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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment delivered on: 11th September, 2015

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CRL.M.C. No.3760/2015

DEEPAK SEHGAL

..... Petitioner

Represented by: Mr.Bharat Sharma, Adv with
petitioner in person.

versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS

..... Respondents

Represented by: Mr.Hirein Sharma, APP for
the State with SI Uma Datta,
PS Mangolpuri, Delhi in
person.

Mr.Akshay Bhatia, Adv for
respondent Nos.2 to 5 with
all three respondents in
person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

Crl.M.A.13311/2015 (for exemption)

Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Accordingly, the application is allowed.

CRL.M.C. No.3760/2015

1. By way of this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioners seek quashing of FIR No.318/2013 registered at Police Station Mangol Puri, Delhi, for the offences

punishable under Sections 285/304A/338 of the IPC and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against him.

2. Learned counsel for petitioners submit that petitioner is proprietor of M/s Deepak Tyre Soles situated at BC-236, Mangol Puri, Delhi and engaged in the business of repairing the tyres and reselling the old tyres after refurbishment. On 21.05.2013, at about 05.30PM one of his employees Pancham, now deceased brought the cane of vulcanizing solution at the ground floor for repair work and petitioner directed him to keep the said can in the store of the shop for which employee Pancham assured that he will be keep the same in a minute. At about 07.00PM, there was an electric short circuit in the shop which led towards the can of vulcanizing solution and thereafter the cane caught fire and alleged incident happened wherein three persons namely Vijay Kumar, Mahesh Pandey and Pancham died. On the complaint of respondent No.2, above noted FIR was registered, who has suffered no injury in the incident. After investigation, police charge sheeted the petitioner, however, charges are yet to be framed against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner approached the wives of all three deceased persons i.e. respondent Nos.3 to 5 and agreed to pay an amount of Rs.4.00 Lac to respondent No.3; Rs.4,01,603/- to respondent No.4; and Rs.4,03,494/- to respondent No.5. All three widows of the three deceased persons have accepted the abovesaid sum and thus, do not want to pursue the case any further against the petitioner.

3. Respondent Nos.2 to 5, are personally present in the Court through counsel Sh Akshay Bhatia and have also been duly identified by the Investigating Officer of the case SI Uma Datta. Learned counsel for

respondent Nos.2 to 5, on instructions of said respondents does not dispute as to what is stated by learned counsel for petitioner and stated that on receipt of abovesaid sum, respondent No.3 to 5 do not wish to pursue the case against petitioner. The respondent No.2 is only the informant of the FIR. They have no objection, if the present petition is allowed.

4. Learned APP appearing on behalf of the State submits that police has filed the charge sheet and notice is yet to be served against the petitioner. In the aforesaid incident, deceased Vijay Kumar was aged 60 years; and deceased Mahesh Pandey and Pancham were of 45 and 35 years respectively. Latter lost their lives at the young age and the compensation given by the petitioner in favour of widows of deceased persons is less. Accordingly, he may be put to certain terms, if this Court is inclined to allow the instant petition.

5. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another***¹, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58.However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim

¹ (2012) 10 SCC 303

have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

6. While recognizing the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, the aforesaid dictum has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in **Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr**². The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal

² 2014 6 SCC 466

proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. *Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.*

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.*

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is*

a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the*

evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

7. Keeping in view the legal position as discussed above, the settlement arrived at between the parties, compensation amount already paid by petitioner and statement of respondent Nos.2 to 5, no purpose would be served by directing the petitioner to face the trial. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

8. Consequently, FIR No.318/2013 registered at Police Station Mangol Puri, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 285/304A /338 of the IPC including all proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

9. Before parting this order, I find force in the submissions of learned APP for the State regarding certain terms to be put upon petitioner. However, the petitioner has come forward and submits that he is ready to

pay further amount of Rs.1.00 Lac each to respondent Nos.4 & 5 and Rs.50,000/- Lac in favour of respondent No.3.

10. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to pay a sum of Rs.1.00 Lac each to respondent Nos.4 & 5 and Rs.50,000/- to respondent No.3 within a period of four weeks from today. The proof of such payments shall be placed on the record of learned Trial Court under intimation to the SHO/ Investigating Officer concerned. In case of non-payment of abovesaid amount by the petitioner, respondent Nos.3 to 5 are at liberty to approach this Court.

11. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed.

12. A copy of this order be given *dasti* to the learned counsel for the parties.

**SURESH KAIT
(JUDGE)**

SEPTEMBER 11, 2015

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