

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

RESERVED ON : 29.01.2018

DELIVERED ON : 27.11.2018

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.V.MURALIDARAN

Crl.R.C.Nos.392 and 393 of 2017

and

Crl.M.P.Nos.3582 and 3583 of 2017 in Crl. R.C.No.392/17

and

Crl.M.P.Nos. 3584 & 3585 of 2017 in Crl.R.C.No.393/17

P.Abdul Razak .. Petitioner in Crl.RC.No.392/2017

M.Murugan .. Accused 2/Petitioner in
Crl.RC.No.393/2017

Vs

State Rep. by
Deputy Superintendent of Police,
CBCID, Chennai.

.. Respondent/Complainant in both the
Crl.R.Cs

Prayer: Criminal Revision Case filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, against the Common order passed in Crl.M.P.Nos.822 and 821 of 2014 respectively in C.C.No.9400 of 2010 by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, on 15.02.2017 dismissing the discharge petition & filed by the petitioners.

(In both the Crl.R.C.s)

For Petitioners : Mr.S.Sairaman

For Respondent : Mr.G.Harihara Arun Somasankar
Government Advocate (Crl.Side)

COMMON JUDGMENT

This revisions petitions were filed under section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. by the Petitioners/Accused (A2 and A3) against the dismissal of their discharge petitions filed under section

239 of Cr.P.C by the Learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai in Crl.M.P.Nos.821 & 822 of 2014 in C.C.No.9400 of 2010 by the common order dated 15.2.2017. The revision petitioner in Crl.R.C.No.392 of 2007 is accused No.3 namely Abdul Razzak and accused No.2 namely Murugan is the revision petitioner in Crl.R.C.No.393 of 2007.

2.The brief case of the revision petitioners are as follows:

The case of the Revision Petitioners is that one Mohammed Hayath, accused No.1, working as the Project Co-ordinator in a computer software company by name "soft Solution" owned by the defacto complainant namely Senthil Kumar, committed an offence of hacking of hard disc owned by the defacto complainant and used the source code for his personal gains. Based on the complaint, a case has been registered by the respondent police against A1 in Crime No.1 of 2005, under sec. 65 of the Information Technology Act r/w 408 of IPC. Subsequently the respondent police laid the charge sheet as against A1 for an offence under section 65 of IT Act r/w 408 and 120 (B) of IPC, as against the Revision petitioners (A2 & A3) for an offences under section 120 (B) of IPC r/w 65 and 66 of Information Technology Act, 2000.

3.The allegations in the final report is that the revision petitioners also colluded with A1 thereby and they committed an offences under the sections mentioned supra. Now charge sheet is pending before the learned trial Court in C.C.No.9400 of 2010. Trial is yet to commence. The Revision Petitioners had filed discharge petitions before the trial Court in Crl.M.P.Nos.822 / 2014 and 821/2014 and both applications were dismissed by a common order dated 15.02.2017.

4.The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioners contends that the 1st Revision Petitioner was employed as General Manager and the 2nd Revision Petitioner was employed as Special Officer of Thiruppattur Town Co-Operative Bank were falsely implicated by the respondent police without any prima facie materials.

5.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the co-operative department as already ordered an enquiry under sec.81 of Co-operative Societies Act and by its conclusion, it has absolved the Revision Petitioners from any criminal liabilities and they have not been subjected to any disciplinary proceedings also. Though they initiated surcharge proceedings that was also dropped. Hence the action of the prosecution is

against the decision of the department and the materials collected from the witnesses no way connect the petitioners with accused No.1.

6.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the prosecution has not sought permission to prosecute the Revision Petitioners which is mandatory under section 197 of Cr.P.C and the quantum of amount awarded as contract to the A1 by the Revision Petitioners is Rs.1,36,000/- which is more or less similar to the amount allotted in the previous year and hence there is no room or reason for any scandal as alleged in the final report.

7.The Revision Petitioners contends that the Reserve Bank of India issued institutional notification to keep all the final accounts of the every financial year in computerized form and the bank is not having facility of the computer and they have to avail outsource agencies by way of giving work orders. Accordingly for the year 2003-2004 the order was allotted to the defacto complainant as per the tender norms. For the year 2004-2005 tender was called for and the tender was allotted to the A-1 as his bid was lowest. Besides, another part of the work was allotted to M/s Online a different contractor. Thus everything was fully transparent in nature and according to accepted norms. The specific case of the defacto complainant is that A1 used source code developed by him for his personal gains in this bank without his knowledge and he hacked the hard disc in order to damage the program developed by the defacto complainant and nothing attributed against the accused No.2 and 3.

8.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per Section 65 of the Information Technology Act, the computer source code is required to be kept or maintained for time being in force as per law. But in the present case, the defacto complainant has not preserved above data's and maintained other things as per the law in force. Hence the witnesses who speaks about the source code and other software issue as alleged by the defacto complainant cannot be taken as a substantive proof.

9.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the defacto complainant ought to prove that he is the lawful owner of the hard disc, source code and other. The allegation as if A1 used FOX PRO, which is common banking software readily available in the market freely and as such that cannot be any impunity over its title by the defacto complainant and no mental act can be attributed to the petitioners. Mere allotment of contract by the A2 and A3 could not be treated at par with hacking.

10.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per Section 79 of the Information Technology Act gives exemption for liability of intermediary in certain cases and hence the intermediary namely the officials of the bank are not liable for the prosecution.

11.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per Section 85 of the Information Technology Act, the offences by the companies or official and the company should also be invariably be arrayed as an accused and without assigning the company the office bearers or the directors cannot be charged. In the present context, the special officer namely the A2 and General Manager namely the A3 has alone be charged. Hence the charge against the Revision petitioners has no legal sanctity and the scope of Section 43 r/w Sec.46 of Information Technology Act has been ignored by the trial Court while disposing the discharge petition.

12.The learned counsel for the petitioners cited the decisions reported in AIR 2012 SC page 2795 and same has been followed another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1222 of 2016 and prayed this Court to allow the revisions.

13.On the other hand, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent filed their Counter against the Revision Petition.

14.The Respondent in their Counter alleged that the Revision Petitioners along with the accused A1 Mohammed Hayath, have been charge sheeted for the commission of offences u/s 65 , 66 of Information Technology Act r/w 120 (B) IPC and 408 IPC. The Defacto Complainant, Senthil Kumar, is the proprietor of "Soft Solution" functioning at No.11, Teacher Govindaraj Street, Arcot, Vellore District. He developed specialized accounting software on his own intellectual ideas and with the assistance of the other paid software developes. A1 Mohammed Hayath was the project co-ordinator of the "Soft Solutions". The Revision Petitioners A2 M.Murugan and A3 P.Abdul Razak entrusted an work order for computerizing the bank accounts of Tiruppathur Urban Co-operative Bank for the financial year of 2003-2004 for Rs.1,40,000/- to the defecto complainant and he executed the work through A1 Mohamed Hayath by using the specialized software. But for the first half of the financial year 2004-2005, the same work order was entrusted to A1 Mohammed Hayath by the Revision Petitioners, who carried out the job by using the

software stolen from the system of defacto complainant. The cost of the work amounting to Rs.71,000/- was shared by the revision petitioners. The case is mainly revolving around the Banking software developed by the Defacto complainant to suit the need of the computerization of the accounts of the Tiruppathur Urban Co-operative Bank. The Revision petitioners and Al Mohamed Hyath were the beneficiaries from the stolen software. During the course of investigation, the Hard disk used by the defacto complainant and the Revision Petitioners for the computerization of the bank records were seized and subjected for digital analysis. The report indicated the use of the source code of the defacto complainant Tr.N.Senthilkumar's banking software by Al. After getting an analysis report, final report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. was filed before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore under Sections 65 and 66 of Information Technology Act 2000 r/w 120(B) IPC on 09.11.2006.

15.The further case of the Respondent is that the Revision Petitioners already preferred quash petition in CrI.O.P.No.7091 of 2007 and this Court in para No.12 observed that "It is the contention of the Revision Petitioners that since the first accused was the highest bidder, the contract has been rightly given to the first revision petitioner. This aspect cannot be decided in this Criminal Original petition as it has to be established only by way of supporting documents. Therefore, insofar as the first point that any Cyber Crime has been committed by the first revision petitioner with the connivance of the second and third accused is concerned, I am of the view that the same has to be considered only at the time of trial, as it requires evidence and documentary proof.

16.This Court has stated in the order passed in CrI.O.P.No.7091 of 2007 in para No.13 that "regarding the statutory bar is concerned, at this stage, it is unnecessary for this Court to scrutinize the said issue and directed the Trial Court to consider the said aspect also at the time of trial.

17.The further case of the Respondent is that the act of the Revision Petitioners comes under Chapter IX Section 43 (a) (b) of Information Technology Act 2000 and attracts both section 66 and section 43 of the Information Technology Act simultaneously. Both are concurrent remedies which are made available by the law to the aggrieved person. It is pertinent to note that if any person dishonestly does any act referred to in Sec.43 he shall be punishable with terms of 3 years or with fine which may be extend to 5 lakhs as per sec.66 of the act. It is wrong to say that the Information Technology Act has not conferred power on

the police. Since the penal section of 66 (Hacking) of Information Technology Act is a cognizable offence as per S 77 (B) which is having punishment of imprisonment up to three years, the Police is empowered to investigate the case as per the schedule, II classification of Cr.P.C. Hence there was no necessity for sanction of prosecution by the authorities of the co-operative bank as the Information Technology Act 2000 do not insist sanction for prosecution under Sections 65 or 66 or any other Information Technology offences and the domestic enquiry conducted by the bank is not having any influence and no force.

18.The Respondent cited the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Smt Om Wati and another Vs State through Delhi Admin" reported in 2001 CrL L.J. 1723 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court recommended the subordinate Judiciary of their statutory obligation to not to interfere at the initial stage of framing of charges merely on hypothesis imagination and for fetched reasons, which in low amount to interdicting the trial against the accused persons. Unscrupulous litigation should be discharged from protecting the trial and preventing culmination of the criminal cases by having resort to uncalled for an in justified litigation under to cloak of technicalities of law. In Bhajanlal's case the Hon'ble Apex Court also observed as follows.

"We also give a note of caution to the fact that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised verify sparingly and with a circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases : that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuiness or otherwise of the allegation made in the FIR or the Complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent power do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and caprice"

19.I heard Mr.S.Sairaman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.G.Harihara Arun Somasankar, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the respondent and perused the entire materials available on record.

20.The Revision Petitioners are A2 and A3.The substratum of the allegation against the Revision Petitioners is that they award the contract to Accused no.1 and he misused the software developed by the defacto Complainant colluding with the Revision Petitioners.

21.In the present case on hand, the entire issue starts with the Reserve Bank of India, who issued institutional notification

to keep the all the financial accounts in a computerized firm and implementing necessary procedures for the maintenance of accounts and other documents related to the bank. But the sad state of affairs is that the bank was not having the computer facility at that point of time and have to avail outsource agencies by way of giving work orders. Accordingly for the year 2003-2004, the order was allotted to the defacto complainant as per the tender norms, which completed the work without any grievance. For the year 2004-2005, tender was again called for and the tender was allotted to the A-1 as his bid was lowest. Besides, another part of the work was allotted to M/s Online, a different contractor. Since the second contract was awarded to A 1, the defacto complainant initiated this false case to settle his score against A1. There are no specific averments from the list witnesses attached to the final report that the contract awarded was not fully transparent and against the accepted norms. The specific case of the defacto complainant is that A1 used source code developed by him for his personal gains in the bank of the Revision Petitioners without his knowledge and he hacked the hard disc in order to damage the program developed by the defacto complainant. The facts being so, it's the issue between him and A1. Further, no mens rea was attributed by any of the list witnesses against the Revision Petitioners. But in the present case, the defacto complainant have not preserved the original data and maintained the source code, as per the Information Technology Act. Hence the list witnesses, which speaks about the source code and other software issue as alleged by the defacto complainant cannot be taken as a substantive proof. Mere allotment of contract by the Revision Petitioners could not be treated at par with hacking. It is also to be borne in mind that Section.79 of the Information Technology Act gives exemption for liability of intermediary in certain cases and hence the intermediary namely the officials of the bank are not liable for the prosecution.

22.No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the Respondent, the law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court for quashing of FIRs and Discharge of the accused before trial. In a celebrated decisions namely:

In the case of R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antulay reported in AIR SC 1986 page 2045 in the law about the discharge has been discussed in the following words in para 44:

The Cr. P.C contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under Section 227 the trial

Judge is required to discharge the accused if he considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless." The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction. It is a fact that Sections 227 and 239 provide for discharge being ordered before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the two parties to be heard. The stage for discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of the charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three Sections, the legal position is that if the trial Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.

23. Thus the power of framing of the charge and also discharge of the accused, if no case is made out, vests in the Magisterial Courts as well as in the Sessions Court. This power is to be exercised in the manner indicated in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh. The relevant portion in this judgment is as follows in para 4 at page 2019 of AIR SC 1977:

It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take

the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.... If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pans to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.

24. Further in the case of Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in AIR 1979 SC page 366, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 has given out the following principles for framing charge or otherwise:

- (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out;
- (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial;
- (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused;

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

25. Thus the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be summed up that before the trial starts a Magistrate and also a Sessions Judge can discharge the accused persons under the provisions of Sections 239, 245 and 227, Cr.P.C. At the time of consideration whether to frame charge or not, the Court is not to consider in detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the fact if proved would be compatible with the innocence or guilt of the person accused. The standard of test and judgment which is applied at the final stage of the trial is not to be applied at this stage. The Court is to see only if there is some evidence sufficient for the conviction of the accused. Even the strong suspicion on account of which the Court may infer that the case may end in conviction is sufficient for framing the charge. Only a prima facie case is to be seen. The Court is to sift and weigh the evidence for a limited purpose to find out a prima facie case. If there is not even the grave suspicion then the accused is entitled to be discharged. But if grave suspicion is found on materials which may lead to an inference about the guilt of the person accused then the Court may frame charge. If the Court finds prima facie that the prosecution is false, frivolous and vexatious by way of an abuse of the process of the Court or prosecution apparently appears to be without any sanction or without jurisdiction then the Court may give benefit of the same to the person accused. But if the prima facie case is there, the Court cannot have discretion of discharge on the ground that the evidence does not come to the standard of a judgment of the final stage; as at this stage the full evidence does not come before the Court, only the materials collected at the investigation stage and some documents are there and not the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses are there. The matter remains in the stage of enquiry. It is only after the framing of the charge in a warrant case that the trial starts" in which full evidence is led by the parties.

26.A discharge does not amount to acquittal because a discharge is at the stage of enquiry, whereas an acquittal is at the stage of final hearing when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties with examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. A discharge can be by a police officer when he does not send up the accused during the investigation and puts his name in col. 2 of the charge-sheet. An accused can be discharged under Section 203, Cr.P.C. when no prima facie case is made out and the Court does not issue notice. Section 300 of Cr. P.C. provides that if a person who has once been convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence. But this bar does not apply when a complaint is dismissed or accused is discharged as both of them are not acquittal for the purposes of this case.

27.But in this case, considering the contentions of the Revision Petitioners and the material placed before this Court, it is possible to arrive at a prima facie decision that no case having been made out against the petitioners, especially, the facts are incomplete and hazy and the statements of the list witnesses do not spell the basic substratum of the Prosecution case. The factual and legal aspects were not taken in to consideration in a true perspective and the materials collected during the investigation and final report led in the Court do not connect the petitioners with crime. This Court requires proof of each ingredient of any offence to be brought on record. Therefore, it would be a futile measure to allow the continuation of proceedings against the Revision Petitioners.

28.It cannot be said that, in the above circumstances, Courts have no power to do justice or redress a wrong merely because no express provision of the Code can be found to meet the requirements of a case. All Courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of express provision in the Code for that purpose, as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of the administration of justice. This is based on the principle, embodied in the maxim "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest" - when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that, without which, it cannot exist. The High Court has, in addition thereto, and in view of its general jurisdiction over all the criminal Courts subordinate to it, inherent power to give effect to any order of any such Court under the Code, and to prevent the abuse of process of any such Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The requirements of justice give

an occasion for the development of new dimension of justice by evolving juristic principles for doing complete justice according to the current needs of the Society. The quest for justice in the process of administration of justice occasions the evolution of new dimensions of the justice. J.S.Verma, J., in his Article "New Dimensions of Justice", (1997) 3 SCC J-3 observed that:-

"...Justice is the ideal to be achieved by Law. Justice is the goal of law. Law is a set of general rules applied in the administration of justice. Justice is in a cause on application of law to a particular case. Jurisprudence is the philosophy of law. Jurisprudence and Law have ultimately to be tested on the anvil of administration of justice. Law as it is", may fall short of 'Law as it ought to be' for doing complete justice in a cause. The gap between the two may be described as the field covered by Morality. There is no doubt that the development of the law is influenced by morals. The infusion of morality for reshaping the law is influenced by the principles of Equity and Natural Justice, as effective agencies of growth. The ideal State is when the rules of law satisfy the requirements of justice and the gap between the two is bridged. It is this attempt to bridge the gap which occasions the development of New Jurisprudence.

29.The existence of some gap between law and justice is recognized by the existing law itself. This is the reason for the recognition of inherent powers of the Court by express provision made in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Constitution of India by Article 142 expressly confers on the Supreme Court plenary powers for doing complete justice in any cause or matter before it. Such power in the Court of last resort is recognition of the principle that in the justice delivery system, at the end point attempt must be made to do complete justice in every cause, if that result cannot be achieved by provisions of the enacted law. These powers are in addition to the discretionary powers of Courts in certain areas where rigidity is considered inappropriate, e.g., equitable reliefs and Article 226 of the Constitution. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in this Court is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which would impede it. It is the salutary duty of this Court to prevent the abuse of the process, miscarriage of justice and to correct the irregularities in the judicial process.

30.The present case does not fall within the aforesaid limitations as there is neither any express provision nor any

express bar in the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge of the accused at the stage of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. if no prima facie case is made out against him. The power of the Trial Court to discharge the accused at the stage of notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C. is based not only on sound logic but also on a fundamental principle of justice as a person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to face the trial. Added advantage is that the High Court will have the benefit of the considered opinion of the Magistrate, and it can always exercise its inherent power if it feels that the Magistrate had gravely erred but to ask this Court to interfere at the very threshold of the prosecution does not appear appropriate because it practically amounts to shifting of the prosecution case from the competent Court of the Magistrate to this Court.

31. On careful consideration of the legal position discussed above, this Court is satisfied that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law and therefore, suffice to find out at this stage, whether there are materials to frame charge or not? If I go deep into the matter and discuss the materials in depth, it may cause any embarrassment either to the prosecution or the defence at the stage of trial for the remaining accused. Needless to say that at this stage, the Court is mostly concerned about the materials or the prima facie case. On careful analysis of the materials, there is no prima facie case against the revision petitioners. The learned Trial Court failed to list out the sufficient grounds and materials against the revision petitioners from the statements and annexure contained in the Final Report.

32. In the result, both the criminal revision cases are allowed. The impugned order dated 15.02.2017 is set-aside. The revisionists are discharged for the offences of Section 65 of the I.T. Act, Section 408 and 120(B) of I.P.C. relating to Case in Crime No.1 of 2005, on the file of the CBCID Cyber Crime Cell at Chennai. Consequently, the connected M.P.s are closed.

Sd/-
Assistant Registrar (CS II)

//True Copy//

Sub Assistant Registrar

To


1.The XI Metropolitan Magistrate,
Saidapet, Chennai.

2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
CBCID, Chennai.

+2ccs to Mr.S.Sairaman, Advocate Sr.81949, 81948

CrI.R.C.Nos.392 and 393 of 2017
and
CrI.M.P.Nos.3582 to 3585 of 2017

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