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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment delivered on: 28th September, 2015

+ CRL.M.C. 3522/2015
RAJU SEHGAL AND ANR Petitioners
Represented by: Ms. Sumita Kapil, Adv.

Versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR Respondents
Represented by: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP
for the State with SI Shiv Dev Singh, PS
Defence Colony, New Delhi.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

+ **CRL.M.C. 3509/2015**

1. Vide the present petition; petitioners seek directions thereby quashing of FIR No. 166/2011 registered at PS-Defence Colony, New Delhi for the offences punishable under Sections 384/387/451/506/120-B/34 IPC against them.

2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the aforesaid case was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2, Ms. Mini Bahadur. Due to intervention of common friends and relatives, the matter has been settled between the parties and petitioners have tendered unconditional apology to the respondent no.2. Thus, respondent no.2 does not want to pursue the case further against the petitioners.

3. Respondent no. 2 is personally present in the Court with her Counsel. She has been identified by SI Shiv Dev Singh, Investigating Officer of the case. Ld. Counsel on instructions submits that the matter has been settled between the parties amicably and respondent no. 2 has no complaint whatsoever against the petitioners. Thus respondent no. 2 does not want to pursue the case further against the petitioners and if the present petition is allowed, she has no objection.

4. On the other hand, Ld. APP submits that in this case charge-sheet has already been filed, charges have been framed, and the case is pending for prosecution evidence. The present matter was registered in the year 2011 and four years have passed and due to the present case, government machinery came into motion and public time and money has been consumed. Pursuant to settlement between the parties, if this Court is inclined to allow the petition, petitioners may be put to some terms.

5. In view of the overall circumstances; and looking to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, which has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; and also ***Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014) 6 SCC 466***, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and

exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 *Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.*

29.2. *When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:*

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. *Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.*

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.*

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence*

based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

6. Keeping in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of ***Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra)***, settlement arrived at between the parties and the statement of respondent no. 2, I hereby quash FIR No. 166/2011 registered at PS-Defence Colony, New Delhi and all proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioners.

7. Before parting with this order, I find force in the submission of learned APP for State regarding putting the petitioners to some terms. At this stage, petitioner no.1 has come forward and submitted that he is ready to contribute a sum of Rs.30,000/- for some welfare purposes.

8. Accordingly, the petitioner no.1 is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000/- in favour of the 'Delhi Police Martyrs Fund' within two weeks from today. Proof of the same shall be placed on record under intimation to the Investigating Officer/SHO concerned.

9. Accordingly, the petition is allowed.

10. A copy of this order be given *dasti* to the learned counsel for the parties.

**SURESH KAIT
(JUDGE)**

SEPTEMBER 28, 2015
RS