

FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.276/2015
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 19132/2014

Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Appearances, court's orders or directions and Registrar's orders	Court's or Judge's orders
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Mr. Hitesh P. Vyas for the Applicant
Mr. P. J. Pawar for the Respondent Nos.1 to 4.

CORAM : K. K. TATED, J.
DATE : JANUARY 20, 2016

P.C.:

1. Heard. This Application is for condonation of 85 days delay in preferring the appeal challenging the award dated 04/01/2014 passed by the MACT, Pune in MACP No.445/2011.

2. The learned counsel for the Applicant submits that in the present proceedings, the Tribunal held the Applicant is liable to pay compensation of Rs.16,95,000/- with 8% p.a. interest. He submits that because of financial difficulties there was delay on the part of the Applicant to make the present First Appeal. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the Applicant relies on paragraph 2 of the Civil Application. He submits that the Applicant has good chance of success in the matter. If delay is not condoned, irreparable loss and injury will be

caused to the Applicant. He submits that in the interest of justice this Hon'ble Court be pleased to condone the delay in preferring the First Appeal and matter may be heard on merits.

3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent vehemently opposed the Civil Application. He submits that the reasons given by the Applicant about the financial crisis cannot be said to be sufficient for condonation of delay. Hence, there is no substance in the Civil Application. Same be dismissed with costs.

4. It is to be noted that in the present proceedings the Applicant has specifically stated in paragraph 2 of the Civil Application that because of financial difficulties, there was delay. Though the Civil Application for condonation of delay was served on the Respondent, the Respondent failed to file Affidavit-in-Reply to oppose the same.

5. The Apex Court in the matter of N.Balkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 held that the object of fixing the time limit is not meant to destroy the rights. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the general welfare. Paragraph Nos.11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment read thus :

11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim *Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium* (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide *Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari*, 1969 SC 575 and *State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality*, AIR 1972 SC 749.

13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to

turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.”

6. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the Applicant and the law laid down by the Apex Court, I am satisfied that the Applicant has made out a case for allowing the Civil Application.

7. Hence, following order is passed:

a. Civil Application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) which reads thus:

“(a) That the delay of about 85 days in preferring the present appeal may kindly be condoned and the appeal may kindly be directed to be registered.”

b. Civil Application stands disposed off accordingly.

JUDGE