

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on	Pronounced on
13.12.2019	19.12.2019

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.DHANDAPANI

CRL. A. NOS. 907 OF 2006 & 462 & 463 OF 2012

State, rep. By
Inspector of Police
C.B. C.I.D., The Nilgiris Unit
Udhagamandalam. .. Appellant/Complainant
in all the Appeals

- Vs -

1. Pandiarajan @ Pandi @ Vazhuthi
2. Narayanan @ Tamilmaran
3. Subramaniam @ Karikalan .. Respondents/Accused 1 to 3
in CA 907/06

Muhilan .. Respondent/Accused -8
in CA 463/12

Pozhilan @ Kumar @ Thalapathy
@ Sampath .. Respondent/Accused -7
in CA 462/12

Criminal Appeals filed u/s 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment and order dated 18.04.05, passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore, in C.A. Nos.43, 47 and 48/02.

For Appellant : Ms.Saradha Devi, GA (Crl. Side)
For Respondents : Mr. G.Pavendhan in CA 907/06 & 462/12
Mr. G.Sankarasubbu in CA 463/12

COMMON JUDGMENT

The accused/respondents herein, along with four other persons, were arrayed as A-1 to A-9, and they were charged and tried before the learned Principal Assistant Judge, Coimbatore, in S.C. No.10/92 for various offences of the Indian Penal Code as well as u/s 3 and 4 (b) of the Explosive Substances Act. The trial court, while acquitting four of the accused, however, found the respondents herein/accused guilty of the offences u/s 120 (B), 153 (B) IPC and Section 3 and 4 (b) of the Explosive

Substances Act and sentenced them to imprisonment for various terms. Against the said judgment of conviction, the respondents herein/accused preferred appeal before the District Judge, Coimbatore, in C.A. Nos.43, 47 and 48/02 and the appellate court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and acquitted the respondents herein/accused of the charges framed against them. The appellant/State, aggrieved by the said order of acquittal of the accused/respondents herein, by the learned District Judge, Coimbatore, in C.A. Nos.43, 47 and 48/02, vide order dated 18.04.05, has preferred the present appeals. For the sake of convenience, the accused/respondents herein will be referred to as accused.

2. The brief facts, necessary for disposal of this appeal, are as hereunder :-

P.W.1 is the Assistant Director of Horticulture-cum-Manager employed in the Botanical Garden at Ooty. P.W.3 is the watchman employed at the garden. In the early morning hours of 18.5.88, at about 4.30 a.m., P.W.1 heard an explosion coming from within the garden. Though he went outside to see what had happened, since it was dark outside, he could not see anything and, therefore, he went inside his house. At about 6.00 a.m., P.W.3 came to his house and informed him that in the flower decorated Indian National Flag there is a big hole caused by some explosion. P.W.1 accompanied P.W.3 to the spot and on inspection found a gaping hold in the north-western side of the flag and he also found bits of time piece, battery parts and other parts strewn around the area. Therefore, he went and informed the Director about the occurrence. Thereafter, he went to the police station at about 7.30 a.m. And gave the complaint, Ex.P-1 to P.W.29, the Sub Inspector of Police.

3. P.W.29 is the Sub Inspector of Police attached to Ooty East Police Station, who was on duty on 18.5.88 before whom P.W.1 appeared and lodged the complaint, Ex.P-1. On receipt of Ex.P-1, P.W.29 registered a case in Crime No.439/99 for offences u/s 286, 427 and 447 IPC and Section 3 (b) of the Explosive Substances Act and prepared printed FIR, Ex.P-30 and despatched the same to the higher officials.

4. On receipt of the printed FIR, Ex.P-30, P.W.31, the Inspector of Police took up investigation along with the in-charge Inspector. Continuing with the investigation, P.W.31 arrested the accused on 30.6.88 and various other dates. The accused, on arrest, were remanded to judicial custody.

5. P.W.32, took up the investigation from P.W.30. He went to the scene of occurrence and prepared rough sketch, Ex.P-35 and prepared observation mahazar, Ex.P-3 in the presence of witnesses. He seized a blown time piece, a dial, and various other objects which were blown to smithereens due to the blast from the scene of occurrence under the cover of mahazar. He examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. On the direction of his superiors, he handed over the investigation to the CB-CID for further investigation.

6. P.W.33, Dy. Superintendent of Police, attached to the Crime Branch CID, took up investigation and on 26.8.88, he arrested A-7 and A-8 from APH Lodge Room No.9 and on enquiry, they came forward to give a confession statement, which was recorded in the presence of witnesses.

7. P.W.34, another officer attached to the Crime Branch, on the directions of the higher officials, took up investigation and in the course of his investigation, seized a banner around 150 feet from the scene of occurrence. Continuing with his investigation, he arrested some of the accused and sent them for judicial remand. He examined other witnesses and recorded their statements. On the request made by P.W.34, the material objects recovered from the scene of occurrence were sent for forensic examination and report in that regard was received by the Court. On completing the investigation, P.W.34 filed the final report against the accused for various offences of the Indian Penal Code as also u/s 3 (b) and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act.

8. The accused/respondents herein were furnished with the relied upon documents u/s 207 Cr.P.C. and the trial court framed eight charges for the offences under the Indian Penal Code as also u/s 3 (b) and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act. When questioned, the accused pleaded not guilty.

9. To prove the case, the prosecution examined P.W.s 1 to 34, marked Exs.P-1 to P-45 and M.O.s 1 to 21. When the accused/respondents herein were questioned u/s 313 Cr.P.C. about the incriminating circumstances appearing against them, they denied the same as false. Neither any oral nor any documentary evidence was marked on the side of the defence. The trial court, after hearing either side and after considering the materials, both oral and documentary, on record, while acquitted the some of the accused, however convicted the respondents herein, aggrieved by which the respondents herein preferred appeal before the District Court. The District Court, Coimbatore, on considering the materials placed before it and

after hearing the prosecution as well as the accused, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused/respondents herein, aggrieved by which the Department/appellant has filed the present appeals challenging the said acquittal. It is to be noted here that as against the acquittal of some of the accused by the trial court, the State did not choose to file any appeal before the appellate court and, therefore, their acquittal reached finality at the appellate stage itself.

10. Ms.Saradha Devi, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side), appearing for the State/appellant contended that the appellate court has not considered Ex.P-23, the sanction order issued by P.W.26 in proper perspective. It is the further submission of the learned Government Advocate that the statement of P.W.2, the approver, recorded by P.W.30, the Judicial Magistrate, has not been considered judiciously, which unequivocally implicated the respondents herein in the commission of the offence. It is the further submission of the learned Government Advocate that the deposition of the recovery witnesses, viz., P.W.s 3 and 13 have not been appreciated in proper light by the appellate court. Learned Government Advocate drew the attention of this Court to the pardon granted u/s 306 Cr.P.C. To P.W.2 by P.W.27, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on P.W.2 turning approver. Therefore, the statement of P.W.2 to P.W.30 assumes significance, which implicates the respondents herein in the commission of the offence. It is further contended by the learned Government Advocate that the Forensic Report conclusively prove the use of explosive substances to blow the Indian National Flag at the scene of occurrence and the purchase of explosive substances has been spoken to by P.W.5, the Manager of the explosives unit and a dealer in explosives. The usage of time piece to trigger the explosive has been established and the purchase of the clock has been proved through P.W.6, who has spoken about A-2 purchasing the clock for which Ex.P-2, purchase bill has been marked. However, the trial court has not considered the evidence in proper perspective, but has erroneously acquitted the respondents herein, notwithstanding the clear reasonings recorded by the trial court to convict the respondents herein and, therefore, the acquittal of the respondents herein by the appellate court warrants interference at the hands of this court.

11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents herein/accused, countered the submissions of the learned Government Advocate by contending that the prosecution has misreably failed to prove the involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence. It is the contention on behalf of the respondents herein that P.W.2, who is stated to

have turned approver, turned hostile and the prosecution has not elicited anything after treating P.W.2 as hostile. The statement recorded from P.W.2 u/s 161 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence and the statement recorded by P.W.30, the Judicial Magistrate from P.W.2 also cannot be relied upon, as P.W.2 has turned hostile. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the respondents herein that though forensic report has been filed with regard to the recovery of the material objects from the scene of occurrence, but the forensic expert, who gave the report having not been examined, reliance cannot be placed on the said report. It is the further contention that though very many materials, which were alleged to be strewn around the place where the explosion is said to have taken place, however, curiously the prosecution has not seized the earth from the place of occurrence, which is a very material piece of evidence, which alone could prove the explosion. The failure of the prosecution to seize the material piece of evidence and subject it to forensic examination hits at the root of the prosecution case. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on Rule 179 of the Explosives Rules, and submitted that the procedure contemplated under the said rules has not been followed. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that no case has been registered against the accused after the above said incident.

12. In fine, it is the contention of the respondents herein that though very many witnesses have been examined and number of exhibits have been marked, however, none of the above point to the guilt of the respondents herein and the appellate court, on clear and cogent reasoning has set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and in the absence of any convincing material which proves the involvement of the respondents herein, overturning the verdict of acquittal is not called for and, therefore, prays for dismissing these appeals.

13. On enquiry by the Court as to the cases, if any, registered against the respondents herein subsequent to this case, learned Government Advocate, on instructions submit that no case has been registered against the respondents herein subsequent to the above incident.

14. This Court heard the learned Government Advocate appearing for the appellant and the respective learned counsel appearing for the respondents herein and perused the materials available on record to which the court's attention was drawn.

15. In dealing with matters, where the acquittal rendered by the court below is put to test, it is trite that unless the

order of the court below suffers from the vice of perversity, the High Court ought not to interfere with the said order. In *Shailendra Pratap & Anr. - Vs - State of U.P.* (2003 (1) SCC 761), the Supreme Court has categorically held that the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. The relevant portion of the order is extracted hereunder for better clarity :-

"8. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, we are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was a reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."

16. Yet again, in *Ram Kumar - Vs - State of Haryana* (1995 Supp. (1) SCC 248), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has once again highlighted the need for the High Court to give proper weight and consideration to the view of the court below and has further held that if the view taken by the court below is reasonable and plausible, order of acquittal should not be disturbed. In the above context, the Supreme Court held as under :-

"15. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial court had recorded the order of acquittal of all the accused persons including the appellant giving sound and cogent reasons for disbelieving the prosecution case and, therefore, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal merely because another view on an appraisal of the evidence on record was possible. In this connection it may be pointed out that the powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379 (sic 378) CrPC are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the trial court with regard to the

credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. No doubt it is settled law that if the main grounds on which the court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal."

17. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in V.Sejappa - Vs - State by Police Inspector, Lokayukta, Chitradurga (2016 (12) SCC 150) reiterating the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal, held as under :-

"22. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court do not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State v. K.Narasimhachary [State v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 41] , this Court reiterated the well-settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [T.Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 401]

23. In Muralidhar v. State of Karnataka [Muralidhar v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 690] , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against

order of acquittal and in para 12 held as under:
(SCC pp. 735-36)

"12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ 225], Madan Mohan Singh [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 637 : 1954 Cri LJ 1656], Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , Aher Raja Khima [Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 : 1956 Cri LJ 426], Balbir Singh [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481], M.G. Agarwal [M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235], Noor Khan [Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 286 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 167], Khedu Mohton [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033], Lekha Yadav [Lekha Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1973) 2 SCC 424 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 820], Khem Karan [Khem Karan v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 603 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 639], Bishan Singh [Bishan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 288 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 914], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108], K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305], Tota Singh [Tota Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 529 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 381], Ram Kumar [Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 355], Madan Lal [Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1997) 7 SCC 677 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1151], Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], Bhagwan Singh [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736], Harijana Thirupala [Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, (2002) 6 SCC 470 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1370], C. Antony [C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair, (2003) 1 SCC 1 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 161], K. Gopalakrishna [State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna,

(2005) 9 SCC 291 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1237], Sanjay Thakran [State of Goav.Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] and Chandrappa [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court;

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal;

(iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and

(iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the

appellate court in the judgment of the trial court."

18. Keeping the above principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in mind, this Court will now proceed to examine the evidence and the materials on record to see whether the conclusions recorded by the court below for acquitting the accused/respondents herein are reasonable and plausible or the same stands vitiated by manifest illegality or the conclusions recorded by the appellate court are such which could not have been possibly be arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously, which could in turn be said to be perverse.

19. The gist of the prosecution case is that on the confession of P.W.2, who turned approver, involvement of all the other accused came to light based on which they were apprehended. It is the stand of the appellant that P.W.2 gave the statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. to P.W.30, the Judicial Magistrate, based on which P.W.27, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, granted pardon to P.W.2 u/s 306 Cr.P.C. However, a perusal of the evidence of P.W.2 reveals that he turned hostile. In such a scenario, not only the appellant is estopped from relying on the statement of P.W.2 recorded by P.W.30, the said statement, Ex.P-9 loses its intrinsic value as a material piece of evidence. Further, it is to be pointed out that after P.W.2 turning hostile, the prosecution examined P.W.2 on cross, but no worthwhile material has been elicited from him, which would point to the guilt of the respondents herein nor give life to Ex.P-9, the statement of P.W.2 recorded by P.W.30 u/s 164 Cr.P.C. Once the fulcrum of the prosecution case suffers a set back, this Court is thrust with a further duty to sift through the various other depositions of other witnesses and other exhibits to find out whether the prosecution has established their case warranting interference with the order passed by the court below.

20. Though very many witnesses have been examined, it is to be pointed out that P.W.s 8 to 12, 15, 16 and 19 turned hostile. Further, P.W.18 did not identify the accused. P.W.s 20 is the photographer; P.W.21 is the forensic officer; P.W.s 23 and 25 are scientific officers; P.W.24 is the Controller of the Explosives Department; P.W.26 is the District Collector, who sanctioned prosecution under the Explosive Substances Act; P.W.27 is the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who granted pardon to P.W.2 u/s 306 Cr.P.C.; P.W.30 is the Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the statement of P.W.2 u/s 164 Cr.P.C.; P.W.6 is the dealer in clock from who the clock is said to have been

purchased and who issued Ex.P-2 bill and P.W.5 is the dealer in explosives, who is said to have sold the explosives to the accused. Though P.W.5 is said to have sold explosives to the accused, however, he has neither identified the accused nor the prosecution has proved that the explosives purchased from P.W.5 were used in the commission of the offence. Equally so is the evidence of P.W.6. The prosecution has not proved that the clock, which was said to have been purchased from P.W.6 has been used in the commission of the offence. The evidence of P.W.6 is only to the effect that he sold a clock to A-2. But that clock was not identified as the clock, which was used for committing the offence. Therefore, the evidence of the above witnesses does not have much bearing on the case.

21. Coming to Ex.P-17 and Ex.P-20, the report of the scientific officers relating to the explosives and the handwriting, though Ex.P-17 reveals that the handwriting samples tally with the writings in the banner recovered from the scene of occurrence, however, the said scientific officer has not been examined. Mere report would not suffice in a case of this nature and it is incumbent on the prosecution to put the expert on the stand and record his deposition and in turn he should be put to the rigour of cross examination to vindicate the stand of the prosecution. However, for reasons best known the expert has not been examined.

22. Further, one other crucial aspect which requires to be pointed out, which reveals the investigative lacunae is that though very many materials were seized/recovered from the scene of occurrence and have been put to forensic examination, curiously, for reasons best known, the investigating agency has not recovered the explosive laden earth from the scene of occurrence. Detonators, batteries, clocks, aluminium foils, etc., said to have been used in detonating the explosive substance were alleged to have been recovered from the scene of occurrence. Definitely, they would contain the chemical, which would normally be found in them. The only material, which would reveal that an explosion, such as the one projected by the prosecution, has taken place is the earth in the said place, which would basically prove the occurrence. It is the normal practice of the investigating agency to collect the stained earth and sample earth to prove the difference and happening and also to establish the scene of occurrence. The the investigating agency has not seized the stained/explosive laden earth and sample to prove the scene of occurrence. This Court, with pain, wishes to observe the pathetic nature of the witnesses, P.W.s 1, 2 and 5, who are said to be employees of the Horticulture Department, who have deposed that they heard some

explosion in the garden around 4.30 a.m. on the early morning hours of 18.5.88, but, however, did not evince any interest to go over there to find out what had really happened. It is more paining for this Court to state that the security personnel of the Raj Bhavan premises, in which the Governor is said to be staying at the relevant point of time, have also not taken any serious efforts to identify the cause of the sound, which is alleged to be an explosion. It is not only an investigative lapse, but also a security lapse on the part of the State. Had an occurrence, as alleged by the prosecution, had really taken place, it is the duty of the investigating agency and the security agency, guarding a special category VIP to be more vigilant in the discharge of their duties. However, less said the better and, therefore, this Court does not want to amplify any more on the same.

23. P.W.s 1, 3 and 5, though speak about the explosion alleged to have taken place in the garden around 4.30 a.m., however, none of them have evinced any interest to find out the reason for the deafening sound. Instead, all of them, after waking up to the alleged sound, have once again retired to slumber and only around 5.30 a.m. on that day when P.W.3 went to have tea, inspected the place and, thereafter, went to inform P.W.1. P.W.5 was even more lethargic, in that he had woken up only around 6.00 a.m., almost an hour and a half after the explosion and, thereafter, after having tea, went to find out what was the cause of the sound.

24. On an overall conspectus of the materials available on record, both oral and documentary, this Court is led to the irrefutable conclusion that the acquittal of the respondents herein, ordered by the appellate court is based on just and reasonable findings and there being no materials available on record to dislodge the said finding, this Court is left with no other alternative, but to dismiss the appeals.

25. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any reason to differ from the findings recorded by the appellate court to acquit the respondents herein and, accordingly, these appeals are dismissed confirming the judgment and order dated 18.04.05, passed by the learned District Judge, Coimbatore, in C.A. Nos.43, 47 and 48/02.

Sd/-

Assistant Registrar(CS III)

//True Copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

To

1. The 1st Additional District Judge
Coimbatore.


2. The Public Prosecutor
High Court of Madras.

3. The Inspector of Police
C.B. C.I.D., The Nilgiris Unit
Udhagamandalam.

+2 cc to Mr.G.Pavendhan, Advocate Sr.Nos.106513 & 106518
+2 cc to Mr.L.Mahendran, Advocate Sr.No. 105760

AKM/21.01.2020/13P-8C /

JUDGMENT IN
CRL. A. NOS. 907 OF 2006
AND
462 & 463 OF 2012



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