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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment delivered on: 04th August, 2015

+ **CRL.M.C. No.2326/2015**

KUSHAL RAJORA Petitioner
Represented by: Mr.Yatendra Nagar, Adv with
petitioner in person.

Versus

THE STATE & ANR. Respondents
Represented by: Mr.M.N.Dudeja, APP for the State
with SI Rakesh, PS Geeta Saket,
New Delhi in person.
Respondent No.2 in person.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

1. By way of this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.195/2012 registered at Police Station Saket, New Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 419/420/467/468/471 of the IPC and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against him.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the aforesaid case was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2, namely, Sh D.P. Jain. After completion of investigation, charge sheet has been filed and after framing of charges, matter is pending for trial. He further submits that respondent No.2 and the petitioner have settled the

matter. Thus, respondent No.2 does not wish to pursue the case against petitioner and submits that present petition may be allowed.

3. Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court, who has been duly identified by the Investigating Officer SI Rakesh Kumar. He states that he has forgiven the petitioner keeping in view his age and the offence committed being first offence. The respondent No.2 has received an amount of Rs.37,500/-, whereas he was cheated for an amount of Rs.25,000/-. Thus, he does not want to pursue the case further against petitioner.

4. Learned APP appearing on behalf of the State submits that on the same date petitioner was involved in other case which was registered at PS Preet Vihar, Delhi. If this Court is inclined to allow the present petition, heavy costs may be imposed upon the petitioner as the government machinery came into motion costing public time and money.

5. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ***Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303***, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58.However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating

to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

6. While recognizing the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, the aforesaid dictum has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in ***Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466***. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. *When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:*

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. *Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.*

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.*

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society*

and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned*

above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

7. Keeping in view the legal position as discussed above, the fact that respondent has forgone the petitioner, the age of petitioner and amount received by respondent from petitioner, no purpose would be served by directing the petitioner to face the trial. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

8. Consequently, FIR No.195/2012 registered at Police Station Saket, New Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 419/420/467/468/471 of the IPC and all proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

9. Though, I find force in the submissions of learned APP for the State for putting the petitioner to some terms, however considering his

age and financial status, I refrain myself from imposing any cost upon him.

10. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed.

11. A copy of this order be given *dasti* to the learned counsel for the parties.

**SURESH KAIT
(JUDGE)**

AUGUST 04, 2015

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