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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
DECIDED ON : 17TH AUGUST, 2017

+ **W.P.(C) 11464/2015 & CM APPL. 30343/2015**

DAYA SINGH Petitioner
Through : Ms.Deepika V.Marwaha, Advocate with
Mr.Vinay K.Shailendra, Ms.Worthing Kasar, Mr.Vaibhav
Rai Asthana & Mr.Alok Pandey, Advocates.

versus

GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF
DELHI & ORS Respondents
Through : Mr.Sanjeev Sabharwal, Standing Counsel
for DDA.
Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with Ms.Jyoti Tyagi,
Advocate for L&B/LAC.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG

S.P.GARG, J. (OPEN COURT)

1. The petitioner claims himself to be recorded owner of the land bearing Khasra Nos.1269(4-16), 1272(4-16), 1273(4-16), 1284(4-16), 1285(4-16), 1286(4-16), 1287(4-16), 1288(4-16) & 1292(4-16) admeasuring 1 bigha situated in the Revenue Estate of Village Malikpur Kohi @ Rangpuri, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'suit land') by virtue of registered Sale Deed dated 30.06.1982. The petitioner's claim is that acquisition of suit land has lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

2. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (old Act) was issued on 27.06.1996; it included the suit land. A

declaration was issued under Section 6 on 10.01.1997. The award bearing No.02/98-99 dated 07.01.1999 was made by the Land Acquisition Collector.

3. The petitioner avers that pursuant to the award, no compensation has been paid or tendered by the respondents nor its possession has been taken. Relying upon *Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors.*, 2014 (3) SCC 183, counsel urged that the acquisition has lapsed since five year period indicated in Section 24(2) of the Act has ended.

4. The Govt. of NCT of Delhi through LAC, in its counter-affidavit, states in Para (10) :

“10. That as regard possession, it is humbly submitted that the possession of the land in question except khasra number 1272 and 1273 could not be taken due to stay from this Hon’ble High Court. So far as compensation is concerned the compensation amount has not been received from requisitioning authority. Thus, the compensation amount could not be paid to the interested persons.”

5. The Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C)No.2299/2002 tilted *Santosh Singh & Ors.vs.UOI & Ors*, decided on 13.11.2014, held after overall consideration of the provisions of Section 19, 24(2) and Section 69, of the Act that the situation where interim orders were made by the court too would fall within the ambit of Section 24(2). In *Santosh Singh & Ors* (Supra) it was held as follows:

“A close analysis of the above provisions would reveal that Section 19 enables the acquisition process by the appropriate Government issuing a declaration, Section

19 (6) is an important exception in that it imposes a limitation on the power itself (i.e limitation for making declaration). In case the time limit is not adhered to, the acquisition lapses. The proviso to Section 19 (6) recognizes that sometime Court intervention by interim orders impede the appropriate Government from issuing declarations. Section 69 (2) enables increased compensation; yet, the explanation provides that if the landowner secures an interim order, the period spent in litigation, particularly when the interim order subsists, cannot be given benefit to him while calculating interest. Thus, limitation of power freshly conferred or created by the Act does not follow a uniform pattern. The object of the provision in question defines how the allusion to interim orders of court are dealt with. However, Section 24 (2) is a special provision that but for its enactment, would have resulted in the operation of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in that all action taken under the old law would have been preserved. It therefore had to be construed in the context of the old enactment which clearly contemplated exclusion of time at the different stages when interim orders subsisted (i.e to make declaration after preliminary notification and also extended period for making the award). These perspectives are indicative of a contrary interpretation. However, this Court notices that the ruling of the Supreme Court on this aspect is decisive; it consequently binds it.”

6. It is evident that neither possession of the suit land (except in Khasra Nos.1272 & 1273) was taken over nor any compensation for acquisition of the suit land was tendered or paid to the recorded owner(s)/ petitioner.
7. As the respondents have not denied that the compensation of the suit land has not been paid, the petitioner is entitled to the declaration sought. Accordingly, it is held that acquisition of suit land in Khasra

Nos.1269(4-16), 1272(4-16), 1273(4-16), 1284(4-16), 1285(4-16), 1286(4-16), 1287(4-16), 1288(4-16) & 1292(4-16) to the extent of petitioner's share i.e. admeasuring 1 bigha vide award No.02/98-99 dated 07.01.1999 is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Act.

8. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending application also stands disposed of.

**S.P.GARG
(JUDGE)**

**S. RAVINDRA BHAT
(JUDGE)**

AUGUST 17, 2017 / tr