

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ CRL.M.C. 2966/2015 & Crl.M.A. No.10612/2015

Date of Decision: February 26th, 2016

MUKESH SINGH Petitioner

Through: Mr. Mukesh Gupta, Advocate

versus

STATE Respondent

Through: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Additional
Public Prosecutor for the State with
Sub-Inspector Virendra Singh, Police
Station Crime Branch, Kotwali, Delhi

**CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI**

P.S.TEJI, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner, namely, Sh. Mukesh Singhla for quashing of FIR No.169/2012 dated 15.06.2012, under Sections 406/420/120B/34 IPC registered at Police Station Crime Branch on the basis of the settlement arrived at between the petitioner and the respondent no.2, namely, Sh. Y.S. Tomar.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has been identified to be the complainant/first informant in the FIR in question

by SI Virendra Singh.

3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the complainant lodged the FIR in question on the allegation that in May, 2011, Mr. Ashok Kumar, Mr. Tilak Raj, Mr. Heera Lal Aggarwal and Mr. Mukesh Singla approached the complainant through Mr. Sukhbir Panwar who is his partner in Medha Housing Pvt. Ltd. for selling three B.Ed. Colleges situated in Panipat, Haryana. An MOU was entered into by the parties. Rs. 1 Crore was given to Mr. Heera Lal Aggarwal and Rs. 10 lakhs were given as loan to Mr. Tilak Raj and 50% share in all the colleges was given to Mr. Ashok Kumar, Mr. Tilak Raj and Mr. Sukhbir Panwar. As per the MOU, 40% to 60% members were to be inducted by 31.07.2011 in all the colleges. But despite several meetings with the above named persons, the terms of the MOU were not complied with, rather, Mr. Heera Lal Aggarwal and Mr. Mukesh Singla ran away with the agreements of the property. Aggrieved by their conduct, the complainant asked them to return the money, but they all refused to pay back the same.

The petitioner was not charge sheeted as an accused person in the charge sheet dated 17.01.2015 and was kept in column No.12 of

the charge sheet. During the course of investigation, the respondent no.2 had fully and finally settled the disputes/matter amicably with the accused persons and thus he got his statement recorded on 25.10.2012 before the Ld. ACMM, Saket Courts, Delhi stating that he will assist the petitioner in getting the FIR in question quashed against him.

4. Respondent No.2 present in the Court, submitted that the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the statement of respondent no.2 before the Ld. ACMM, Saket on 25.10.2012, it is stated that respondent no.2 has received demand drafts No. 341766 for Rs. 9 Lacs, DD No. 341767 for Rs. 9 Lacs, DD No. 341768 for Rs. 5 Lacs, DD No. 341773 for Rs. 9 Lacs, DD No. 341774 for Rs. 9 Lacs and DD No. 341769 for Rs. 9 Lacs dated 05.10.2012 from Sh. Heera Lal Aggarwal and DD No. 880757 for Rs. 2.10 Lacs and DD No. 880758 for Rs. 7.90 Lacs both dated 15.10.2012 from Sh. Tilak Raj amounting to Rs. 60 Lacs in *toto*. It is further stated by respondent no.2 that he shall do all that is necessary to assist all the accused persons named in the FIR in question in quashing the same and all consequential proceedings before this Court

and shall cooperate with the accused persons as and when required. Respondent No.2 affirmed the contents of the aforesaid settlement. All the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitioner survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end. Statement of the respondent No.2 has been recorded in this regard in which he stated that he has entered into a compromise with the petitioner and has settled all the disputes with him. He further stated that he has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed.

5. In ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303*** Apex Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

“61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.”

6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in ***Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC***

466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in *Narinder Singh (Supra)* are as under:-

“**29.** In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be

quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

7. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The respondent no.2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question and has stated that the matter has been settled out of his own free will. As the matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there would be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legal proceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

8. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured; where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to

avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to circumvent the express provisions of law.

9. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of ***State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014*** and in the case of ***Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009*** has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

10. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.

In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of ***B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675*** the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that notwithstanding the fact that as per Section 320 (2) Cr.P.C., the offences under Sections 420/406 IPC are compoundable only with the

permission of this Court, there should be no impediment in quashing the FIR under these sections, if the Court is otherwise satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.

11. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of statement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrants to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to be quashed.

12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.169/2012 dated 15.06.2012, under Sections 406/420/120B/34 IPC registered at Police Station Crime Branch and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed against the petitioner.

13. This petition is accordingly disposed of.

14. Application CrI.M.A. No.10612/2015 is also disposed of.

(P.S.TEJI)
JUDGE

FEBRUARY 26, 2016
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