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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment delivered on: 30th November, 2015

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CRL.M.C. No.4814/2015

AFTAB KHAN

..... Petitioners

Represented by: Mr. Mahbob Alam and
Mr. Md. Sohail, Advs. with petitioner in person.

Versus

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR

..... Respondents

Represented by: Mr. Kamal Kr. Ghai, APP for the
State with SI Sanjeev Kumar, PS
Kalkaji, New Delhi.
Mr.M.A. Jamal, Adv for
respondent No.2 with R2 in
person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

Crl. M.A. 17392/2015 (for exemption)

Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Accordingly, the application is allowed.

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CRL.M.C. No.4814/2015

1. Vide the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioner seeks directions thereby quashing of FIR No.891/2015 registered at Police Station Kalkaji, New Delhi for the offences

punishable under Sections 392/34 of the IPC and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against him.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the aforesaid case was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2, Mr. Anil Gupta that on 12.10.2015, he was going to Kalkaji Temple by his Santro Car bearing no. DL-8CS-0927 and at about 9.30pm when he reached at R-3, Nehru Enclave, Near Apollo Hospital, Kalkaji, New Delhi, his car broke down. He was sitting inside the car and tried to start the same. Meanwhile, three boys came there on motorcycle and stopped near his car, one of them caught hold of his neck, another boy snatched his gold chain and third boy took out his ring which he was wearing in his right hand. He raised alarm and public gathered there. Resultantly, two boys ran away from the spot on a motorcycle. However, he caught one boy, i.e., petitioner with the help of public.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner came to Delhi, first ever in life, on 11.10.2015 by train as he had to board a flight for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 14.10.15. Since he was going to such a country where the liquor is prohibited therefore, he consumed liquor heavily on the said date and was roaming on the road when this incident had taken place. Public gathered and he was also caught and handed over to the police.

4. He further submits that the petitioner is nowhere connected to other two accused. He does not know them and never met them earlier. Moreover,

nothing recovered from him. Thus, he has been falsely implicated in this case.

5. He further submits that the respondent no.2/complainant has compromised the matter with the petitioner after knowing this fact. Therefore, he does not want to pursue the case further against him.

6. Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court through learned counsel named above. He is identified by SI Sanjeev Kumar, IO of the case. This Court verified from the IO whether the petitioner is connected with this case. He very fairly conceded that the petitioner is not connected with this case. He was found in the state of heavy intoxication and he was creating nuisance, therefore, he was booked in this case under misunderstanding that he was with the culprits.

7. A copy of the IRCTC's E-Ticket dated 09.10.2015 is placed on record which reveals that the petitioner arrived New Delhi on 11.10.2015 from Howrah. A copy of E-ticket dated 01.10.2015 for boarding a flight from Delhi to Bahrain on 14.10.2015 is also annexed with the petition.

8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that matter is at the initial stage of investigation. Since the parties have amicably settled the matter and the respondent No.2/ complainant does not wish to pursue the case against the petitioner, therefore, looking to the overall circumstances, no useful purpose will be served in continuing the proceedings. Thus, the State has no objection if the present petition is allowed.

9. Undisputedly, offence punishable under Section 392 IPC is not compoundable, however, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this Court has power to accept the compromise.

10. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:-

“61..... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any

compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

11. The aforesaid view has been affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of **Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466** wherein held as under:-

29. *In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:-*

29.1 *Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.*

29.2. *When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:*

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. *Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.*

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or*

arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.*

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

12. Both the parties who are present in the Court today, approbate the aforesaid settlement dated 24.11.2015 and undertake to remain bound by the same.

13. In view of the facts noted above, considering the settlement arrived at between the parties and the statement of respondent No.2 and the learned counsel for the State and IO of the case, and that fact that the persons involved in the instant case are still remain to be arrested, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings against the petitioner arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

14. Consequently, FIR No.891/2015 registered at Police Station Kalkaji, New Delhi for the offences punishable under Sections 392/34 of the IPC and all proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby quashed qua petitioner.

15. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed.

16. Order *dasti* to the parties.

**SURESH KAIT
(JUDGE)**

NOVEMBER 30, 2015

Afa/jg