

Bail Slip Slip

The Appellants/Accused 1 to 3 namely 1.Sankar S/O Sathiyamoorthy, 2.Sathyamoorthy, S/O Ayyakannu, 3.Vijaya W/O Sathiyamoorthy were directed to be released on bail as per the order of this Court dated 01.02.2010 in CrI.A No.34/10 on the file of this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 04.03.2019

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.D.JAGADISH CHANDIRA

CrI.A.No.34 of 2010

1.Sankar

2.Sathyamoorthy

3.Vijaya

... Appellants /Accused 1 to 3

Vs

State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
Kayarlabad Police Station, Ariyalur Sub Division
Ariyalur District(Cr.No.156 of 2007)

... Respondent

Prayer:- This Criminal Appeal is filed, against the judgement of conviction and sentence, dated 07.12.2009, made in SC.No.1 of 2009, by the Session Judge, Mahila Court, Perambalur.

For Appellants : Mr.M.Ravi

For Respondent : Mr.K.Prabakar, APP

JUDGEMENT

This Criminal Appeal is filed, against the judgement of conviction and sentence, dated 07.12.2009, made in SC.No.1 of 2009, by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Perambalur, convicting and sentencing, each of the appellants/accused for the offence under Section 498A of IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each, in default, to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment and for the offence under Section 306 of IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each, in default, to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment and ordering the sentences to run concurrently.

2. The case of the Prosecution has arisen on the basis of the complaint Ex.P1, dated 23.12.2007, given by PW.1, who is the mother of the deceased, alleging that the marriage between the first appellant/accused and the deceased, Sindhupriya, had taken place on 07.09.2007 and that at the time of marriage, the appellants 2 and 3 had demanded 8 sovereigns of gold jewels and that the parents of the deceased had given 2 ½ sovereigns of gold jewels to the first appellant and 3/4 sovereign of the gold jewel to the victim and that since the balance sovereign was not given, the appellants 2 and 3 had tortured the victim and that the first appellant suspected her fidelity and assaulted her and that due to the torture meted out to her by the Appellants, the deceased committed suicide by self-immolation on 05.12.2007 at 3.30 p.m. and died in the Hospital, on 23.12.2007 at 6.30 a.m. due to the burn injuries, within seven years of her marriage. Hence, the Appellants/accused were charge sheeted for the offences under Sections 498A and 306 IPC.

3. The case was taken on file in SC.No.1 of 2009, by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Perambalur and necessary charges were framed. The appellants/accused have denied the charges and sought for trial. In order to establish the guilt of the appellants/accused, the prosecution examined 19 witnesses as PW.1 to PW.19 and marked documents as Exs.P1 to P16 and Mos.1 and 2.

4. On completion of the evidence on the side of the Prosecution, the appellants/accused were questioned under Section 313 of Cr.PC as to the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the accused have come with the version of total denial and stated that they have been falsely implicated in this case.

5. The Court below, after hearing the arguments advanced on either side and also looking into the materials available on record, found the accused/appellants guilty and awarded punishment as referred to above, which is challenged in this Criminal Appeal.

6. This Court heard the submissions of the learned counsel on either side.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants / accused has assailed the impugned judgement and conviction and sentence, on the following infirmities, discrepancies and grounds :-

a. The entire case of the Prosecution is filled with embellishments and contradictions. The witnesses, who are the parents and the close relatives of the deceased have not supported the case of the prosecution.

b. The occurrence had taken place on 05.12.2017 and the victim succumbed to the injuries on 23.12.2007. But, the complaint was given only on 23.12.2007 at 13.00 hours. Thus, there was a delay of 18 days in lodging the complaint, Ex.P1, which is fatal to the case of the Prosecution.

c. There was also a delay of 22 days in sending the dying declaration Ex.P9, to the Court concerned, on 27.12.2007, though it was stated to have been recorded on the date of occurrence, i.e. on 05.12.2007 at 9.45 p.m. it had been sent to the Court only after 22 days of recording and four days after the death of the victim. Such a delay was also not explained satisfactorily by the Prosecution, thereby making the case of the Prosecution doubtful.

d. The dying declaration, Ex.P9 though stated to have been recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, it suffers from infirmities and it was sent to the Court belatedly after a delay of 22 days of the recording of the same. The medical evidence does not corroborate Ex.P9, with regard to the statement made by the victim that she was pregnant by four months when especially the marriage between the 1st Appellant and the victim had been solemnised on 7.9.2007 and the occurrence having taken place on 5.12.2007, thereby, suggesting that the declaration of her stating she was pregnant by four months is untruthful. The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination and it should express truth and truth alone and when there is a doubt with regard to the truthfulness in the declaration it would not be safe to rely upon the Dying Declaration alone to base the conviction. Further the Non examination of the Doctor, who attested the dying declaration, Ex.P9 is also fatal to the case of the Prosecution. Further, P.W.12 Dr.Senthil Kumar and P.W.13 Dr.Amirthakani the Doctors at the Ariyalur Government Hospital and Thanjavur Medical College Hospital and who have entered Ex.P.4 and Ex.P.5 respectively have stated that the victim had suffered second degree burns in both upper limbs and thereby suggesting that the thumb impression could not have been affixed on the dying declaration and ultimately creating a doubt with regard to the recording of the dying declaration.

e. PW.1 and PW.2, parents and PW.6 brother-in-law of the victim have not supported the case of the Prosecution. There is no other evidence to prove that cruelty was meted out to the deceased by the Appellant and thereby the Appellants, abetted and instigated the deceased to commit suicide.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused would ultimately contend that the impugned judgement of conviction and sentence is against law and that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts by cogent evidence, inasmuch as the necessary ingredients attracting the offence under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC were not established, thereby the Trial Court is not correct and justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants/accused under said Sections and hence, the appellants/accused are entitled for acquittal. In support of his contentions, he would rely on the decisions reported in 2007 2 MWN Cr. 157 (Thanga Durai Vs. State of Tamil Nadu), 2009 16 SCC 432 (J.Ramulu Vs. State of AP), 2009 12 SCC 139 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Yusuf) and 1999 7 SCC 69 Dandu Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of AP).

9. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent would contend that immediately after the occurrence, the victim had been taken to Government Hospital, Ariyalur at 5.45 p.m. and from there, she was referred to Thanjavur Government Hospital for further treatment, where on the request of PW.12, Doctor Amirthakani, dying declaration was recorded at 10.30 p.m by PW.16 in the presence of the Doctor Elangovan, who was not examined by the Respondent. He would further contend that Trial Court, after taking into consideration the dying declaration, the evidence of the Magistrate, PW.16 and the Revenue Divisional Officer PW.15 and the report of the RDO under, Ex.P8, had rightly convicted the accused/appellants, which warrants no interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of this Criminal Appeal.

10. With regard to placing reliance on Ex.P8, the counsel for the appellant would submit that when none of the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution before the trial Court, the statement given before the R.D.O can only be taken as a statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C during the course of investigation and without the statements having been corroborated the R.D.O report cannot be relied and would rely on the decision of this Court in Gunasekaran V. State by the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station reported in (2017) 1 L.W (Cr1) 88, wherein it has been held as follows :

" 39. After registering the F.I.R. under Section 154 Cr.P.C., a Police Officer gets power of investigation in cognizable cases under Section 156 Cr.P.C. and the procedure he has to follow has been prescribed in Section 157 Cr.P.C. He collects evidence; oral, documentary, material and scientific. He collects the oral evidence by examining the witnesses and recording their statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. In view of the

embargo in Section 162 Cr.P.C. such statement cannot be relied on, unless it becomes a dying declaration under Section 32 (1) of Evidence Act r/w Section 162 (2) Cr.P.C.

40. A statement recorded by a police officer during investigation falls under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is also called 'police statement' because it has been given to a Police Officer. It is also called a 'previous statement'. It can be used by the defence to contradict the author/maker of the statement and also to impeach his credibility. But it cannot be used by the prosecution because of the embargo in section 162 Cr.P.C.

41. A statement given by a witness to a Revenue Divisional officer under Section 176 r/w Section 174 Cr.P.C. is also a 'previous statement'. It is not a 'Substantive piece of evidence'. Because it is not recorded before the Trial Court on oath. It is recorded 'elsewhere'. It is recorded outside the Court, namely, before the R.D.O. It is also like a statement given to a Police Officer during inquest under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The only difference is instead of a Police Officer a Revenue Official conducts the inquest and the inquiry thereon. After his enquiry, the R.D.O submits his (inquest) report.

42. In *Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab* [AIR 1992 SC 1944 = 1992 CrLJ 3592] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that although the contents of the inquest report cannot be treated as evidence, it can be looked into to test the veracity of the witnesses.

43. Statement given to R.D.O. can be used by the defence to contradict the witness because it is also a previous statement. The Court cannot mark a police statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. equally, the Court cannot mark a statement given to the R.D.O. Under certain circumstances, they can be marked as defence exhibit.

44. The danger of marking, admitting statement given to a R.D.O. in evidence is that the mind of the Court will be prejudiced. And a statement not given before the Court being introduced in the evidence. A statement given to police during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not marked. Likewise, a statement given to R.D.O. also should not be marked."

11. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scanned through the entire evidence available on record and also perused the impugned judgement of conviction.

12. In this case, the Trial Court, based on the materials had framed charges against the Appellant/ accused for the offences under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC. Though it is a very unfortunate case that the victim died within three months of her marriage, strangely, PW.1 and PW.2, the parents of the victim and PW.6, brother in law of the victim, have not supported the case of the Prosecution and they have been treated as hostile by the Prosecution. Further, PW.3 and 4, who are the neighbours, have also not supported the case of the Prosecution and they have also been treated as hostile. PW.5 and PW.6, who are the brothers in law of the victim, have also turned hostile. Apart from the relatives of the victim, all other independent witnesses have also not supported the case of the Prosecution and they have turned hostile.

13. The marriage between the 1st Appellant and the victim was solemnised on 7.9.2007 and the occurrence had taken place on 05.12.2007 at 3.30 p.m. The victim was initially taken to the Government Hospital, Ariyalur at 5.45. p.m. by PW.1, mother of the victim and from there, she was referred to the Thanjavur Medical College and Hospital, where she was admitted at 8.15 p.m. and the burn injury was noted to be 54%.

14. As per the case of the Prosecution, on intimation from the Hospital, PW.16, Judicial Magistrate had gone and recorded the dying declaration from the victim in the presence of Dr.Elangovan, who has attested and certified with regard to consciousness and physical condition of the deceased. Strangely, thereafter, the dying declaration had not been sent to the Court immediately and no First Information Report had been registered till 23.12.2007. The First Information Report had been registered only after the death of the victim on 23.12.2007. Admittedly, the marriage between the victim and the 1st Appellant had happened only three months prior to the date of occurrence. Whereas a specific declaration is stated to have been made by the victim in her dying declaration that she was pregnant by four months. Thereafter, the victim had been in continuous treatment from 5.12.2007 at Thanjavur Medical College and Hospital and thereafter, since her condition became worse, she was taken to KAPV Government Hospital, Tiruchy, by the 1st Appellant and PW.2, father of the victim, where she succumbed to burn injuries and the Doctors have given an opinion, stating that the victim died of burn wounds and its complications.

15. As stated above, only after the death of the victim on 22.12.2007 the First Information Report had been registered under Section 174 of Cr.PC. Thereafter, based on the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, the case had been altered to one under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC and after obtaining opinion from the Director of Prosecution, Trichy, the final report has been filed for the offence under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC.

16. Further, PW.1 had rescinded from Ex.P1, the statement given to the Police, based on which, Ex.P2, First Information Report was registered. As stated above, all the witnesses including the relatives and the Panchayatars, who have been examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer, have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the Prosecution. When such being so, the report of the RDO based on the statement given by the witnesses who have turned hostile in Court cannot be taken as substantive piece of evidence.

17. Further, in this case, the dying declaration had been sent to the concerned Judicial Magistrate on 28.12.2007 and the statement Ex.P1 and the First Information Report Ex.P2 had been sent to the Court on 22.5.2008. Though the victim has stated that she was pregnant by four months, as per Ex.P6, post mortem report and the evidence of PW.14, Doctor, who conducted the post mortem, the victim was not pregnant. The Trial Court, despite all the witnesses, including the parents and close relatives of the victim, having turned hostile, placing reliance on the dying declaration, had convicted the accused for the offence under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC.

18. Now what is to be seen is as to whether the Trial Court is right in basing conviction based on the uncorroborated statement of the victim in the form of a dying declaration recorded in the presence of the Judicial Magistrate.

19. About the evidentiary value of the dying declaration of the deceased, it is relevant to refer to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under:-

"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the

following cases:

(1)When it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question."

20. The principles of law relating to the dying declaration have been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in 2014 10 SCC 336 (Prempal Vs. State of Haryana), wherein in paragraphs 12 and 13, it was summarised as under:-

"12. When reliance is placed upon dying declaration, the court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is true, voluntary and not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. In State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127 : AIR 1985 SC 416] , this Court held that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it without corroboration. In this context, the observations made in para 13 of the judgment are relevant to be noted: (SCC pp. 556-57, para 13).

"13. It is well settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration. (See Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106 : 1958 SCR 552] , Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1962 SC 439 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 479 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 104] , Gopalsingh v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 268 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 513]) There is not even a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the court has to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration."

13. In Bapu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 12 SCC 73 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 545] , this Court in paras 14 and 15 observed as under: (SCC pp. 77-79)

"14. In Ravi v. State of T.N. [(2004) 10 SCC 776 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 576] the Supreme Court observed that: (SCC p. 777, para 3)

'[I]f the truthfulness ... of the dying declaration cannot be doubted, the same alone can form the basis of conviction of an accused and the same does not require any corroboration, whatsoever, in law.'

15. In Muthu Kutty v. State [(2005) 9 SCC 113 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1202] vide para 15 the Supreme Court observed as under: (SCC p. 120-121)

'15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC 474 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 403 : (1992) 2 SCR 197] (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 18-19)

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376])

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127 : AIR 1985 SC 416] and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169] .)

(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473 : AIR 1976 SC 1994] .)

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1974 SC 332])

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645])

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 581])

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 364] .)

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519] .)

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342])

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P.

v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 585] .)

(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra [(1982) 1 SCC 700 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 334] .)" (emphasis in original).
"

While capsuling the above principle, judicial prudence requires that the Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the statement is true, voluntarily, not a result of tutoring and overall it should not be suspicious and if it passes the above tests the trial Court can rely on it for basing conviction without looking for any corroboration.

21. In the case on hand, while analysing the facts and the evidence, in the light of the decision cited above, what is to be seen is whether it would be safe to convict the accused based on the uncorroborated statement of the victim. As stated above to believe on the uncorroborated dying declaration, the Court should be satisfied that the dying declaration should be true and a duty is cast on the Court to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.

22. If the statement of the victim is true that she was pregnant by four months, it should have been supported by the evidence Ex.P6 post mortem report and the evidence of PW.14, who conducted the post-mortem. Whereas it is not so. Then, if the statement is taken to be untruthful, it could be out of imagination, creating doubt with regard to the statement given by the victim. When the veracity of the dying declaration is doubtful, it is a common prudence that there should be proper corroboration and before exercising judicial discretion, a duty is cast on the Court to look into the attended circumstances encircling the case and the condition of the deceased, at the relevant point of time and the medical evidence and also the other factors, attached to this case when especially the parents and the relatives of the deceased have not supported the case of the prosecution. Further, in this case, the Doctor, who was said to have attested to the mental fitness of the victim has not been examined.

23. In 2009 16 SCC 432 (J.Ramulu Vs. State of AP), when the close relatives have not supported the prosecution and when the doctor who had certified the dying declaration had not been examined creating a suspicion regarding the correctness of the

dying declaration, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that it is unsafe to convict the accused. Further, it was held that suspicion is no substitute to proof.

24. In a later decision of the Constitutional Bench reported in 2002 6 SCC 71) (Lakshmanan Vs. State of Maharashtra), it was held that the non examination of the Doctor, in whose presence, the dying declaration was recorded, does not affect the evidentiary value attached to the dying declaration. But, in the above decision it has not been held that the attending circumstances cannot be altogether ignored since because the dying declaration has been recorded by a Judicial Magistrate.

25. In the case on hand, the dying declaration has been recorded on 5.12.2008 and the victim had died on 23.12.2008 after 18 days of recording such statement. Strangely, in this case, the dying declaration had reached the jurisdictional Court only after the death of the victim. The F.I.R had been registered on 23.12.2008 after 18 days of the occurrence.

26. Another point for consideration in this case is the conduct of the 1st Appellant. As per Ex.P5, the accident register, the victim had been taken to the Government Hospital at Tiruchy by the 1st Appellant and PW.2, father of the victim, for further treatment. When the truthfulness of the statement of victim is suspicious and when the parents and close relatives of the deceased have not supported the prosecution, it would be unsafe to convict the Appellants/ accused when no explanation had been given by the Prosecution for the delay in the First Information Report and dying declaration reaching the Court belatedly.

27. When there are several infirmities in the case coupled with delay in the registration of F.I.R and the valid documents including the dying declaration reaching Court much belatedly and suspicion with regard to the truthfulness of the statement given by the victim to the Judicial Magistrate, doubt with regard to the recording of the dying declaration and the entire witnesses related to the victim having not supported the prosecution case, what remains is suspicion and surmises as against the appellant/accused. A bounden duty is cast on the prosecution to prove to hold that the appellant/accused have committed the offence and it cannot be held that the accused "might have committed" the offence. Suspicion however grave cannot take the place of proof. The Prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and thereby, the Appellants/ accused are entitled for acquittal.

28. In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellants/accused are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. The bail bond, if any, executed by the appellants/accused, shall stand cancelled. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellants/accused. shall be refunded to them.

Sd/-
Assistant Registrar(CCC)

//True Copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

ms/Srcm

To

- 1.The Sessions Judge,
Mahila Court, Perambalur.
- 2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ariyalur Sub Division,
Ariyalur District,
Kayarlabad Police Station.
- 3.The Superintendent,
Central Prison, Tiruchirappalli.
- 4.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.
- 5.The Section Officer,
Criminal Section, High Court, Madras.

+3cc to Mr.M.Ravi,Advocate Sr.20185

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