



BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

Reserved on: 14.09.2017

Delivered on : 22.09.2017

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CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.M.SUNDRESH
and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.SATHISH KUMAR

Special Tribunal Appeal (MD) No.1 of 2013
and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2013

- 1.Suba.Kuppusami
- 2.Suba.Chinnasami
- 3.Danushkodi
- 4.Andiappan
- 5.Karuppiyah
- 6.Muthucholai Asari
- 7.Murugesan Asari
- 8.Karu.Silambayee
- 9.Karu.Alagappan
- 10.Karu.Muthuvel
- 11.Kannan
- 12.Nagammai
- 13.Nesavalli
- 14.Karuppiyah
- 15.Vairavan
- 16.Adaikammai
- 17.Vellaichami
- 18.Ramiah
- 19.Veeramani
- 20.Sethu Asari
- 21.Silambayee
- 22.Kamaraj
- 23.Chellayee
- 24.UmaiyaI

..Appellants/Respondents 2 to 12,
13 to 18, 21 to 23, 25, 28 to 30,

vs.

Kailasa Vinayagar Koil,

Rep. by its Trustee Alagappa Chettiar (Died),

- 1.Manikandan .. 1st Respondent/Appellants
- 2.Chinniah Ambalam
- 3.Pappathi
- 4.Uyyavanthan
- 5.Rama.Karuppiyah
- 6.Ganesan

.. Respondents 2 to 7/Respondents 1,
19, 20, 24, 26 & 27



Special Tribunal Appeal is filed under Section 30(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act (Tamil Nadu Act 30/1963) against the judgment and decree dated 07.01.2013 made in R.A.No.6 of 1999 on the file of Inam Abolition Tribunal (Subordinate Judge), Sivagangai preferred against the exparte order dated 19/7/99 passed in S.R.No.48/Karaikudi/95 on the file of Assistant Settlement Officer, Madurai.

For Appellants 1, 5, 6, 8, 14 to : Mr.V.K.Vijaya Raghavan
16, 18, 20 & 22 to 24 for M/s.V.Raghavachari

For Appellants 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 to : Mr.V.K.Vijaya Raghavan
13, 17, 19 & 21

For 1st Respondent : Mr.AR.L.Sundareshan
Senior Counsel for
M/s.A.L.Ganthimathi

For Respondents 2 to 7 : No appearance

JUDGMENT

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.M.SUNDRESH, J)

The litigation which started in the year 1950 is yet to reach its finality though concluded by the Civil Court.

2.Lands were granted in favour of the 1st respondent by the Inam Commissioner way back in the year 1864 in T.D.No.867. By the order of the Settlement Officer, Manamadurai dated 17.01.1950, it was held that Pillayarendal being a hamlet of Chinna Vengavayal is not part of 1936 Act nor comes under the definition of the Estate. Accordingly, it was held that the Village of Pillayarendal is not Inam Estate as per 1948 Act. The following is the order passed:

"Action was taken Suo Moto to determine whether the Inam Village of Pillayarendal, Tirupathur Taluk is an Inam Estate or not. The Inamdar is Sri Kailasa Vinayagar at Pillayarendal.

Notices were published on the notice board of the Settlement Office in a conspicuous place in the village and by beat of Tomtom there. It was also served on the Trustee of the Temple. In response to the notice issued, the Karnam appeared and gave a deposition. The Trustee of the Temple, One A.P.Subramanian Chettiar filed a Written Statement with enclosure. No ryot was

The extract from the IFR Exhibit A1 shows that the grant was confirmed by the British



Government in T.D 867 on 11.7.1864 tax free the Zamindars Zodi being for Rs.5-9-0.

It is mentioned in the extract that Pillayarendal is only a hamlet of Chinnavengavayal and Inam village. Hence, a whole village was not granted as Inam. The village will not be a part of 1936 Estate nor is it any Estate at all.


I therefore declare that the Inam village of Pillayarendal is not an Inam Estate under Sec.2 (7) of the Madras Act XVI of 1948 Appendix."

3.A challenge was made by four persons claiming to be the ryots. Upon consideration, their appeal was dismissed in Revenue Appeal No.193 of 1950 dated 05.10.1950, in the following manner:

"The learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied upon a decision reported in 63 Law weekly 819. There, it has been held that the crucial date for determining whether the property granted is a village or not, is not any date subsequent to the make of the grant either the date of the settlement or the present date, but is the date of the grant and it is immaterial whether subsequent to the grant, the property granted had been treated or made into a separate village by the Government. That a hamlet cannot be a village is also clear from the definition in Section 3(9) of the Estates Land Act where the Village is defined as a local area etc. and is also stated to include hamlet. It is clear therefore on the definition set out under Section 3(19) that a hamlet cannot be a village so long as it is construed as hamlet that is portion of a village. In this case, it is quite clear from the documents that at the time of grant, Pillayarendal was only a hamlet of Chinnavengavayal though it might have been subsequently recognized as a village at the time of Inam Settlement as it has been dealt with separately. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the grant was only of a part of a village and the property so granted will not therefore come within the definition of an "Estate" under Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act."

The aforesaid proceedings become conclusive and final.

4.A comprehensive suit for declaration and possession was filed by the respondent, in O.S.No.151 of 1957 on the file of District Munsif Court, Devakottai. In the aforesaid suit it was claimed that the plaintiff is having absolute title and right over



to both warams. The defendants through whom the present appellants claimed rights raised a plea that the Village of Pillayarendal is Inam Estate under Act XVIII of 1936. On consideration of the respective cases put forth by the parties, the following issues were framed:

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1. Whether the plaintiff-mentioned village Pillayarendal is a hamlet of Chinavengavayal and an absolute Inam of both warams?

2. Whether the village is an estate as contended by the defendants?

3. Whether the defendants are ryots and have acquired ryoti interest by prescription as contended by them?

4. Whether the defendants are estopped from claiming the suit lands as ryoti lands by reason of the decision in R.A.No.193 of 1950 on the file of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Madurai, operating as res-judicata?

5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from denying that the defendants have any kudiwaram right in the suit lands by reason set out in para 5 of the written statement?

6. Whether the suit has to be transferred to the Tribunal constituted under Act XXIX of 1956 and Act XXX of 1956 and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit?

7. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties?

8. Whether the property has been grossly undervalued?

9. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Thus, the issues were answered against the defendants.

5. As a preliminary objection was raised with respect to jurisdiction, the suit was transferred to the Tribunal under Act XXX of 1956. The Tribunal gave a finding to the effect that Pillayarendal is not an Estate within the meaning of Estate land. Accordingly, the papers were sent back to the Civil Court. Based upon the same, issue No.6 was disposed of.

6. After the trial was over, the counsel for the defendants took up a specific stand while giving up others. The trial Court noted the said submissions, which is as under:

"However, after the trial was over, and possibly in view of the oral and documentary evidence on either side, regarding the issues in this suit, the learned counsel for the defendants took up a definite stand and he gave up all other contentions. He conceded in the course of argument, that the plaintiff has got



title to the suit properties, that he is entitled to both warams, that Pillayarendal is a hamlet of Chinna Vengavayal village and that the same is not an Estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) (d) of Act 1 of 1908. His definite stand in the course of the argument is, that even though the defendants claimed occupancy right or Kudiwaram right in the suit lands, they do not now claim any such right, but since the plaintiff's title to the suit properties has been conceded, he should establish his possession within 12 years prior to suit; and if he fails to do so, the suit must fail. In other words, the defendants only contention in the course of the argument is, that this is a suit in ejectment (i.e., for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit lands), and hence, irrespective of the defendants' case, as set up in the written statement and in the course of the trial, the plaintiff can succeed only by establishing his title and possession within 12 years prior to suit. As already pointed out, the defendants concede the plaintiff's title, but their further and only contention is, that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit lands within 12 years prior to the suit. On the other hand, the contention of the plaintiff is that the defendants having fought out the matter till the trial of the suit, as stated above, cannot change their case and take up the stand as stated above: and this suit cannot be construed as a suit in ejectment. It is also his contention, that since the plaintiff claimed both warams and since the defendants claimed kudiwaram right in the suit lands, he filed this suit for declaration in respect of his both warams, as against the kudiwaram or occupancy right set up by the defendants, and that since they are in unlawful occupation ever since 1951, he prayed for recovery of possession of the suit lands, and therefore this suit cannot be construed as a simple suit in ejectment. It is also his contention, that even assuming that this suit can be construed as a simple suit for ejectment, still, he has proved his possession within 12 years prior to suit, and therefore he is entitled to recover possession of the suit lands. Thus, the whole question in this suit has now narrowed down to a single point, viz., whether this is a suit for ejectment and if so,



whether the plaintiff has established his possession within 12 years prior to suit. In the above circumstances, and in view of the stand taken by the learned counsel for the defendants, it is unnecessary to discuss about the oral and documentary evidence under these issues, and necessary findings can be given in respect of these issues, on the basis of the reasons stated above. The tribunal has already held that Pillarendal is a hamlet of Chinnavengavayal village. And therefore I find issue No.1 in the affirmative, in view of the fact that the defendants have conceded as stated above. The Tribunal has already held that Pillayarendal village is not an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) (d) of Act 1 of 1908, and hence issue No.2 does not now arise. In view of the reasons state above, and in view of the stand taken up by the defendants, issues 4 and 5 do not arise for consideration, but if a finding is necessary in respect of these issues, the same are found in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants."

7. Taking note of the plea of the defendants, the trial Court after considering numerous documents and oral evidence held that the plaintiff has proved his possession 12 years prior to the suit. A finding has also been rendered with respect to the cultivation by the plaintiff. The following passage would be apposite:

"Further, I am also of the opinion that even assuming that the defendants are entitled to give up their case set up in the course of the trial, and take this stand viz., that the plaintiff should prove his possession within 12 years, in view of the oral documentary evidence, I hold that the plaintiff has established his possession of the suit lands within 12 years prior to the suit. I therefore find under this issue that the plaintiff has title and possession within 12 years prior to the suit, and that the defendants have not acquired any right either by prescription or by adverse possession or by adverse possession and enjoyment."

8. In the result, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff with the following findings:

"18. Issue No.7:- If the plaintiff's suit is a simple and straight one for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit lands, on the ground that the defendants are



unlawfully squatting upon the respective plots, then the plaintiff cannot club all these defendants together and file a single suit against them, even though the suit lands are situate within Pilayarendal. But as already pointed out, the plaintiff and his predecessors have been all along contending that they are entitled to both warams; and that is their only contention against the defendants and others in respect of the entire lands comprised in Pillayarendal village. Therefore, the plaintiff filed this suit against all the defendants, who claimed kudiwaram right in the suit lands alleging that they are not entitled to such kudiwaram right, but on the other hand, he is entitled to both waram. No doubt, it is alleged in the plaint that each one of the defendants is in possession of certain stulls, as detailed in the plaint. But since the prayer is one for declaration against all the defendants who claim kudiwaram right in the entire lands situate in Pillayarendal, I am of the opinion that it cannot be said that the plaintiff should file a separate suit against each of the defendants who claim kudiwaram right and who is in possession of certain separate stulls. In the above view, I am of the opinion that the suit is not bad for misjoinder of parties. I find this issue accordingly.

19.Issue No.9:- In the result, in view of my findings on issues mentioned above, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs against all the defendants."

9.An appeal was filed in A.S.No.50 of 1959. The appeal was also dismissed by taking into consideration of the evidence adduced. The following paragraph would be apposite:

"8. Point No.3:- It has been merely stated at the end of paragraph 3 of the 1st defendant's written statement that the plaintiff or his predecessors never cultivated the suit lands at any time. The plea of the plaintiff not having been in possession within 12 years has not been specifically raised anywhere in the 1st defendant's written statement and no issue was rightly framed on that important question. But since the question was raised and arguments were heard by the lower Court the learned District Judge has dealt with it in paragraph 15 of his judgment with reference to the documents and oral evidence adduced by both sides since in a



suit for ejectment it is not merely enough for the plaintiff to make out his title to the property claimed by him but he has to prove his possession also within 12 years prior to suit. There is also no plea in the plaint of possession and dispossession. In this connection it is important to note that Ex.A-8 which is the earliest document marked on the side of the 1st respondent is an important piece of evidence which cannot be ignored. In that document there is reference to Swami Bogam the payment of which is one of the tests laid down in the Full Bench case in *Periannan & others Vs. Amman Kovil* (1). In EX.A-9 also there is mention of irruwaram. It is also significant to note that some of these defendants viz., defendants 3, 8, 12, 13 and 14 have signed these documents. Considering the other documents Exs.A-15 to A-17 which are also Sagupadi Muchalikas along with Exs.A-2 to A-6 also it is amply clear that the plaintiff alone must be held to have been in possession of the properties within 12 years prior to suit. In view of the documents mentioned above, it is unnecessary to consider the oral evidence in the case. For these reasons I find that the 1st plaintiff has succeeded on the question of possession also."

Thus, it is seen that a factual finding has been rendered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants after rejecting the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff or its predecessor never cultivated the suit land. The statement made on behalf of the counsel for the plaintiff that plaintiff is entitled for both warams was also taken note of.

10.The second appeal filed in S.A.No.1653 of 1961 and the further Letters Patent Appeal No.9 of 1965 was also dismissed. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, Act XXVI of 1963 came in. This was mentioned by the appellants before the Division Bench. It has been specifically stated that the suit lands were notified under Act XXVI of 1963. The Division Bench passed the following order:

"The findings are all factual and one of them is that the appellants are trespassers. These findings appear to be correct and call for no interference. Mr.Sankaran says that during the pendency of S.A.No.26 of 1963 the village in which the suit lands are situate has been notified under the provisions of Madras Act 26 of 1963 and that his clients' rights, if any, must be left open. It seems to us that there is nothing to be left open in view of the findings.



But if the appellants think that they have any right, they are of course at liberty to pursue their remedy under the Act. Any authority under the Act is bound to have regard to the findings in this litigation. On that view the appeal is dismissed. No Costs."

11. In the aforesaid civil proceedings the entire properties belonging to the plaintiff was included. An execution petition was filed and possession was taken. Thereafter, another suit was filed in O.S.No.360 of 1967 inter alia alleging that during the pendency of the proceedings some constructions have been put up. There was also an attempt to trespass the plaintiff property and preventing them from enjoying the suit land. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that the lands have vested with the Government under Act XXVI of 1963. The delivery made in the execution petition was only a paper one.

12. The learned Additional District Munsif, Devakottai took note of the proceedings including that of the settlement Tahsildar and decreed the suit filed for permanent injunction while giving a finding that the construction put up by the defendants with respect to present S.No.256 is the subject matter of the earlier proceedings. A finding has also been given that the Settlement Officer ought not to have given a finding that it is a natham poramboke. The following findings rendered by the learned Additional District Munsif are relevant:

"But from the contentions raised by some of the defendants in C.M.P.No.6192/65 in the High Court, it is oblivious that the defendants have raised superstructures in the punja lands of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is clear that the defendants have raised superstructures in the portions of punja lands of the plaintiff and that the present S.No.236 is a part of punja lands of the plaintiff. When High Court's decision in S.A.No.1653/61 and the letters patent appeal No.9/65 have held that all the Nanjas and Punjas in Pillayarendal are Iruwaram pannai lands of the Plaintiff, the classification of the punja lands of the plaintiff as Natham Poramboke in S.No.236 by the settlement authorities must be wrong. Letters patent appeal No.9/65 has clearly held that there is nothing to be left open to claim rights under the provisions of Madras Act 26 of 63 and that any authority under the Act is bound to have regard to the findings in this litigation. In such circumstances, the settlement Tahsildar

not to have held that S.No.236 is a Natham Poramboke. From the documents and the evidence available in this case, it is clear that the



plaintiff has got title to the suit properties and he has been in possession and enjoyment of all the Nanjas and Punjas except the superstructures on the date of suit. The defendants have also not disputed the plaintiff's title and possession of Nanja lands in S.No.257 and Punja land in S.No.254/2 excepting the superstructures raised by them in S.No.236. I have already found that S.No.236 is a portion of punja lands of the plaintiff. The defendants have not established that they are in possession and enjoyment of entire S.No.236 except the houses put up by them in S.No.236. On the other hand the plaintiff has proved that he is in possession and enjoyment of all the properties except the site wherein the superstructures sprang up by producing the delivery warrant and attakshi under Ex.A.2. In the said circumstances, I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has got title to the suit properties and that he was in possession on the date of suit. Hence I find these two issues in favour of the plaintiff."

13.Thus, the Civil Court has given a specific finding that the properties belonging to the plaintiff is not Natham Poramboke land. Thereafter, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Sivagangai granted patta in favour of the respondents for S.No.236/1. This order was challenged in R.A.No.156 of 1969, wherein patta was granted in favour of the plaintiff temple in respect of 14.93 acres of land. However, the judgment rendered in O.S.No.360 of 1967 has become final as there was no further appeal. Though the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order on 15.10.1973, a further appeal was made by R.A.No.47 of 1980 after a period of nearly 6 years. The appeal was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer, who once again granted patta in favour of the Temple. Once again the matter was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer on appeal. It is to be noted that at the time of passing the earlier order on 15.10.1973, the Assistant Settlement Officer took into consideration the report of the Karnam with respect to the cultivation made by the temple.

14.When the matter was remanded by the Inam appellate Tribunal in R.A.No.15 of 1992, dated 27.11.1995, the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order dated 19.07.1999, granting patta in favour of the appellants, absolutely without considering any materials but on the sole ground that the 1st respondent did not appear. The Assistant Settlement Officer did not take into consideration the findings recorded earlier in the order dated 15.10.1973 and did not set aside the said order specifically, while granting patta to the appellants. The said order was passed by just relying upon the



submissions made by the appellants and taking note of the absence of the 1st respondent. Thus, there was no discussion at all in the order passed.

15. An appeal was filed once again by the 1st respondent as against the said order. The Tribunal this time allowed the appeal taking into consideration of the earlier judgement between inter se parties. It is needless to state that the appellants claim right through the defendants who contested the proceedings as against the 1st respondent. The Tribunal was also pleased to hold that even other wise, Sections 13, 41, 44 of the Indian Evidence Act would govern the case and therefore, the 1st respondent would have been in a better position. Accordingly, the Assistant Settlement Officer was directed to issue a Ryotwari patta in favour of the appellants.

16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the judgment of the Civil Court deals with only the punja lands. The properties involved therein and the one before us are different. If title to both warams are considered while seeking patta, the requirements of Act XXX of 1948 are to be complied with. In any case, the 1st respondent will have to establish its right for patta. For that it has to establish that it was doing prior cultivation. The land in question is a poramboke land. The land in question would not come under the definition of private land. The judgment though between inter se parties would govern them normally, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court they are to be held per incurium. Since they are dwelling houses, appellants are entitled to protection under Section 15(4) of the Act. The entire lands are governed by the prior enactments. When a village is included under the definition of Estate, the land which forms part and parcel of it also gets included.

17. In support of his contentions reliance has been made on the following decision:

(i) *T.S.P.L.P. Chidambaram Chettiar (dead) by his legal representatives v. T.K.B. Santanaramaswami Odayar and others* [1968 2 SCR 754].

(ii) *Pollisetty Pultamma v. Kalluri Kameswara Rao* [1991-1-L.W. 16] and

(iii) *Srinivasan and 6 others v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Thiruchirapalli District* [1998-2-L.W. 189].


18. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that it is a litigation in a different form. In the subsequent suit filed in O.S.No.360 of 1973, the very same issue was raised and concluded. All the appellants are seeking their rights only through defendants in the earlier suit. They are not ryots but encroachers. They are not ryots. The findings have been concluded by inter se parties. Therefore, the appeal will have to be dismissed.



19. The proceedings recorded above would show that a decision has been rendered both by the statutory authorities and by the Civil Courts that the land in question could not come under the purview of Estate qua 1937 Act or 1948 Act. There was an adjudication made by the Settlement Officer confirmed by the Tribunal. The said issue was also answered in favour of the 1st respondent in O.S.No.151 of 1957 after asking for a specific reference from the Tribunal. The counsel for the defendants also gave up the said issue. In fact they have clearly admitted the title. On the contrary the counsel appearing for the 1st respondent in L.P.A. No.9 of 1965 has also stated that lands have been noted under Act XXVI of 1923. In such view of the matter we do not think that the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for appellants can be accepted. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in 1968 2 SCR 754 (cited supra) cannot help the case of the appellants. In the aforesaid case, factually the lands were found within the village and the whole village was included in the notification.

20. After the conclusion of the earlier proceedings, namely, civil proceedings which started in the year 1957, the position of the appellants stand on a different footings. In the Execution proceedings delivery was ordered. Thereafter, once again a decree was granted. Thus, the appellants are mere encroachers having no semblance of right. To put it differently, they can never claim themselves as ryots. Once the appellants did not have any right, they cannot question the patta granted in favour of the 1st respondent on 15.10.1973. All the issues and the findings rendered by the Civil Courts would substantiate the same. On the contrary the first respondent has satisfied the authorities about the personal cultivation. It is not open to the appellants to contend that the entire land will come under the purview of the Estate as defined under Madras Act XVIII of 1936. As discussed earlier, even according to the appellants they were notified only under the Act XXVI of 1963. Even otherwise, the finding rendered and as discussed by us would clearly show that the point raised for the first time before us can never be countenanced on merits also. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (cited supra) does not have any application to the case on hand. When the appellants are not even ryots and the first respondent has satisfied the authorities for issuance of a patta under Section 9 of Act XXX of 1963, then interference is not required by this Court.

21. The learned counsel for the appellants made substantial reliance upon the definition clause under Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. According to the learned counsel, to come under the purview of the Act, there must be private cultivation. Therefore, Section of 9 Act XXX of 1963, which speaks about Ryotwari Patta is not available to the respondent. There is a presumption under



Section 65 that the land under Inam is a Ryotwari land. The said contention cannot be countenanced. The definition of private land as seen from the Madras Act, 1908 has been incorporated by reference under Inam Abolition Act XXVI of 1963. Section 9 defines a private land within the meaning sub clause (b) of Clause (10) of Clause 3 of Estate Land Act, 1908. If one sees sub-clause (b), it is clear that a private land is different from a ryoti land. A land holder has to retain kudivaram. The earlier proceedings would clearly show that the respondent has satisfied the same. Even otherwise the land was included only under Act XXVI of 1963. Admittedly, as per Section 9(2), the requirement of cultivation for a continued period of 3 years within a period of 12 years has been dispensed with for religious institution like that of the 1st respondent herein. In such view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants.

22. One more submission has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant with respect to the construction made. A reliance has been made to Section 15 of the Act XXVI of 1963. We are of the view that the said contention also cannot be countenanced. Construction, if any, cannot be taken note of in view of the decisions made in the civil Court proceedings. Therefore, Section 15(4) of the Act also will not come to the aid of the appellants who are none other than the encroachers. The appellants have also not made any specific plea in this regard. They are bound by the decree in O.S.No.151 of 1957 and specifically O.S.No.360 of 1973. What the appellants have suffered decades ago by way of a judicial decision is sought to set aside in an indirect manner. Similarly, the issue with respect to classification of Natham Poramboke is dealt with in extenso in O.S.No.360 of 1973. Thus, looking from any perspective, we do not find any merit in this appeal.

23. Accordingly, this Special Tribunal Appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed.

Sd/-

Assistant Registrar (Crl.Side)

/True Copy/

Sub-Assistant Registrar

To

1. The Subordinate Judge, Inam Abolition Tribunal, Sivagangai.

2. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Madurai

+2ccs to M/s.A.L.Gandhimathi, Advocate, SR.No.80438

+One cc to Mr.M.R.S.Prabhu, Advocate, SR.No.80581

+One cc to Mr.S.Srinivasa Raghavan, Advocate, SR.No.80760

sj

RL/7C/13P/KK/SAR1/10/10/2017

Order in