

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD

CRIMINAL PETITION No.11476 of 2013

ORDER :

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed by the petitioner Nos.2 to 5 seeking to quash the proceedings in D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 on the file of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy District. This Criminal Petition as against petitioner No.1 has been dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 04.10.2013.

The petitioners are respondents in the above D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 filed by the 2nd respondent herein.

The brief facts of the case are that the 2nd respondent is the wife of petitioner No.1. Petitioner Nos.2 to 5 are parents, brother and sister, respectively, of petitioner No.1. The 2nd respondent has filed the above DVC.No.5 of 2012 under Section 12, r/w. Sections 18 to 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for brevity "the Act") against the petitioners alleging that petitioner No.1 used to consume liquor every day and beat her mercilessly and the other petitioners used to support his inhuman activities. It is further alleged that the petitioners came to know about the house given to respondent No.2 by her parents and started harassing her to sell the said house to perform the marriage of petitioner No.4. It is alleged that all the petitioners bore

grudge against respondent No.2 and petitioner Nos.2 to 5 always used to instigate petitioner No.1 to beat respondent No.2 brutally and on one occasion, petitioner No.1 came to the house late in the night in an intoxicated condition and demanded respondent No.2 to sell the house given by her parents and when she refused to sell the house, petitioner No.1 beat her brutally and poured kerosene on her and thereby tried to kill her. However, respondent No.2 with great difficulty escaped from there and informed about the incident to her parents and Panchayat was also conducted in that regard in the presence of the caste elders and well wishers, who advised petitioner No.1 to stop all such inhuman activities and live happily with respondent No.2. In spite of the same, the petitioners did not change their attitude and harassing her. It is further alleged that the petitioners have taken all the gold ornaments given by her parents and sold the same for their necessities. With these allegations the above D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 has been filed and the present criminal petition is filed to quash the proceedings against them in the above D.V.C.No.5 of 2012.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. Though notice is served on respondent No.2 none appeared on her behalf.

It is to be noted that the petitioners are not entitled for quashing of the proceedings in the light of the judgment rendered by this Court in **GIDUTHURI KESARI KUMAR AND**

ORS. V/s. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ORS., vide Crl.P.Nos. 7289 of 2014 and batch, wherein it is clearly held that the proceedings under section 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs, therefore, the petition for quashing the proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C., is not maintainable.

In para-10 of the aforesaid judgment, this Court observed as under :

10) So, a study of statement of objects and reasons would show that though the domestic violence against women was addressed to some extent by the penal law under Section 498A, the same was not addressed by the civil law it was felt. Hence, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was brought into force w.e.f. 26.10.2006. The reliefs sought to be provided under this enactment, as we will presently see are therefore predominantly civil in nature in tune with the object of the Act. In the line, Section 18 provides Protection order against domestic violence; Section 19 intended to grant Residence order; Section 20 confers Monetary reliefs; Section 21 grants Custody order relating to the custody of the children and Section 22 confer compensation and damages to the victim of domestic violence. So these remedies are purely civil in nature and it is important to note none of the several forms of the domestic violence committed by the respondents under these sections is referred as an offence and respondents as offenders. It is only when an order is passed under any of the aforesaid sections and the breach of protection order is caused by them, such breach will be termed as an offence under Section 31 of the D.V. Act and the same is categorized as cognizable and non-bailable under Section 32 of the D.V. Act. That is what held in **Velisetti Chandra Rekha's** case (1 supra). In the subsequent judgments also similar view was expressed as below:

i) In **Gundu Chandrasekhar vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh**^{1[5]}, a learned judge of this High Court observed thus:

“None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by

^{1[5]} 2012 (2) ALD 910

any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case." (Emphasis supplied)

ii) In **Mohit Yadav and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh**^{2[6]}, a learned judge of this High Court observed thus:

"Para 22: If a statute does not provide an offender liable to any penalty (conviction or sentence) in favour of the state, it can be said that legislation will be classified as remedial statute. Remedial statutes are known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented legislations. A remedial statute receives a liberal construction. In case of remedial statutes, doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. Whenever a legislation prescribes a duty or penalty for breach of it, it must be understood that the duty is prescribed in the interest of the community or some part of it and the penalties prescribed as a sanction for its purpose. None of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has direct penal consequences. (Emphasis supplied)

Para 23: Under Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the Respondent shall be an offence under the Act. Therefore, all other orders passed under Sections 17,18,19,20 and 22 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 have no penal consequences, even if the Respondent committed breach of the order, except as provided under Section 31 of the Act." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, it is clear that the proceedings conducted till passing of the orders under Section 18 to 22 are only civil in nature to provide a civil remedy. Thus it is a civil complaint packed with a criminal wrapper.

It is also pertinent to see that whether the allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute any offence or not to quash the proceedings.

^{2[6]} 2010(1)ALT (Cri) 105

In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **C.B.I. V/s. A. RAVI SHANKER PRASAD** reported in 2009 [6] SCC-351, certain guidelines rendered in Bhajanlal's case have been referred. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C is limited and this Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction only to give effect to the orders passed under the Code to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. Keeping in mind, the Apex Court in **State of Haryana v/s. Bhajanlal**³ laid down the following seven guidelines, which are as follows :

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

³ 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

In the instant case, there are allegations against the petitioners/respondent Nos.2 to 5 that they were also responsible for harassment for dowry and they were also responsible for domestic violence. The questions of fact can only be decided during trial. In this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it is to be seen only whether there are allegations, which prima facie constitute any offence or not? If there are prima facie allegations, then the petitioners are not entitled for quashing of the proceedings.

In the light of the decisions referred above and in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner Nos.2 to 5. The petitioners have already been granted interim

stay and it is appropriate to dispense with their presence during the trial. Therefore, the presence of the petitioners/respondent Nos.2 to 5 is dispensed with during the trial, except on the occasions whenever their presence is required by the trial court.

With the above observations, this Criminal Petition is dismissed.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions if any, pending in this Criminal Petition stands vacated.

12.04.2018.
Msr

GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD, J



HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD

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