

**IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH**

**CRM-M-7915-2017
Date of decision: 26.03.2018**

Vipin Sharma and others

...Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana and another

...Respondents

CORAM:- HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR

Present:- Mr. Parveen Kaushik, Advocate
for the petitioners.

Mr. P. P. Chahar, DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Azam, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.

JAISHREE THAKUR, J. (Oral)

1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of FIR No. 73 dated 20.07.2016, registered under Sections 498-A, 377, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Women Police Station, Jhajjar, District Jhajjar (Annexure P-1) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in view of the compromise (Annexure P-2) entered into between the parties.

2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the aforesaid FIR came to be registered at the behest of the complainant/respondent No. 2 in which it was stated that her marriage was solemnized with Vipin Sharma son of Ram Vinod Kumar on 17.02.2016. However, she was harassed and maltreated on account of demand for more dowry at the hands of the petitioners herein and was also subjected to unnatural sex by her husband. It was in this background that the aforesaid FIR came to be registered. However, now

with the intervention of respectable persons, the matrimonial dispute has been amicably settled between the parties and they have entered into a compromise. In fact, the parties decided to part ways and a decree of divorce has now been obtained under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act.

3. By an order dated 09.02.2017, the parties were directed to appear before the trial Court so that their statement could be recorded regarding the genuineness of the compromise. The parties appeared before the JMIC at Jhajjar. In pursuance of the direction, a report has been received from JMIC at Jhajjar, stating that the compromise arrived at between the parties is without any pressure or coercion from any one and the same appears to be genuine one. It is also reported that no PO proceeding is pending against either of the parties.

4. In normal circumstances, this Court would not entertain a matter when the non-compoundable offences are heinous and serious in nature. In the instant case, the offence complained of includes an offence punishable under Section 377 IPC which is an offence of grave nature. This Court is aware of the fact that time and again it has been held that an offence under Section 377 IPC is a grievous offence and thus, such matters should not be compromised. In the eyes of law, such offence is serious and non-compoundable and the Courts should not in ordinary circumstances interfere and quash the FIR that has been registered.

5. In a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, 2014(6) SCC 466***, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down certain principles and guidelines which should be kept in mind while quashing of FIRs pertaining to

non-compoundable offence. For ready reference paragraphs No. 29.2 and 29.5 are reproduced as under :-

“29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure :

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.”

6. Even in a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Madan Mohan Abbot vs State Of Punjab, 2008 (4) SCC 582***, it has been held that it is advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced herein below :-

“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be

served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out.

6. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.”

7. In the judgment rendered in ***Gian Singh vs State of Punjab & Anr, reported as 2012(10) SCC 303*** the basic principle of law as laid down is that where offences are purely private in nature and do not concern public policy, the power to quash proceedings involving non-compoundable offences on the basis of compromise can be exercised.

8. Therefore, while relying upon the ratios of the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the view that the compromise which has been entered into for quashing of the FIR which includes an offence under Section 377 IPC on the basis of the compromise should be accepted. It is also relevant to note that a divorce has already been granted and the parties have moved on. There is also no MLR to substantiate the allegations of offence punishable under Section 377 IPC. As has been held in ***Narinder Singh & Ors.*** case (supra) those cases where a settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of the offence, the High Court

may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings. Moreover, as per the terms of the compromise, a petition, under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, was filed by the parties for dissolution of their marriage. This Court is informed that now a decree of divorce has been obtained by the parties on 16.01.2018 and the marriage stands dissolved. A certified copy of the said decree of divorce is also placed on record. Since the marriage has been dissolved subsequent to the compromise, this Court feels that it would be in the welfare of the parties if the FIR in question is quashed.

9. Consequently, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the above ratios of law, this petition is allowed and the FIR No. 73 dated 20.07.2016, registered under Sections 498-A, 377, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Women Police Station, Jhajjar, District Jhajjar (Annexure P-1) and all subsequent proceedings arising out of the same are quashed qua the petitioners herein.

26.03.2018

Waseem Ansari

**(JAISHREE THAKUR)
JUDGE**

Whether speaking/reasoned
Whether reportable

Yes/No
Yes/No