

BAIL SLIP

The Appellant No.2 namely Shanthi, W/o.Kaliaperumal (A2) was granted bail in and by the Order of this Court dated 25.08.2010 made in M.P.No.1/10 in CrI.A.474/10.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

RESERVED ON: 29.07.2019

PRONOUNCED ON: 26.08.2019

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.D.JAGADISH CHANDIRA

CrI.A.No.474 of 2010
(Without EB)

1.Velmani
2.
3.Shanthi

Appellants/A1 and A2

-Vs-

State by Inspector of Police,
Chidambaram Police Station, Cuddalore

..Respondent

Prayer:- This Criminal Appeal is filed, against the judgement of conviction and sentence, dated 07.07.2010, made in SC.No.385 of 2009, by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Cuddalore.

For Appellant : Mr.S.Yogarajasekar
for Mr.Johnsathyan-A1
Mr.P.Nagarajan-A2

For Respondent: Mr.K.Prabakar, APP

JUDGEMENT

1.This Criminal Appeal is filed, against the judgement of conviction and sentence, dated 07.07.2010, made in SC.No.385 of 2009, by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Cuddalore, (a) finding the Appellant/A1 for the offence under Section 376(f) of IPC, guilty and the Appellant/A2 for the offence under Section 376(f) read with 109 of IPC guilty, (b) convicting and sentencing the Appellant/A1 for the offence under Section 376 (f) of IPC to undergo 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo further 2 years Rigorous Imprisonment and (c) convicting and sentencing the

Appellant/A2 for the offence under Section 376(f) read with 109 of IPC, to undergo 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo two years Rigorous Imprisonment.

2. The case of the Prosecution has arisen on the basis of the complainant, Ex.P1, dated 16.12.12.2008, given by PW.1, father of the victim, Kuralarasi, PW.2, alleging that the victim, aged below 12 years, was studying VII Standard in Nandanar Girls Higher Secondary School and staying in the Hostel of the said School and that prior to three months of the occurrence, the victim complained to PW.1 that when she was alone in her house at, Mazavarayanallur, the Appellant/A1 came and called her to have intercourse, by promising to marry her and that PW.1 had warned the Appellant/A1 and that on 08.12.2008, at 4.30 p.m. when the victim was coming out from the school, the Appellant/A1 came there and promised her to marry her and forcibly took her to Bharaduchavadi, where the Appellant/A2 was living and that the Appellant/A1 forcefully raped against her will and that the Appellant/A2 had aided and abetted for such offence. On the basis of such complainant, the Appellant/A1 was charge sheeted for offences under Sections 366A and 376(f) of IPC and the Appellant/A2 was charge sheeted for the offences under Sections 376(f) read with 109 of IPC.
3. The case was taken on file in SC.No.385 of 2009, by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Cuddalore and necessary charges were framed. The accused had denied the charges and sought for trial. In order to bring home the charges against the accused, the prosecution examined PW.1 to PW.7 and also marked Exs.P1 to P8 and Mos.1 and 2. On completion of the evidence on the side of the prosecution, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.PC as to the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the accused have come with the version of total denial and stated that they have been falsely implicated in this case.
4. The Trial Court, after hearing the arguments advanced on either side and also looking into the materials available on record, while acquitting the Appellant/A1 for the offence under Section 366(A) of IPC and while finding that the physical relationship was consensual in nature, holding that the Prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age and was not capable of giving consent, had found the Appellant/A1 guilty for the offence under Section 376(f) of IPC and found the Appellant/A2 for the offence under Section 376(f) read with 109 of IPC and awarded punishments, as referred to above, which is challenged in this Criminal Appeal.
5. This court heard the submissions of the learned counsel on either side.

6. The learned counsel for the Appellant/A1 would submit that the Trial Court, having held that the relationship between the Appellant/A1 and the victim was consensual in nature, gravely erred in relying on Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 to fix the age of the victim to be less than 16 years. Though the offence is stated to have been committed during the year 2008, the Prosecution has not attempted to conduct inquiry as contemplated under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 to determine the age of the victim. No legal and reliable evidence has been let in by the Prosecution to vouch for the correctness of date of birth as recorded in the transfer certificate and the school certificate, namely, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4. Moreover, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 do not fall within the category of documents required under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. Further, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 are not the documents relating to date of birth from the School first attended by the victim. He would further submit that Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 have not been marked in the manner known to law as required under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and when such being so, no reliance can be placed on Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, more particularly, when Ex.P3 is the xerox copy of the transfer certificate.
7. The learned counsel for the Appellant/A1 would further submit that when the Head Mistress, who issued Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, has not been examined and when no evidence had been let in by examining the parents to prove that the entry regarding the age in the transfer certificate, the Trial Court erred in fixing the age of the victim as 11 years, whereas the evidence of PW.5, Radiologist is very clear that the age of the victim was above 16 years and below 17 years and in such circumstances, the Trial Court ought to have taken judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side and such a margin of error in age is to be given in favour of the accused and benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused and consequently, the Appellants/ accused ought to have been acquitted by the Trial Court.
8. The learned counsel for the Appellant/A1 would further submit that the documents under Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 are not part of the documents at the stage of furnishing documents to the accused, under Section 207 of Cr.PC and that PW.2 was examined in chief on 24.03.2010 and that at the time of re-examination, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, both dated 24.3.2010, had been marked only on the next day 25.3.2010 and that when neither a source document relating to the age having been marked nor the author of the certificates having been examined before the Trial Court, reliance ought not to have been placed on Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 and

that the Rules of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 cannot be made applicable to the case on hand.

9. The learned counsel for the Appellant/A2 would submit that the 1st Appellant and the 2nd Appellant are related to the victim and that the 2nd Appellant had neither abetted nor had an intention to abet the crime and that no legal evidence has been let in by the Prosecution to prove that the 2nd Appellant had abetted the Appellant/A1 in committing the offence and when such being so, the Trial Court erred in convicting the Appellant/A2.
10. Both the learned counsel for the Appellants/A1 and A2 would ultimately contend that even assuming that the occurrence is accepted as true, it can only at the most suggest a case of consensual relationship, rather than a case of rape and that the court below erred in convicting the Appellants/accused, since there is no legally acceptable material to prove the age of the victim let in by the Prosecution, but based on inconsistent material evidence available on record, which is not supporting the case of the Prosecution. On behalf of the Appellants, reliance is placed on the decisions of Honourable Supreme Court reported in 2010 8 SCC 714 (Satpal Singh Vs. State of Haryana), 2011 2 SCC 385 (Alamelu Vs. State), 2003 8 SCC 745 (Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and another) and 1988 Supp. SCC 604 (Biad Mal Singhvi Anand Purohit).
11. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would vehemently refute the above contentions of the learned counsel for the Appellants, stating that as per Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, the age of the victim was 11 years and that as per the Rule 12(3)(a)(i) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, matriculation or equivalent certificates can be marked as proof of Age and that considering the evidence, both oral and documentary, in a proper perspective, the Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the Appellant/accused, by the impugned judgement, which warrants no interference by this Court.
12. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scanned through the entire evidence available on record and also perused the impugned judgement of conviction.
13. For proving the offence under Section 366 of IPC, it must be proved by the Prosecution that the girl was forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. But, for proving the offence under Section 366A, IPC, the prosecution has to prove that the girl was kidnapped with the intention that she

will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person. In this case, the Trial Court not found the Appellant/A1 guilty under Section 366A of IPC, holding that the the victim had been taken by the Appellant/A1 with her consent only and that there were no materials to show that the Appellant/A1 had kidnapped the victim against her will.

14. However, though the Trial Court held that the physical affair was consensual, it found the Appellant/A1 guilty for the offence under Section 376(f) of IPC finding that the Prosecutrix was not capable of giving consent holding that she was less than 16 years and the Appellant/A2 was found guilty for the offence Section 376(f) read with 109 of IPC, based on the evidence of the solitary witness, PW.2, the victim girl and relying on the documents, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, attested xerox copy of the transfer certificate and the school certificate, respectively, containing the date of birth for determining the age of the victim to be less than 16 years. Ex.P3, attested xerox copy of the transfer certificate and Ex.P4, school certificate were dated 24.03.2010 and they have been marked through the victim, PW.2, during her re-examination on 25.03.2010.

15. Therefore, it is suffice to decide the following questions:-

- i. Whether it was proper for the Trial Court to rely on Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 for determining the age of the victim to be less than 16 years.
- ii. Whether the evidence of the Prosecutrix, PW.2 inspires confidence.

16. The offence was said to have taken place during the year 2008 when the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 were applicable. Rule 12(3) is applicable to determine the age of the juvenile or child in conflict with law.

17. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007 reads as under:-

"12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.-(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be, the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose.

(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical

appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining—

(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year, and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned.

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and

obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this Rule.

(6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law."

18. Admittedly, in this case, the Prosecution has failed to adopt the procedure as contemplated under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 to determine the age of the victim during investigation, whereas relied on Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 to prove the age of the victim.

19. Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 cannot be treated as documents, which are equivalent to the documents referred to under Section 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. At the cost of repetition, Ex.P3 is the attested xerox copy of transfer certificate, issued by the earlier school where the victim studied and attested by the Head Mistress of the present School on 29.03.2010 and Ex.P4 is the school certificate issued by the Head Mistress of the present school where the victim was studying. As per the entries in Ex.P3, the victim was admitted in the earlier School on 12.06.2005 and discontinued studies on 13.04.2009 and the transfer certificate was issued on 05.06.2009. The date of birth of the victim entered in Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 is 14.05.1997. None of the documents having been issued by the School where the victim was initially admitted or first attended school. Further, the persons, who were said to have given information regarding the age of the victim, have not been examined. Further, no legal evidence has been let in by the Prosecution to prove the documents and the entries made thereunder as contemplated under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. सत्यमेव जयते

20. Neither the person who issued Ex.P3 nor the person who issued the attested copy of Ex.P3 was examined. Further, the documents under Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 did not form part of the documents at the stage of furnishing documents to the accused under Section 207 of Cr.PC. The victim PW.2 was examined in chief and cross examined on 24.03.2010 and only at the time of re-examination, on the next day, on 25.3.2010, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, both dated 24.3.2010, had been marked. In other words, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 had been obtained during the course of the trial. Neither a source document relating to the age was marked nor the persons who issued the certificates, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4, were examined before the Trial Court.

21. In 2006 5 SCC 584 (Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP), it was held in paragraph 23 as under:-

"23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in the ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder: (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register; (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto."

22. Further, in 2010 8 SCC 714 (Satpal Singh Vs. State of Haryana), it was held as under:-

"26. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] while dealing with a similar issue, this Court observed that very often parents furnish incorrect date of birth to the school authorities to make up the age in order to secure admission for their children. For determining the age of the child, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeccable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeccable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the municipal corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded."

27. Thus, the entry in respect of age of the child seeking admission, made in the school register by semi-literate chowkidar at the instance of a person who came along with the child having no personal knowledge of the correct date of birth, cannot be relied upon.

28. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised that

the entry made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the court/authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other civil and criminal case.

29. In case, the issue is examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, there is nothing on record to corroborate the date of birth of the prosecutrix recorded in the school register. It is not possible to ascertain as to who was the person who had given her date of birth as 13-2-1975 at the time of initial admission in the primary school. More so, it cannot be ascertained as who was the person who had recorded her date of birth in the primary school register. More so, the entry in respect of the date of birth of the prosecutrix in the primary school register has not been produced and proved before the trial court. Thus, in view of the above, it cannot be held with certainty that the prosecutrix was a major. Be that as it may, the issue of majority becomes irrelevant if the prosecution successfully establishes that it was not a consent case."

23. In 2011 2 SCC 385 (Alamelu and another Vs. State), it was held as under:-

"45. In fixing the age of the girl as below 18 years, the High Court relied solely on the certificate issued by PW 8 Dr. Gunasekaran. However, the High Court failed to notice that in his evidence before the court, PW 8, the x-ray expert had clearly stated in the cross-examination that on the basis of the medical evidence, generally, the age of an individual could be fixed approximately. He had also stated that it is likely that the age may vary from individual to individual. The doctor had also stated that in view of the possible variations in age, the certificate mentioned the possible age between one specific age to another specific age. On the basis of the above, it would not be possible to give a firm opinion that the girl was definitely below 18 years of age.

46. In addition, the High Court failed to consider the expert evidence given by PW 13 Dr. Manimegalaikumar, who had medically examined the victim. In his cross-

examination, he had clearly stated that a medical examination would only point out the age approximately with a variation of two years. He had stated that in this case, the age of the girl could be from 17 to 19 years. This margin of error in age has been judicially recognised by this Court in *Jaya Mala v. Govt. of J&K* [(1982) 2 SCC 538 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 502]. In the aforesaid judgement, it is observed as follows: (SCC p. 541, para 9)

"9. ... However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side."

47. We are of the opinion, in the facts of this case, the age of the girl could not have been fixed on the basis of the transfer certificate. There was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe the correctness of the date of birth as recorded in the transfer certificate. The expert evidence does not rule out the possibility of the girl being a major. In our opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove that the girl was a minor, at the relevant date.

48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in *Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P.* [(2006) 5 SCC 584 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 632] which held as follows: (SCC p. 595, para 38)

"38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape,

or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgement of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." (emphasis supplied)

49. In such circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the High Court without examining the factual and legal issues has unnecessarily rushed to the conclusion that the girl was a minor at the time of the alleged abduction. There is no satisfactory evidence to indicate that she was a minor."

24. In 2013 14 SCC 637 (Mahadeo Vs. State of Maharashtra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the age of the victim can be determined as per Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, relying on the certificate issued from the School first attended or birth certificate issued by the Corporation/Municipal Authority and only in the absence of such documents, medical opinion can be sought for.

25. In 2015 7 SCC 773 (State of MP Vs. Anoop Singh), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that when the Prosecution has not let in evidence to prove the age of the victim by marking documents required under the Law to prove the age as per Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, medical opinion can be sought or and relied to determine the age of the victim.

26. In this case, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 have not been proved in the manner known to law and thereby in the opinion of this Court, the Trial Court committed an error by relying on the above documents. When such being so, the available evidence on record with regard to the age of the victim is the opinion, Ex.P5 given by PW.5, Radiologist. As per Ex.P5, PW.5 has opined that the individual/victim had completed 16 years and not completed 17 years and thereby, in the opinion of this Court, the Prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts that the age of the victim was less than 16 years at the time of the incident. The evidence of the Prosecutrix also does not inspire confidence and thereby, reliance cannot be placed on her oral testimony. Further, in 2011 2 SCC 385 (Alamelu and another Vs. State) cited supra, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Court can take judicial note that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. The

principle under criminal jurisprudence is that when two views are possible, the Court has to accept the view which is favouring the accused.

27. In 2016 1 SCC 696 (State of MP Vs. Munna), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that when there is evidence, establishing sexual intercourse to be consensual and when it is not proved by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubts that the age of the victim was less than 16 years, at the time of the incident, it can be inferred that the victim was competent to give her consent and the question of rape does not arise.

28. In 2019 4 SCC 522 (Digamber Vaishnav and another Vs. State of Chattisgarh), it was held as under:-

"One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof. The onus of the prosecution cannot be discharged by referring to very strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculcate the accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the defence at best, be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt. "

29. On analysis of the entire evidence, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts with regard to the age of the victim girl and thereby, in the opinion of the Court, the Trial Court has erroneously convicted the Appellants and consequently, the impugned judgement of conviction and sentence is unsustainable in law.

30. In the result, this Criminal Appeal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement of conviction and sentence is set aside. The Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The bail bond, if any executed by the Appellants, shall stand cancelled and the fine amount if any paid by them shall be refunded to them.

Srcm

Sd/-

Assistant Registrar

//True Copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

To

- 1.The Sessions Judge, Mahila Court,
cuddalore
- 2.The Inspector of Police,
Chidambaram Police Station,
Cuddalore
- 3.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras
- 4.The Judicial Magistrate-II, Chidambaram.
- 5.The Chief Judicial Magistrate ,
Cuddalore.
6. The District Collector,
Cuddalore.
7. The District & Sessions Judge,
Mahila Court, Cuddalore.
8. The Superintendent,
Central Prison (Women's Wing)
Vellore
9. The Superintendent,
Central Prison,
Cuddalore.
10. The Director general of Police,
Mylapore, Chennai- 4.

+1cc to Mr.R.John Sathyan, Advocate, SR.No.72939
+1cc to Mr.G.Pugazhenthir, Advocate, SR.No.72351

Cr1.A.No.474 of 2010
(Without EB)

Kak(17/10/2019)

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