

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

129

CR-3719-2017(O&M)

Date of Decision:22.05.2017

Sandeep

.....Petitioner

Versus

Rita

.....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK.

**Present: Mr.Narender Kaajla, Advocate,
for the petitioner.**

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J.(Oral)

Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order dated 12.04.2017 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned matrimonial Court, whereby application moved by the respondent-wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short “the Act”), during the pendency of the divorce-petition filed by the petitioner-husband was allowed, granting her an amount of ₹8,000/- per month as maintenance pendente lite, husband has filed the instant revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for setting aside the impugned order.

Placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in **Smt.Geeta alias Son Dai and another Versus Bhupinder Singh Choudhary, 2014(2) PLR 355**, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is wholly illegal for the reasons that the respondent-wife concealed her source of income at the time of moving her application under Section 24 of the Act. He also submits that the respondent-wife did not disclose her qualification also at the time of moving the application. He

prays for setting aside the impugned order.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after going through record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present revision petition is without any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed whereas the impugned order deserves to be upheld, for the following more than one reasons.

So far as the judgment in **Bhupinder Singh Choudhary's case (supra)** relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, there is no dispute about the observations made and law laid down therein. However, on a close perusal of the cited judgment, it has been found to be of any help to the petitioner, being distinguishable on facts.

It is the settled principle of law that peculiar facts of each case are to be examined, considered and appreciated first, before applying any codified or judgemade law thereto. Sometimes, difference of even one circumstance or additional fact can make the world of difference, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Padmasundara Rao (Dead) Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533**, **Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda and others, 2004 (3) SCC 75**, **State of Orissa Vs. Md. Illiyas, 2006 (1) SCC 275** and **State of Rajasthan VS. Ganeshi Lal, 2008 (2) SCC 533**.

With a view to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity, the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 11 and 12 of its later judgment in **Ganeshi Lal's case (supra)**, reiterating its view taken in **Amrit Lal Manchanda's case (supra)** and **Mohd. Illiyas's case (supra)**, which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-

11. *“12....Reliance on the decision without looking into*

the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates; (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Coming to

the peculiar fact situation obtaining on record of the present case, it is unhesitatingly held that learned Permanent Lok Adalat discussed, considered and appreciated each and every relevant aspect of the matter, before passing the impugned award. The only endeavour made by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat was to do complete and substantial justice between the parties and this approach adopted by learned Permanent Lok Adalat has been found well justified on facts as well as in law. Ed. See State of Orissa Vs. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 at p.282, para 12.

12. 15....Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."

16. *In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.* (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said (at All ER p.297g-h), "Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in *Shepherd Homes Ltd. V. Sandham* (No.2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: (All ER p. 1274d-e) "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in *Herrington v. British Railways Board* (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."

17. *Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.*

15. *The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT, AIR 1962 SC 680*

"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."

"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead

wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it Ed. See Union of India VS. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75, pp. 83-84, paras 15-18."

So far as, the alleged source of income of the respondent-wife is concerned, petitioner has placed on record two FDRs as Annexure P-4 (Colly.) for an amount of ₹5 lakhs, which were got prepared by her father in her name at the time of her marriage. It is not in dispute that the petitioner-husband did not contribute even a single penny. Even if the respondent-wife did not mention about those FDRs, it would never amount to any concealment on her part. Further, the income on account of interest on the above-said FDRs would be hardly any income, which cannot be said to be sufficient for maintaining the respondent-wife. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the learned matrimonial Court was well within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld.

Again, about the alleged concealment of her qualification by the respondent-wife is hardly of any consequence. Even if she is accepted to be qualified, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that she is not working anywhere. Non-disclosure of alleged qualification without any employment would also not amount to any concealment on the part of the respondent-wife. In this view of the matter, it can be safely concluded that the learned matrimonial Court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason also.

So far as the impugned order on merits is concerned, learned

counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that the petitioner is not challenging the impugned order on its merits. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is serving as Sub-Inspector of Police. In this view of the matter, an amount of ₹8,000/- per month as maintenance pendente lite cannot be said to be on higher side under any circumstances. This would be the bare minimum amount for the sustenance of the respondent-wife. Thus on merits as well, no fault can be found with the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason as well.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present revision petition is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance, thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

Resultantly, with the above-said observations made, the instant revision petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

May 22, 2017
seema

(RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether Reportable: Yes/No