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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment delivered on: 20th October, 2015

+ CRL.M.C. 4440/2015

RAMINDER SINGH BAKSHI & ORS Petitioners
Represented by: Mr. Rajesh Arya, Adv.

versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR Respondents
Represented by: Mr. Sudershan Joon, APP for
State with SI. Mohd. Haroon, PS-Tilak Nagar.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

Crl. M.A. Nos. 15725/2015 to 15727/2015 (for exemptions)

Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Accordingly, the applications are allowed.

+ **CRL.M.C. 4440/2015**

1. Vide the present petition, petitioners seek directions thereby quashing of FIR No.34/2012 registered at Police Station Tilak Nagar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom against them, including the look-out circular dated 16.11.2012 and the non-bailable warrants issued against petitioner no.1.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the aforesaid case was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2,

namely, Ms. Jaspreet Kaur Bakshi. Thereafter, parties arrived at a amicable settlement before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, High Court of Delhi vide dated 13.10.2015. As per the settlement, petitioners agreed to pay an amount of Rs.28,00,000/- as full and final settlement. Out of which an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid on 12.10.2015 and an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- has been paid today in the Court. However, as per the settlement remaining amount of Rs.7,00,000/- shall be paid at the time of withdrawal of the petition filed under 125 Cr.P.C. by the respondent no. 2. Thus, the present petition may be quashed.

3. Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court. She has been duly identified by SI Mohd. Haroon, Investigating Officer of the case. Respondent no. 2 submits that the matter has been settled between the parties before the Centre mentioned above and she has received an amount of Rs.21,00,000/- out of the settlement amount and the petitioners agreed to pay the remaining amount of Rs.7,00,000/- at the time of withdrawal of her petition filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which is pending before the Trial Court. She further submits that if the petitioners bound by their statements made in the settlement dated 13.10.2015, she has no objection if the present petition is allowed.

4. On the other hand, Id. APP appearing on behalf of the State submits that after investigation, police has filed the chargesheet, however, the charges are yet to be framed. He further submits that present case is of the year 2012 and pertains to matrimonial disputes. Though, the matter has been settled between the parties and respondent no.2 has come forward to quash the FIR mentioned above, however, in this process, Govt. machinery has been put into motion and precious public time of the

Court has been consumed. Thus, if this Court is inclined to quash the FIR mentioned above, heavy cost be imposed upon the petitioners.

5. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58.However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

6. While recognizing the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, the aforesaid dictum has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in ***Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466***. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

- (i) ends of justice, or*
- (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.*

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family

disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.*

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of*

offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

7. In the case of ***Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58***, wherein the Supreme Court in respect of the matrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably

and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed....”

8. Both the parties are present in the Court today, approbate to the aforesaid settlement dated 13.10.2015 and undertake to remain bound by the same.

9. Since the subject matter of this FIR is essentially matrimonial, which now stands mutually and amicably settled between the parties and the complainant is no longer interested in supporting the prosecution because of which, its chances of success in the matter are now greatly diminished. Therefore, in view of the law discussed above, in the facts and circumstances as noted above, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings

arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

10. Consequently, FIR No.34/2012 registered at Police Station Tilak Nagar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed against the petitioners. Consequently, the look-out circular dated 16.11.2012 is also recalled.

11. Before parting with the instant petition, I find force in the submission of the ld. APP for the State on the issue of cost. However, Counsel for the petitioners on instructions from father of petitioner no.1, Sardar Amarjit Singh Bakshi (petitioner no. 2 herein) has come forward and stated that petitioners are ready to contribute an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- for the welfare purposes.

12. Accordingly, petitioners are directed to pay an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- in favour of the Superintendent, '*Nirmal Chaya*', in the account of '*Welfare Fund for Children and Destitute Women*' Nirmal Chaya, Jail Road, Tihar, New Delhi.

13. The said Superintendent is directed to keep the above amount in the form of FDR initially for 02 years with any Nationalized bank and get it renewed periodically. The interest accrued thereon shall be utilized for the well being of the children and the destitute women.

14. In view of above, the petition is allowed.

**SURESH KAIT
(JUDGE)**

OCTOBER 20, 2015/jg