at a later stage."

b) (2017)9 SCC 641 Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others -vs- State of Gujarat and another, is extracted hereunder:-

"16.The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1.Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of Justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2.The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the Court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3.In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4.While the inherent power of the High

Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice,

or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court.

16.5.The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6.In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7.As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8.Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9.In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10.There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and

16.9, above, Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

17.Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing the first information report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the FIR would subserve or secure the ends of justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. The first is that the appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The second is that the appellants have criminal antecedents, reflected in the chart which has been extracted in the earlier part of this Judgment. The High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been followed by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels of land and noted that in the past as well, they were alleged to have been connected with such nefarious activities by opening bogus bank accounts. It was in this view of the matter that the High Court observed that in a case involving extortion, forgery and conspiracy where all the appellants were acting as a team, it was not in the interest of society to quash the FIR on the ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. We agree with the view of the High Court.

18.The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a land transacted between two contesting parties.

> The case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents, utilisation of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crime. In these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code."

and further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment in Criminal Appeal No.255 of 2019 dated 12.02.2019 Sau.Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar -vs- The State of Maharashtra and others is extracted hereunder:

> "9.Having heard the learned Senior Counsel and examined the material on record, we are of the considered view that the High Court ought not to have set aside the order passed by the Trial Court issuing summons to the Respondents. A perusal of the complaint discloses that prima facie, offences that are alleged against the Respondents. The correctness or otherwise of the said allegations has to be decided only in the Trial. At the initial stage of issuance of process it is not open to the Courts to stifle the proceedings by entering into the merits of the contentions made on behalf of the accused. Criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on the ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of a civil nature. If the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are prima facie made out in the complaint, the criminal proceeding shall not be interdicted."

As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Criminal Proceedings are at the stage of FIR, and it should not be interfered and an investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance.

9.In the case on hand, the averments made in the FIR have prima - facie case to attract the offences under Sections 420, 506(1) r/w 34 of IPC. The correctness or otherwise of the said allegations have to be decided only during the investigation and as such the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that the allegations made that they are appeared to be Civil in nature.

10.Therefore, in view of the above discussions, this Court is not inclined to quash the FIR. Accordingly, the Criminal Original Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

Sd/-
Assistant Registrar(CS-IV)

//True copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

rna

To

1.The Inspector of Police,
EDF Team 4,
Central Crime Branch,
Vepery, Chennai 600 007.

2.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.

+1cc to Mr.P.Paulselvam, Advocate SR.No.17491

+1cc to Mr.M.Velmurugan, Advocate SR.No.18112

Crl.O.P.No.17399 of 2018
and Crl.M.P.No.9003 of 2018

KS(CO)
GMY(22/03/2019)