

\$~51

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ W.P.(CRL) 3319/2017, Crl. M.A. 19527/2017
SALIM @ SALIM MALIK & ORS

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. M.I. Siddiqui, Adv.

Versus

STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR

..... Respondent

Through: Mr. Ashish Aggaacmal, ASC with SI
Manoj Kumar, P.S. Jafrabad, Delhi
Mr. Raj Kumar, Adv. for R-2

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

ORDER

%

27.11.2017

Crl. M.A. No.19527/2017 (for exemption)

Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The application stands disposed off.

W.P.(CRL) 3319/2017

1. This writ petition seeks quashing of FIR No.278/2016 dated 02.07.2017 registered at Police Station Jafrabad, Delhi for the offences punishable under sections 498-A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on the complaint of Ms. Nasreen, daughter of Mr. Saeed Ahmad against her husband and in-laws pursuant to a matrimonial discord and other grievances she had against them. All the petitioners except petitioner Nos. 3 and 8 are present in the Court today. The complainant too is present in the Court today. All the parties have been identified by their respective counsel. The petitioners

have sought quashing of the FIR in view of the settlement having been arrived at between them on 22.10.2016 before the Counselling Cell, Family Court, Karkardooma, Shahdara, Delhi. In terms of the settlement, an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs was to be paid to the complainant Ms. Nasreen towards settlement of all her claims against the petitioners which she states she has received. In view of the settlement, she does not wish to pursue the FIR against the petitioners or the complainant. She would like to forget this unhappy episode and wishes to carry on with her life and raise her minor child namely Master Aayan in the best possible manner into a responsible citizen. The parties undertake to abide by the terms of the settlement deed. Petitioner Nos. 3 & 8 have supported the petition with their affidavits. They shall file an undertaking within a week from today in terms of the aforesaid compromise deed.

2. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that since the respondent No.2 does not wish to pursue the case against the petitioners any further, no purpose would be served if the petitioners are directed to face trial. Therefore, the State has no objection, if the present petition is allowed.

3. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court keeps in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, which held that even a non-compoundable offence can be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant and observed as under:

“58.However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,

particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

4. The amicable resolution of cases like the present one, is an abiding objective. The dictum of *Gian Singh* (supra) has been affirmed by the Apex Court in ***Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.*** 2014 6 SCC 466 while observing:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which

if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this *prima facie* analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after *prima facie* assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section

307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

5. In a similar vein regarding matrimonial disputes the Supreme Court in ***Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58*** held:

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice

require that the proceedings ought to be quashed....”

6. The complainant submits that she has no complaints whatsoever against the petitioners hence, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question may be brought to an end. Since the respondent/complainant herself does not wish to pursue the case against the petitioners any further, keeping the FIR alive will serve no purpose and any proceedings emanating from it would be an exercise in futility. The parties have agreed that custody of Master Aayan (three years) will be with her mother.

7. In view of the aforesaid, FIR No.278/2016 dated 02.07.2017 registered at Police Station Jafrabad, Delhi, for the offences punishable under sections 498-A/406/34 IPC and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and all proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

8. The petition stands disposed off in the above terms.

NAJMI WAZIRI, J.

NOVEMBER 27, 2017

ACM