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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

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Date of Judgment: 23rd January, 2018

+ **W.P.(C) 485/2016**

RISHI PAL SINGH VERMA

..... Petitioner

Through: **Mr. Vishal Maan, Advocate**

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.

.... Respondents

Through: **Mr.Akhil Mittal, Advocate for L&B/
LAC.**

**Mr. Nikhil Goel and Mr. Anirudha
Deshmukh, Advocates for DDA.**

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)

CM.APPL 34387/2017(delay)

1. This is an application filed by the applicant/LAC seeking condonation of 138 days delay in filing the counter affidavit.
2. Notice. Counsel for the non-applicants accepts notice.
3. For the reasons stated in the application, delay of 138 days in filing the counter affidavit is condoned.
4. The application stands disposed of.

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5. With the consent of the parties, the writ petition is set down for final hearing and disposal.

6. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner. The petitioner seeks a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of the land of petitioner comprised in Khasra nos.208(1-7), 212 min (2-10), 272(2-14) total measuring 6 bigha 11 biswa, situated in the revenue estate of village Dallupura, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the subject land') is deemed to have lapsed in view of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the '2013 Act'), as neither the physical possession of the subject land has been taken nor the compensation has been paid to the petitioner in this case.
7. Brief facts for the disposal of this writ petition are that a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued on 17.11.1980. A Section 6 declaration was made on 29.09.1981 and an Award bearing no.79/82-83 was rendered on 09.03.1983.
8. Mr. Maan, learned counsel or the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the counter affidavit filed by the LAC, as per which it is admitted that the compensation is lying with RD.
9. Counsel for the LAC submits that physical possession of the part of the land has been taken and handed over to the DDA. Mr. Maan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is in actual physical possession of the land and even the possession could not have been taken as the area falls part of the unauthorized colony and the area is built-up. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the

case of the petitioner would be fully covered by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of ***Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & ors.***, reported at (2014) 3 SCC 183 and the petitioner would be entitled to a declaration.

10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit filed by the LAC, reads as under:

“6. It is submitted that the possession of land of the village Dallupura in Khasra no.212 min (2-10) out of area (5-5) was taken on 11.03.1983 and handed over the requisition agency i.e. DDA on the spot and as per records the compensation is lying with the RD.”

11. Reading of the counter affidavit filed by the LAC makes it clear that compensation of the subject land was not tendered to the petitioner. Thus, the case of the petitioner would be fully covered by the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of ***Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr.***(supra). Paragraphs 14 to 20 of the decision rendered in ***Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr.***(supra), read as under:

“14. Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act enjoins upon the Collector, on making an award under Section 11, to tender payment of compensation to persons interested entitled thereto according to award. It further mandates the Collector to make payment of compensation to them unless prevented by one of the contingencies contemplated in sub-section (2). The contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2) are: (i) the persons interested entitled to compensation do not consent to receive it (ii) there is no person competent to alienate the land and (iii) there is dispute as to the title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of it. If due to any of the contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2), the Collector is prevented from making payment of compensation to the persons interested who are entitled to

compensation, then the Collector is required to deposit the compensation in the court to which reference under Section 18 may be made.

15. Simply put, Section 31 of the 1894 Act makes provision for payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the court. This provision requires that the Collector should tender payment of compensation as awarded by him to the persons interested who are entitled to compensation. If due to happening of any contingency as contemplated in Section 31(2), the compensation has not been paid, the Collector should deposit the amount of compensation in the court to which reference can be made under Section 18.

16. The mandatory nature of the provision in Section 31(2) with regard to deposit of the compensation in the court is further fortified by the provisions contained in Sections 32, 33 and 34. As a matter of fact, Section 33 gives power to the court, on an application by a person interested or claiming an interest in such money, to pass an order to invest the amount so deposited in such government or other approved securities and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as it may consider proper so that the parties interested therein may have the benefit therefrom as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be.

17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word “paid” to “offered” or “tendered”. But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word “paid”, Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression “paid” used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal

construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid” if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been “paid” within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.

18. 1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly followed. The procedure, mode and manner for payment of compensation are prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the payment of compensation, can only act in the manner so provided. It is settled proposition of law (classic statement of Lord Roche in *Nazir Ahmad*[1]) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the compensation and since they did not receive the compensation, the amount (Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the government treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation in the government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do not think so. In a

comparatively recent decision, this Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes[2], relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kapur[3], has held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in the state's revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the state to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been deposited in court.

20. From the above, it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.”

12. Taking into consideration the submissions made and the stand taken by the LAC in the counter affidavit, we are of the considered view that the necessary ingredients for the application of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India, stand satisfied.
13. Since the award having been announced more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and, having regard to the stand taken by the LAC and the fact that the compensation has not been tendered to the petitioner, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with regard to the subject land are deemed to have lapsed. It is ordered accordingly.

14. The petition stands disposed of.

CM.APPL 1991/2016(stay)

15. The application stands disposed of in view of the order passed in the writ petition.

G.S.SISTANI, J.

SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J

JANUARY 23, 2018

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