**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CWP No. 26448 of 2018
Decided on : 15.10.2018

AG Enterprises ...... Petitioner

Versus

Central Bank of India and another ...... Respondents

**CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN**

Present : Mr.Anand Chhibbar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Gaurav Mankotia, Advocate
for the petitioner.

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AVNEESH JHINGAN, J.

The present writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of order dated 02.05.2018 (Annexure P-6) whereby the District Magistrate, Karnal has allowed respondent No.1 to lift the stocks of rice of the petitioner firm, mortgaged/pledged assets with Central Bank of India, Karnal.

2. The petitioner is a proprietorship concern and the petition has been filed by its proprietor. Central Bank of India, Karnal and District Magistrate, Karnal have been arrayed as respondents No.1 and 2 respectively in the present writ petition.

3. The petitioner availed credit facility to the tune of Rs.15 crores from respondent No.1. The credit facility was sanctioned on 20.11.2015. In order to secure the credit facility, the stocks of rice stored at Warehouse situated at Taraori, District Karnal, was pledged with respondent No.1.

4. The petitioner failed to maintain the financial discipline, consequently, respondent No.1 initiated recovery proceedings. A letter dated 09.03.2018, was issued by respondent No.1 to the petitioner demanding outstanding dues of ₹11.73 crores. Respondent No.1 moved an application before respondent No.2 for taking over the possession of pledged stock lying in the godown of the petitioner. Respondent No.2 vide order dated 02.05.2018 allowed the application and directed for providing police help for taking over physical possession of the pledged stocks of rice. Aggrieved of the order passed by the District Magistrate, the present petition has been filed.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that respondents have not followed the procedure prescribed under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity 'the Act'). No notices have been issued and the respondent erred in passing the order for taking over the physical possession of the pledged property.

6. The petitioners have nowhere stated that they have inspected the record and found that the notices as prescribed have not been issued or that the documents required as per Section 14 of the Act have not been appended with the application.

7. The petitioners have raised disputed questions of fact. Moreover, there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act against the order passed under Section 14 of the Act.

8. Section 17(1) of the Act is reproduced below :-

> ***"17. Application against measures to recover secured debts—***

> *(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:*
>
> *Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.*
>
> *Explanation - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.*

9. Section 17 provides for filing of an application by any person aggrieved of any of the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the Act. Section 17 provides remedy even for an action taken after the stages contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of ***Kaniyalal Lalchand Sachdev & others Vs. State of Maharashtra 2011(2) SCC 782*** relied upon its earlier decision in Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. v. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366 and observed as under:-

*"19. In **Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. v. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8SCC 366** the main question which fell for determination was whether the DRT would have jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate post Section 13(4) events or whether its scope in terms of Section 17 of the Act will be confined to the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act?*

On an examination of the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act, in particular Sections 13 and 17, this Court, held as under :

"35. In order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and to prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error on the part of the banks or financial institutions, certain checks and balances have been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person, including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor, to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken for the reliefs indicated in sub-section (3) thereof.

36. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the banks and financial institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to *the transferee.*

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39. We are unable to agree with or accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the DRT had no jurisdiction to interfere with the action taken by the secured creditor after the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT.

20. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT.

21. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well-settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See: ***Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2003(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 772 :(2003) 3 SCC 524,***

Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors., 2004 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 147 : (2003) 6 SCC 675, State Bank of India v. Allied Chemical Laboratories & Anr., (2006) 9 SCC 252. *In* ***City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 168*** *this Court had observed that :*

"The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) the petition reveals all material facts;

(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.

22. In the instant case, apart from the fact that admittedly certain disputed questions of fact viz. non-receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, non-communication of the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate etc. are involved, an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act was available to the appellants, who ultimately availed of the same. Therefore, having regard to the facts obtaining in the case, the High Court was fully justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

11. Further, the Supreme Court in ***<u>United Bank of India Vs.</u>***

Satyawati Tondon and others (2010) 8 SCC 110, held as under:

> *"It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues."*

12. In the present writ petition, the disputed question of facts have been raised. Moreover, alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Act is available to the petitioner.

13. The writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail alternative remedies available.

(AJAY KUMAR MITTAL)
JUDGE

(AVNEESH JHINGAN)
JUDGE

October 15, 2018
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Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes

Whether reportable : Yes